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preFace
Paolo Garonna*
“The problems that our countries need to sort out are not the same as in 1950. But
the method remains the same: a transfer of power to common institutions, majority
rule and a common approach to finding a solution to problems are the only answer in
our current state of crisis” (Jean Monnet, L’Europe et la nécessité, 1974)
europe is BacK
The European economic policy environment in 2017 has registered a significant up-
turn. The gloomy prospects foreseen until recently have given way to a return of con-
fidence and a burst of self-esteem and determination.
Part of the change is in the perceptions, the popular mood and the expectations
for the future, as the worst scenarios daunting the aftermath of past shocks did not
materialize. But there is more to it. The economic recovery has picked vigour and
spread broadly across the continent. The ﬁnancial sector appears in a much stron-
ger shape after the thorniest legacy issues have been addressed. Investment growth
has turned positive and accelerating. Also, the labour market is showing ﬂedgling
signs of improvement. The geo-political risks linked to European elections have sub-
sided. 
All this looks obviously reassuring. After all, Brexit, while still looking threate-
ning and obscure, did not open the way to the disintegration of the EU. And the new
Trump administration did not pull the sprint to emboldened nationalism, protectionism
and anti-establishment attitudes in Europe. Fears created by terrorist attacks, ille-
gal immigration and global war risks have contributed positively to raising aware-
ness of the seriousness of the matters at stake, and to seek a new sense of responsi-
bility and a more enlightened leadership in the “old world”.
The common sentiment prevailing now can be summarized in the following pro-
positions: the European agenda must move on; concrete and practical solutions must
be found on the most urgent questions; this will require a compromising attitude,
give and take and a mind-set open to innovation; the time has come to make it work,
correct the worst imbalances, and prepare for the future. European leaders, be it in
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governments, European institutions, business, ﬁnancial intermediaries, all stake-
holders, and the citizenship at large, must be capable to work together, share the bur-
dens of change, and deliver on what peoples basically need and expect of them.
An unprecedented window of opportunity has been unlocked. It must be ﬁlled
with content, substantive planning and priorities, so that we can move on swiftly to
concrete action and deliverables. 
“FiNaNce For groWTH” is FiNally WorKiNg
“Finance for growth” is a relatively new approach to policy making in Europe, which
has been at the centre of the discussions and policy analyses of the previous editions
of the Rome Investment Forum since the end of 2014. Until recently, this new con-
cept, though innovative and promising, had remained elusive. 
The idea that reforms and development in the ﬁnancial sector should drive a new
phase of economic development in Europe had gained increasing traction and sup-
port in oﬃcial circles. But how this policy approach would translate in more growth
and jobs, better functioning markets and more cohesive societies, proved to be qui-
te hard to demonstrate and, even more, to secure the support of public opinion at
large. Above all, concrete outcomes were missing, and the recovery seemed to drag
on by-and-large fragile and uncertain. 
In theory it looked plausible that a more stable integrated and developed ﬁnancial
sector could substantially contribute to striking a better balance between security
and innovation, stability and growth, and help produce a healthier and more cohesive
European integration process. But in practise… Has it worked? Can it work? At ti-
mes, it seemed more a gamble than a calculated risk taking. And then came Brexit,
making ﬁnancial development even more haphazard, and putting into question the
future itself of European ﬁnance.
But now the wind has changed. Moreover, it is blowing in the right direction. “Fi-
nance for growth” has started to respond to expectations and deliver on its promi-
ses. After the stagnation of the previous period, outstanding bank credit to non-ﬁ-
nancial enterprises has had a signiﬁcant revival since 2015. This reﬂects among other
things the healthier conditions of the banking sector, which is more capitalised, with
better asset quality and a stronger balance sheet. Concerns for the high stock of Non-
Performing Loans (NPLs) have receded, considering the improvements underway,
well above expectations. The most diﬃcult components of the legacy question, par-
ticularly after the pragmatic decisions of June and July 2017, appear to be behind
our shoulders. This rosier picture is completed by recovery in proﬁtability and bet-
ter quotations on the stock exchange. So, Banking Union is showing resilience and
vitality, and it is starting to take hold. Capital Markets Union is also gradually mo-
ving on, after taking stock of the terrible shock of Brexit. There is a growing awa-
reness of the importance of providing alternative sources of ﬁnancing for SMEs and
infrastructure projects, and the ﬁrst signals are emerging of shifting practises: mi-
nibonds, IPOs, ﬁntech, venture capital, securitization, etc. In the mid-term review
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of the Action Plan, it is shown that 20 out of the 33 actions envisaged there have been
completed, while the others are well underway. Above all, the Plan has been revamped
and adapted to account for the likely impact of Brexit. The CMU response to the for-
midable challenge has meant more determination and more ambitious goals, including
in the ﬁelds of taxation (the debt equity bias), insolvency legislation, proportiona-
lity and the strengthening of the supervisory authorities. 
As far as investment is concerned, the Juncker Plan is making progress, fully on
schedule in its implementation. Moreover, the Plan has been expanded and exten-
ded, banking on the growing recognition that it represents a cultural shift in the ap-
proach to bridging the investment gap and in the relationship between public fun-
ding and the market. 
In sum, in the last period we have seen an intensiﬁcation of policy eﬀorts for ﬁ-
nancial reform both at national and European levels, and at the same time a mar-
ked improvement in the economic outlook, with an economic recovery that appe-
ars not only more robust and wide-spread, but also more consistent with fundamentals,
and therefore more sustainable. Moreover, the two trends seem to amount to more
than a simple correlation. A causal relationship linking ﬁnancial development and
economic growth can be argued, in line with the “ﬁnance for growth” philosophy,
even though more data, and time, will be needed for getting a full proof. 
a NeW policy eNViroNmeNT: europe’s adulTHood
The European awakening is taking place in a policy scenario that is undergoing pro-
found changes and facing unprecedented challenges. The Global Risks Report of the
World Economic Forum at the beginning of 2017 showed remarkable foresight in an-
ticipating the major challenges of the year: extreme weather events and natural di-
sasters, large-scale migration pressure, terrorist attacks, cybercrime, and social and
political polarization. To make the picture bleaker, add war and instability, the thre-
at of nuclear confrontation and the growing appeal of protectionism. 
Turmoil and disruption inevitably generate chain reactions that may lead into
positive or negative directions depending among other things on the clear thinking
of leaders and the maturity of the public opinion. On both scores, the response co-
ming from the “old world” has been reassuring, and promises well for the future. The
wave of electoral outcomes in signiﬁcant European countries dispelled the scourge
of populist uprising and triumphant anti-establishment coalitions. During 2017, the
perception of geo-political risk aﬀecting the economic and social landscape in Eu-
rope improved signiﬁcantly. Many commentators and forecasters attributed to chan-
ges in geo-political risks the major responsibility for the substantial upward revisions
in conﬁdence and economic growth estimates that have being issued by the major
sources of economic forecasts (e.g. the IMF).
European peoples and their leaders are gradually realizing that major discon-
tinuities are taking place in the global exchequer. Not only in terms of the scale and
depth of the challenges we are facing, but also, and above all, in relation to the new
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players, and the traditional partnerships and alliances we have been counting on all
along the post-war period. It is undoubted that these alliances and partnerships have
represented one of the major factor underlying the long period of peace stability and
prosperity Europe, and the developed world, has enjoyed. These discontinuities have
created fears and uncertainty, but also a new sense of resolve and adulthood. It is
not easy for instance for the 27 EU member countries after Brexit to come to terms
with the fact that, at least for the time being, they have to give up the belief that they
can count on the British to provide leadership, economic and social models, best prac-
tise and inspiration in the process of European integration. This has obviously a lot
to do with the key role that London has plaid, and even more could play, in a fully
functioning European Capital Markets Union. But it goes well beyond. It calls into
question the primary role that Britain has plaid in projecting a pro-market, liberal,
empiricist and “open society” culture into the European construction. From now on-
wards, continental Europe will have to do without it. And it will be a big loss. The
UK will be looking inward, searching for a redeﬁnition of its identity and mission,
and its relationship with Europe, and the world. 
Likewise, the US superpower appears vulnerable and polarized, uncertain on how
to accomplish its role of upholding freedom and democracy in the world. For the ﬁrst
time in its recent history, the U.S. probably will not be able to act as a catalyst for Eu-
ropean integration, as a guarantee of peace and stability at the regional and global
level. The Europeans will have to do more for their defence, for safeguarding their
competitiveness in the world economy, for promoting a rules-based free trade and
investment system, for ﬁghting terrorism, and addressing the challenges and con-
ﬂicts arising in their “near abroad”, from the Middle East to Russia, from the Gulf
to Africa, from the Euro-Mediterranean to Central Asia. 
Europeans therefore have entered adulthood. They must take in their own hands
their destiny. They must invest more in foreign policy, multilateral and bilateral coo-
peration, and defence. They will have to take responsibility and ﬁght for maintaining
and enhancing the global trade system, managing demographic pressures and te-
chnological change, cooperating for conﬂict prevention and resolution, climate chan-
ge and the environment, democratic values and the rule of law. They will have to be
more eﬀective in ﬁghting against terrorism and patrolling their common borders.
Orphans, but heirs, of the fundamental Anglo-Saxon and transatlantic roots of the
European ethos. 
It is a quantum change, and a heavy burden to carry. But European leaders seem
to have understood the lesson, and perceived what and how much is at stake. A win-
dow of opportunity is there, and should be exploited. Moderatism, vision and de-
termination are the key words of mainstream European politics, and the future of
Europe ﬁgures prominently in their programs. Public opinion seems overall to fol-
low suit. 
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“il Tempo È galaNTuomo” “Time is aN HoNouraBle maN”
“Le temps retrouvé” is the seventh and last volume of Marcel Proust’s masterpiece
“In search of lost time”. Marcel, the protagonist, comes to term with his past, and di-
scovers that things acquire with time a different and more profound meaning. The
equivalent say in English is:” Truth is the daughter of time”. Many commentators
thought that the time elapsing from the British referendum to the various elections
(until the German one), covering the most part of 2017, would be wasted, since no
major decision could be taken at the European level. The various consultations, gre-
en papers, opinions and conventions would be mere stopgaps, useful only to gain time.
I admit I was thinking along those lines myself. I felt the sense of urgency was mis-
sing for adopting a few measures that were necessary to accelerate the transition,
complete the Banking Union and fix the Euro. 
We were wrong. The time spent discussing the future of Europe has not been lost.
It was precious, and did contribute signiﬁcantly to the change in the policy landscape.
There has been a considerable mobilisation of minds, energies, resources and in-
stitutions around this topic with contributions from academics, think-tanks, business,
political parties and institutional players. It was felt that the question had a burning
impact on everyday’ s life and the future of ordinary citizens. The process itself ge-
nerated ownership and participation. Populist, anti-EU and nationalist rhetoric were
muted, and understood that the popular sentiment versus Europe, even in the most
rebellious anti-establishment quarters, should not be taken for granted and exploi-
ted with impunity.
The discussion is still raging, and has produced a host of visionary and practi-
cal suggestions, with various degrees of ingenuity feasibility and wisdom. It is pro-
bably still early day to try to distil agreed structured programs out of it. But the ge-
neral sentiment that is accompanying it has already been reaped, and has produced
a signiﬁcant environmental beneﬁt. With three unambiguous indications: on, su-
stainable and multi-speed.
On. “Adelante Pedro, con juicio”. The European integration process must go on.
There is no alternative. With gradualism, pragmatism, but without any hesitation.
Only a more integrated Europe can be more authoritative and eﬀective in pursuing
her citizens’ interests and her mission in the world.
Sustainable. Europe, like Rome, was not built in a day, and will not. A long-term
vision and plan is needed, and steadfast determination in moving on step by step. 
Multi-speed. This principle is now accepted, has been elaborated upon by oﬃ-
cial statements (lastly the State of the Union address in 2017), and applied in prac-
tise in several occasions. Nobody should be left behind if she is willing to participate.
But no-one should have a veto power, and impress to the process the speed of the
slowest wagon. 
These conclusions may look vague and abstract. But they respond ﬁrmly to op-
posite principles, and practises that were taking roots in the European narrative of
the past. A strong reaction to: “we have gone too far, too soon”; “from one quick ﬁx
to the next”; resignation to the paralysis imposed by the laggards. 
Ambitions therefore must be set up at the level that is required by the challen-
ges and the demands of the citizens, not what bureaucracies and national politicians
think is realistic. This puts on top of the list issues on which governments have been
recalcitrant for a long time, and progress has been lacking. Defence and the com-
mon ﬁght against terrorism. Illegal immigration and the common control of the Schen-
gen borders. Relationships with our close neighbours, from Russia to Turkey, from
South Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean. A European budget suﬃcient to pro-
vide backstops to the Economic and Monetary Union, anticyclical buﬀers against asym-
metric shocks, and support for ﬁlling the investment and infrastructure gaps that drag
down the growth potential in Europe. 
THe aVoidaBle clasH BeTWeeN THe desiraBle aNd THe aBsoluTely Necessary
We should not expect, neither wish, that the exciting discussion on the future of Eu-
rope finish quickly, and that we move then quickly to action. This discussion is here
to stay. It is not only a means to an end, but it is a policy objective in itself, because it
engages all the relevant players, including the citizens, in an exercise of democratic
participation and institution building. It prepares the ground for a new social contract,
and fills the gap between Europe and the people, the local communities and the Eu-
ropean techno structures, the contingent pressures and the construction of the future. 
The dialogue on the future of Europe should be continued, extended, deepened
and made more systematic. The ﬁnancial community should not only be an active
participant in this dialogue, but a promoter and a leader, in line with the “ﬁnance
for growth” philosophy. It should be also understood that some of the agreed solu-
tions that are emerging do not lend themselves to easy and quick implementation.
Take the question of Brexit, which, as much as all would like to reach right away cla-
rity and pragmatic solutions, will require deeper understanding, imaginative com-
promises and a long digestion of the practicalities involved. Defence will require clo-
se coordination with NATO, a new relationship with the UK and, in my view, with
Russia. Support for Africa implies a new focus on our “near abroad” in the Medi-
terranean and South East Europe, a reappraisal of the EU enlargement prospects,
and a leap forward in the common foreign and security policy. The most ambitious
proposals for ﬁscal Union, the ones requiring debt mutualisation, large-scale inco-
me transfers and risk sharing will not pass unless a climate of mutual trust can be
restored, and the fear of moral hazard can be neutralised; which once more will take
probably time, and persistent mutual engagement. The long view is Europe’s best
ally, and dialogue her most powerful tool. 
But long-term Europe cannot aﬀord to become complacent with the short-term
dangers and vulnerabilities that confront us. Instead, it is exactly in the present fa-
vourable environment that we ﬁnd the best opportunity for tackling the structural
weaknesses and imbalances, which are still there and must be addressed. This op-
portunity should not be missed. It requires to act quickly and boldly to maintain and
repair the most serious faults in the structure. 
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sTrucTural WeaKNesses iN THe europeaN policy FrameWorK
The past crises have clearly shown where Europe is most vulnerable. They also of-
fered indication on the required adjustments. Therefore, the diagnosis of what does
not work and must be fixed is not new. The needed therapies are also well known.
As a matter of fact, following Jean Monnet method, after each stage of the crisis, a
pragmatic response has been found and swiftly acted upon. European integration
has made progress in this way: as a pragmatic reaction to crisis. Think for instance
how, after the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, the Banking Union was agreed upon
in order to break the vicious bank – sovereign debt circle. Think also of how rapidly
the Banking Union new institutional framework has been set up and made opera-
tional, including the most delicate shift from the bail-out to the bail-in principle; which
amounts to a “cultural revolution” not only in banking practises, but above all in the
investors’ perception of risks (particularly at the retail level). 
However, the response to the past crises has not been complete and thoroughgoing.
It is still unﬁnished business. This has repercussions in the functioning of Europe-
an institutions, and in the economic performance of the Union. I refer in particular
to the Economic and Monetary Union that from the start was supposed to require
comprehensive reforms in order to function properly. 
Four aspects come to the fore:
1. The persistent fragmentation of the ﬁnancial services single market, in spite of
the Banking Union
2. The asymmetric and uncoordinated adjustments to common shocks
3. The lack of a central demand management and stabilisation function
4. The insuﬃcient economic convergence of national economic performance
European banks still operate in a fragmented market, with great obstacles to cross
border operations and very limited capital flows between EU countries. Cross bor-
der banks face additional burdens in terms of liquidity and capital requirements. In
spite of the Single Supervisor and the single rule-book, and with a common currency,
banks still operate in multiple jurisdictions, where there are significant national di-
scretions and different practises in implementing banking rules. We are far even from
recovering pre-crisis level of cross-border market interconnection. Lack of a single
Europe-wide capital market prevents risk-sharing through debt and equity, creating
bottlenecks of liquidity and affecting the transmission channels of monetary poli-
cy.
A single currency requires symmetric adjustments between surplus and deﬁcit
countries, determining otherwise economic and political tensions and a deﬂationary
bias in economic policies. In other terms, with a single currency, restoring relative
competitiveness requires symmetric adjustments in terms of internal devaluations,
real wages and labour costs, structural reforms. Otherwise, one would need fede-
ral transfers and suﬃcient ﬁscal capacity to maintain cross-border ﬂows and cushion
asymmetric shocks (this is the case of the U.S.). So far economic policy coordina-
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tion has not been able to achieve consistency and burden sharing in the adjustment
to the economic cycle.
Forcing economic convergence through ﬁscal constraints as in the Stability Pact
has not worked. For two reasons. First, because the rules of the Pact were not applied
strictly, neither on deﬁcit nor on surplus countries. But also, and more importantly,
because when the rules – due to market pressures – became more stringent (as for in-
stance in occasion of the sovereign debt crisis), the asymmetric adjustment meant that
the correction was severely deﬂationary and created a double dip recession. Where
austerity failed, ﬂexibility accompanied by economic reforms enabled a more balan-
ced recovery. But the adjustment was slow and painful, much more than necessary.
FixiNg ecoNomic aNd moNeTary uNioN: aN urgeNT TasK
The outcome of these persisting structural deficiencies is that in the common cur-
rency area economic convergence is not taking place. On the contrary, the current
imbalances – not matched by effective adjustment mechanisms – create in-built di-
sincentives to convergence. The bottom line is that the Euro-zone remains a sub-op-
timal currency area, a fragile environment that – if not fixed – would not be sustai-
nable in the long-run, and would fail to withstand the impact of a future crisis.
This vulnerability, which the markets are now ignoring, but know very well, must
be corrected. It does not concern the optimal design of Europe’s future, for which
there is time. Rather, it is a matter of urgency sustainability and crisis prevention.
Therefore, it should be faced up to with that frame of mind. As an absolute priori-
ty.
What does it take? In a few words, the completion of the banking union, with
the ﬁnal breaking of the bank sovereign nexus, and a signiﬁcant advancement in ca-
pital markets union enabling private sector risk sharing. It also requires the provi-
sion of ﬁscal backstops and some form of stabiliser in relation to asymmetric shocks.
It requires strengthening economic reforms at national level in both deﬁcit and sur-
plus countries. 
Does it take bold and painful decisions? Yes! And No! Yes, because the additio-
nal measures imply a transfer of prerogatives and sovereignty at the European le-
vel. No, because those measures can be made consistent with a framework of minimum
further integration, no additional permanent transfers (no transfer Union) and no
debt mutualisation.
It requires from political leaders a full understanding of the technical aspects,
and an appreciation of the diﬀerence between what would be desirable (but can wait)
and what is necessary (that cannot wait). 
Above all, it requires the political determination to do it, i.e. to do “whatever it
takes” to achieve it. This will most likely imply give and take, pragmatic compromises.
It means reconciling conﬂicting interests in the name of the superior exigency of sa-
feguarding the Euro. It means understanding the value of the Euro for the stability
of ﬁnancial markets, economic growth and jobs, and its political signiﬁcance.
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“THe cHalleNges are greaTer THaN iN THe pasT: 
FurTHer progress is Needed” (m. dragHi) 
We conclude these introductory remarks with a quote from the ECB President Ma-
rio Draghi, who well captured with his words the Zeitgeist of our epoch.
“This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome that created the Eu-
ropean Union and the 25th anniversary of the Maastricht Treaty that created the
Monetary Union. Further progress is needed. The institutional architecture of
the Economic and Monetary Union remains incomplete in a number of aspects.
The crisis has exposed structural weaknesses in our construction and has forced
us to address them. The repair has started with the creation of the Banking Union.
But the work is far from over and the challenges we face go beyond Economic
and Monetary Union. They pertain to security, migration, defence, and generally
all those challenges that can be addressed only by pooling sovereignty. And the-
se challenges are greater than in the past. Today we can sense a rising wave of
energy in demanding joint European action. The European Union and the euro
always commanded the support of the majority of European citizens, but, often,
it was only the vocal opposition that was heard. Now, this silent majority has re-
gained its voice, its pride, and its self-confidence. Only by working together can
the nations of Europe overcome these challenges. The opportunity for progress
is real.” (Speech at Tel Aviv University, 18 May 2017)
FiNaNciNg loNg-Term europe
This volume collects a series of essays, essentially drawing on the contributions to
the International Conference that took place at the end of 2016 in Rome, the Rome
Investment Forum. The perception then, and now at the time of publication, is that
Europe, and the world economy is at a turning point. The reasons are many, and re-
late to a set of different and interacting coordinates: geopolitical, social, institutio-
nal, regulatory and economic.
After a decade of gloomy and erratic performance, the European exchequer has
shown a new vitality, and promises to provide an anchor of moderation and hope
for its citizens, its neighbours, and a growingly unsettled world. 
“Finance for growth” has been the leit motiv of the Rome Investment Forum in
its diﬀerent editions from 2014 onwards. This concept has come to encompass the
many dimensions of policy eﬀorts aimed at a better balance between stability and
development, innovation and security, continuity and change. Finally, “ﬁnance for
growth” has started to work, after proving rather elusive in the past. The European
recovery is more robust, widespread and consistent with fundamentals. The vicious
circle between austerity and depression has been broken. The dichotomy between
core and periphery appears less acute. The resilience of European institutions, mar-
kets and society, has passed the test of unprecedented stress: from Brexit to unfo-
reseen developments in American leadership. The world of ﬁnance appears to-day
more able to play its role of bridging savings and investment, supply and demand,
merit and need, the present and the future. 
The challenges however are daunting. Mainly because, while sailing through un-
chartered waters, the “European project” itself has appeared at times uncertain and
fuzzy. It is in any case unﬁnished business. 
The essays in this volume give evidence that there is ﬁnally a new policy envi-
ronment, a new vision and sense of responsibility, from the point of view of a pro-
minent group of business leaders, policymakers and international stakeholders. Mo-
reover, they contribute ideas with the aim of moving on the reform agenda in the
business and policy context, at national and European level.
A new policy environment in Europe. In response to unprecedently serious chal-
lenges, there is greater determination to face up to the backlog of unresolved con-
tradictions: ﬁxing the Euro, completing the Banking Union, advancing the capital
market union in a post-Brexit perspective, extending the Investment Plan (Juncker
Plan) to the Euro-Mediterranean, reforming Schengen and Dublin, etc. 
A new vision of the future of Europe. A lively discussion is underway on the new
frontiers of European integration, from defence to infrastructure, from the digital
to the ﬁscal union, from migration to climate change. Even though it is unlikely that
we will reach easily, nor shortly agreement on such controversial questions, it is im-
portant that we have engaged in the discussion and shown commitment to confront
diﬀering views on it. The vision of the future must come before or at least accom-
pany the action plans and the road maps. The basic question is: “Where are we going”?
and “Where do we want to go”?
Finally, Europeans seem to have a better perception of the critical importance
of the time dimension. There are urgent things that require immediate deliverables
and a pragmatic and compromising approach. This is the case for instance of cer-
tain measures to strengthen the economic and monetary union and the response to
unsustainable migration pressures. Others need to be carefully worked out and thought
over, avoiding short cuts and quick ﬁxes. We need both to promote a sense of urgency
for immediate action, and at the same time remain focused on the long-term objectives
of the European journey. Time consistency is the most delicate task of to-day’s po-
licy making and business strategies.
Two concepts have appeared particularly promising, and were focused upon at
the Rome Investment Forum. First, the idea that diﬀerent speeds and concentric cir-
cles are not only unavoidable, but also desirable, to avoid stalemates and roadblocks.
Second, long-term development, supported and driven by long-term ﬁnancing, is cen-
tral to attain structural solutions to complex structural problems. Both concepts were,
and remain central to the “ﬁnance for growth” philosophy, which has inspired the
contributions to this volume, and the discussions at the Rome Forum. 
The volume starts with the Rome Declaration on the future of European Inte-
gration in the economic financial and monetary field. The Declaration was signed
in Rome in March 2017, on the occasion of the 60’s Anniversary of the Treaty of
Rome.
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Following the structure of the previous editions of this volume, and the discus-
sion that took place at the Rome investment Forum, the contributions have been grou-
ped in seven sections. First, the most urgent tasks: ﬁxing and completing the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union in Europe, with reference in particular to the unﬁnished
and still vulnerable Banking Union.
Second, a focus on ﬁnancing for innovation infrastructure and long-term inve-
stment. Follows then a reconsideration of the Finance for Growth approach, what
still represents a new and innovative vision for the future of Europe. Forth, ﬁnance
for competitiveness, entrepreneurship and Small and Medium Enterprises, the role
played by pensions, start-ups, private equity and venture capital, and the points of
view of two main Supervisory Authorities in Europe, like ESMA and EIOPA.
In the following sections, the global risk scenarios and the resilience of the world
economy, and society, are focussed upon. The importance of ﬁnancing for sustainable
development is then discussed, with contributions targeting an area of special in-
terest to the stability and prosperity of Europe: the Euro-Mediterranean. The ﬁnal
section deals with broader issue, on which ﬁnance can, and should have a signiﬁ-
cant impact, i.e. solidarity, inclusion, social responsibility and ethics: ﬁnance for the
common good. The volume concludes with an intervention on the next steps and prio-
rities in the policy agenda for ﬁnancing long-term Europe.
We thank all the contributors to this volume, who provided texts or revised the
transcription of their interventions at the Rome Investment Forum. Special men-
tion deserve the various institutions that contributed to the organisation of the
Forum, i.e. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the Long-term Investment and Reindu-
strialisation Intergroup of the European Parliament, Confindustria, the Long-term
Investor Club, Paris Europlace, Frankfurt Main Finance, the City UK, the Con-
siglio Italiano del Movimento Europeo, the Forum per la finanza sostenibile, In-
tegrate, the CEEP (European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Pu-
blic Services). 
Also thanks to the European Parliament (Rome Information Office) and the Eu-
ropean Commission, under whose patronage the event took place, and to our me-
dia partners Data Stampa and EUNews.
Finally I wish to thank the Rome office of Febaf, and in particular Elia Lofran-
co, for helping out in the collection of the essays, the preparation and the fina-
lisation of the book, and Gianni Rizzuti for coordinating the whole production.
Paolo Garonna
Rome, October 2017
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FiNaNce For groWTH: a NeW VisioN For europe

iNVesTiNg iN europe
Jyrki Katainen*
I plan to talk about the investment environment, investments and what the European
Commission is doing in order to improve the business environment and the investment
climate in Europe.
I would therefore like to focus on four things – 1) delivering on investment, 2)
removing barriers to investments, 3) building a capital markets union, and then I will
round oﬀ by saying a few words about 4) modernising our economy.
deliVeriNg oN iNVesTmeNT
Growth, jobs and investment in Europe are the number one priority of this Com-
mission. The Investment Plan for Europe is an integral part of our comprehensive
strategy. 
The economic recovery is ongoing but economic growth in the euro area is ex-
pected to remain modest, relying mainly on domestic consumption. And investments
have slightly picked up recently, suggesting that the favourable conditions – such as
improved borrowing conditions, capacity utilisation above its long-term average and
lower corporate deleveraging pressure – are starting to have their long-awaited im-
pact. However, we are still behind the long term average. 
The European Fund for Strategic Investments is a key part of the Investment Plan
for Europe. Our ﬁrst proposal aimed at mobilising at least €315 billion until mid-2018
in new investments in areas of strategic importance to the EU economy to support
growth and jobs in Europe. Given the success so far, we plan to bring the mobilised
investments to half a trillion euros by 2020.
I am proud to say that, since its launch in July last year, the Fund has been de-
livering on its promise. The European Fund for Strategic Investments is delivering.
Approximately €30 billion of public EU guarantees have been used. And we are not
only delivering on numbers – investments approved for backing by the European Fund
for Strategic Investments in 27 Member States are worth €163.9 billion and almost
388,000 SMEs and midcaps stand to beneﬁt (of which by the way around 190.000
are in Italy.)
* Vice President European Commission; European Commissioner for Jobs, Growth, Investment
and Competitiveness.
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And crucially, we are delivering on additional investments that would not have
happened without the European Fund for Strategic Investments.
I already mentioned that Italy has been an active user of EFSI, especially for small
and medium sized enterprises. And having said this, I must congratulate Italian ﬁ-
nancial institutions, banks and funds for being active users of EFSI. This has been
the pre-condition for allocating more resources for small and medium sized enter-
prises in Italy. 
As a result of this, there are 28 industrial and infrastructure projects approved
by EIB under EFSI ﬁnancing. This will mobilise around €8.5 billion additional in-
vestments in Italy. And this is only the result of the ﬁrst one and a half years.
remoViNg Barriers To iNVesTmeNTs
However, investment prospects are still held back by a range of factors, including weak
global demand, the legacy of the crisis, sluggish medium-term growth prospects, and
political risks and uncertainties, not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world.
These elements and the outlook for a prolonged period of uncertainty could affect
investment decisions. 
The Commission supports an ambitious agenda of structural reforms to sustain
growth and job creation. And this can only be achieved through complementary ac-
tions at EU and at country level. 
At EU level, the Commission is taking actions to enhance regulatory predicta-
bility, reduce barriers, and reinforce the Single Market. In particular, it has laun-
ched initiatives regarding the development of a Capital Markets Union, the further
deepening of the Single Market for goods and services, and a true Digital Single Mar-
ket. 
Other initiatives have also been adopted in the context of the Energy Union, and
the Circular Economy package. All contain speciﬁc measures that will remove con-
crete obstacles to investment and further improve the framework conditions in which
ﬁrms operate. 
So, the EU will be a more harmonised and better market in three to ﬁve years'
time than it is at the moment.
So far Member States have implemented quite a number of reforms. Italy is a good
example of a reforming country. To my mind, Italy is probably one of the most in-
novative economies in Europe, if not the most innovative economy. But the socie-
tal structures are not translating this capability for creating added value into growth.
And this is the reason why structural reforms are needed, also in Italy. 
All the European countries are more or less in a similar situation, where they have
to recognise that the world around us has changed and that our societies must chan-
ge accordingly. 
As I said Italy is probably the most innovative economy in Europe, and in order
to translate this phenomenal capability to create added value for jobs and growth,
reforms are needed.
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In some countries, investment challenges may include a lack of transparency in
public administration, a high level of taxation and overly complex taxation systems,
product and labour markets distortions, weaknesses in research and innovation fra-
meworks, and barriers to accessing ﬁnance, particularly for small and medium-si-
zed enterprises. 
The barriers to investment and for economic growth vary between the Member
States. There are good examples of addressing these barriers. 
One good example of reforms to improve the business environment was intro-
duced in Italy, to reduce the debt-equity tax bias in order to improve ﬁrms’ capita-
lisation and diversify access to ﬁnance. 
The Italian government has introduced in 2011 the "allowance for corporate equi-
ty", which allows Italian ﬁrms to deduct a notional return on new equity and on rein-
vested proﬁt from corporate income tax. In the course of 2014, the government has
further strengthened the framework and adopted the so-called super-ACE in order
to give Italian ﬁrms an incentive to make their equity base more robust. 
This is exactly the same kind of measure as the European Commission has just
proposed as part of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) proposal
and this is very important for improving capital markets in Italy, and more broadly
in Europe. 
As part of the European Semester, the Commission has placed a particular em-
phasis on the identiﬁcation of investment barriers and priority reforms to remove
them. These reforms are well reﬂected in the Country Speciﬁc Recommendations
for Member States.
BuildiNg a capiTal marKeTs uNioN
What is very important for financial markets and investments in Europe is strong ca-
pital markets.
The Capital Markets Union seeks to better connect savings to investment and to
strengthen the European ﬁnancial system by enhancing private risk-sharing, providing
alternative sources of ﬁnancing and increasing options for retail and institutional in-
vestors. 
The Capital Markets Union Action Plan of September 2015 set out a comprehensive
programme of 33 actions to put in place the building blocks for the Capital Markets
Union of which around half are already delivered. Several more will be completed
in the coming months.
Let me mention some examples:
• Overhaul of the prospectus rules to improve access to ﬁnance for companies and
simplify information for investors. 
• On 23 October we published the proposal to re-launch the Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base, which included an equity tax allowance that was modelled
on Italian legislation, as I mentioned before. 
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• Last May we published a report explaining the market and regulatory landsca-
pe in crowdfunding, in order to expand the options for ﬁnancing for EU businesses.
Italy being the ﬁrst to introduce legislation on equity crowdfunding shows the
support for alternative ways of investing.
• We are reviewing the functioning of EU corporate bond markets. A group of ex-
perts has been set up to ﬁnd practical solutions to improve the eﬃciency and re-
silience of corporate bond markets. 
• Minibonds are a prime example of Italy leading innovation in this ﬁeld. Borsa
Italiana’s ExtraMot Pro market is home to 196 listed minibond listings. These have
raised more than €8 billion at the end of last October. 
The Capital Markets Union is one of our primary targets. It is one of our main Sin-
gle Market projects at the European level. But more must be done also at the national
level in order to implement all those reforms which will lead to more diversified fi-
nancing, especially for small and medium sized enterprises.
moderNisiNg our ecoNomy
Now finally, let me say a few words about Europe's need to modernise its economy
and strengthen its competitiveness.
For many sectors experiencing fast and disruptive changes which are challenging
established norms and approaches, investment and new ways of working are par-
ticularly needed.
Investment in Research, Development and Innovation is also crucial and EU funds
are limited compared to the investment needs of the European economy. 
It is therefore essential to mobilise private investment in RDI-related sectors, such
as key enabling technologies, bio-economy, circular economy, health and well-being,
new transport energy technologies, as well as access to ﬁnance for innovative SMEs
or research infrastructures to ﬁll the investment gap. 
The Investment Plan for Europe represents an opportunity to scale up private and
leverage public spending, build a pipeline of quality projects and remove the barriers
to investment in RDI. Of the EFSI transactions approved by the European Investment
Bank so far, 20% are in the RDI sector. This ﬁnancing does not replace, but com-
plements support for fundamental research.
And crucially – Europe needs to invest in its people. Skills are a key factor to bo-
ost competitiveness and drive innovation. They are a pull factor for investment and
a catalyst for job creation and growth.
We need to ensure high quality education and training. And this is my message
to public authorities. Imagine if all teachers in Europe in primary education had a
higher university degree in teaching. What would it mean? First it would mean more
equal societies, more social justice, higher productivity, higher competitiveness, more
innovation, and more economic growth and jobs. 
To me this is a low hanging fruit. Even more so, as a former ﬁnance minister I
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am always interested in public expenditure. If we look at the OECD PISA study, which
is comparing education systems in Europe, you can see that those countries on the
top of the list are sometimes spending even less public resources on education than
those, in which the results are not as good. 
Therefore, money spent on education does not always correlate with the quali-
ty. That is why structural reforms in the education sector are often more important
than the amount of money spent. The same amount of money can be spent well or
less well. 
I would like to make a proposal to the ﬁnance ministers. Take this to your Coun-
cil formation and look at it as an investment for the future. Education is something
which needs to be reformed in Europe, otherwise we will lag behind our competi-
tors. 
I will stop here. We are at a moment in time where we have to reinvent oursel-
ves. In our Member States we have excellent assets. We have lots of creativity. But
the world around us has changed, and this is the reason we need to be ready to re-
form ourselves. 
Reform does not mean taking something away from someone. It means just chan-
ging the way we are operating or running our societies. And education reform is a
good example of this. 
Italy would not be as prosperous a country today without reforms carried out in
previous years and decades. This illustrates why we have to look forward with a cou-
rageous mind, as we have the opportunity and the chance to reform our excellent
societies.

FiNaNce For groWTH: moViNg THe ageNda oNWards1
Pier Carlo Padoan *
This is the most appropriate venue to reflect upon recent developments in the ban-
king industry, starting from the context within which these developments have oc-
curred. Back in 2014, the Country had put behind it two years of recession. Still, in
the course of the previous thirteen years, between 2001 and 2013, our growth achie-
ved 1-2% five times, stood at 0-1% for four years and was followed by four years of
recession. This trend of the economy, that reflects the combination of structural ob-
stacles and the impact of recession, was accompanied by volatile public finances. Ita-
ly’s public deficit fluctuated around 3%, with spells of improvement to 1.5% and sharp
deterioration beyond 5%.
From 2007 to 2013, the Debt/GDP ratio went from 100% to 130%. In 2014 the
country’s economic structure had been profoundly wounded by two rounds of re-
cession, in 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 respectively, and the country was faced with
the twofold need to ﬁx public ﬁnances in order to stop public debt from skyrocke-
ting while underpinning economic recovery. It was necessary to support the wea-
kest groups of the population, encourage businesses and favour the recovery of hou-
sehold consumption. At the same time, international markets and European partners
had to be reassured.
The country’s economy has been recovering since 2014. ISTAT (Oﬃce for Na-
tional Statistics) analyses show that measures such as the Irpef (personal income tax)
bonus, the pensioners bonus and REIS (guaranteed minimum income) combined have
reduced inequalities and poverty alike. Growth acceleration coupled with progres-
sively improving public accounts is the right avenue to reduce debt, curb its pace ﬁrst
and subsequently revert its trend. 
Italian businesses are overcoming the crisis, supported by labour and income tax
cuts and by a taxation regime that promotes investments and innovation. 
The GDP deﬁcit and stabilisation of debt over the last four years seem to indi-
cate that the pace of consolidation during this period has led to positive achievements,
notwithstanding the surrounding context, including very weak inﬂation. 
The ﬁrst economic policy implication is that all of the foregoing suggests that we
should keep going along the way that we are.
1. This is a revised version of the paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Italian Ban-
king Association, 12 July 2017.
* Minister of Economy and Finance, Italy.
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Of course, one should consider not just the performance of public accounts po-
licies but also their composition and the quality of the measures taken. The spending
review of the last several years has been very deep, making it possible to structurally
ﬁnance accommodative measures. Tax cuts have boosted consumption and supported
businesses, with the latter also beneﬁtting from speciﬁc incentives for private inve-
stments, which are gaining momentum. 
Much remains to be done, instead, on the front of public investments, the decline
of which has been stemmed also because across-the-board expenditure cuts have been
replaced by selective ones and by an eﬀort to urge public players to invest more in
infrastructures. The ability of the public administration system to spend – and “to
spend well” – remains limited. The introduction of the new public procurement code
in 2016 is a step in the right direction, but like many structural reforms it requires
a period of adjustment during which results may temporarily worsen. The recent ﬁne-
tuning of the code has allowed to overcome the issues found during its implemen-
tation and we expect investments to recover during the current year. We have to re-
solutely capitalize on this driver, being aware, though, that much needs be done to
improve the planning and spending ability of the public administration system.
The second economic policy implication is that it is necessary to carefully con-
sider how to use the ﬁscal space, especially when it is limited. Not all tax cuts equal-
ly impact growth and employment. Public investments are crucial, but their size does
not depend solely on the resources available. The double crises years, between 2008
and 2013, have profoundly changed also the context within which ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries operate. In particular, the eﬀect of the economic crisis on the quality and
quantity of bank loans has become clear. There is a time lag between the economic
crisis and the dynamics of NPLs that explains also why the amount of NPLs peaked
in 2015 while the economy is already showing signs of recovery. At the same time,
the build-up of NPLs helps hold back, though partly, the recovery.
In the meantime, the new European rules are coming into force, which, as is now
clear to all, require the Italian system as a whole to take a leap forward quality-wise:
more awareness is needed in the choices of savers, actions need be taken at source
on the governance of banks so as to make it more functional, by strengthening ma-
nagement incentives. It is within this context that the Government approved the re-
form of people’s banks. The outcome of that reform is that we now have banks that
are more accountable and reactive to the market and a banking group that is larger
and more eﬃcient than the two banks that have originated it, whereas the banks that
have been mismanaged for years, to the detriment of their shareholders and other
creditors, have been driven out of the market with no consequences for their customers,
savers and employees.
The reform of cooperative credit banks followed in the same furrow, the aim being
that of establishing a stronger system, one that is capable of better reacting to cri-
ses. There have been crises in these years, but their number is fairly limited. The re-
silience of the Italian banking system is shown, amongst other things, by the very
limited use of public resources in the management of these crises, including thanks
to the contribution of the banking system itself. The savers who have been adver-
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sely impacted by the improper conduct of banks have been compensated by the ban-
king system, without using the resources of taxpayers; also, by setting up the Atlan-
te Fund, industry players have proven that they are capable of creating a shared tool
for managing their common interests.
Still, this has not prevented a sizable amount of criticism. In Italy, it has been said
that the search for speciﬁc solutions for each of the diﬀerent crises shows the absence
of an organic and overall approach by the Government. I disagree. Quite to the op-
posite, I think that in the course of the transition to a new regulatory framework, the
implications of which have not yet been well considered, case-by-case solutions are
needed, and in each case such rules should be applied as are most appropriate to mi-
nimize the social and economic impact of each speciﬁc situation. 
Italy has also been accused of having found a way to respect the letter but not
the spirit of the rules. In the Eurogroup and Ecoﬁn meetings of yesterday, the Eu-
ropean institutions involved in the recent banking cases have conﬁrmed that the ac-
tions taken fully comply with the rules and that in any case they have shown a high
level of ﬂexibility, greater than might be envisaged. European rules allow the Sta-
te to intervene in a liquidation, as provided for in the 2013 communication of the
Commission. Such intervention must be justiﬁed by the need to contain the costs of
a disorderly liquidation, as has been the case. It should be reminded that the sha-
reholders and subordinated creditors have had to bear the cost of the crisis before
the intervention of taxpayers, who are reasonably likely to recover the amount spent.
This case-by-case resolution mechanism has allowed to improve the overall situation,
in the light of improving economy. In 2016, NPLs declined over 2015 and in the ﬁrst
4 months of the current year they have continued to decrease sharply. The liquida-
tion of the two people’s banks headquartered in the Veneto region and the NPLs di-
sposal announced by Monte dei Paschi and other banks lead to believe that at the
end of this year we can record a clear decrease. 
We can say that we have reached a turning point. At the origin of this turning point
is, amongst other things, the recovery of the economy, thanks to which those busi-
nesses that are temporarily having diﬃculties are better able to fulﬁl the obligations
undertaken vis-à-vis lenders. Also the reforms have played a crucial role: not only struc-
tural industry reforms but also the innovations introduced in the insolvency and cre-
dit recovery procedures as well as the speciﬁc support instruments for this transition
phase, including, in the ﬁrst place, the guarantees for securitizing NPLs. 
There follows another economic policy implication: the reform eﬀort must be main-
tained and increased. 
Private initiatives have been taken within this framework with the support of the
Government, such as the setting up of the Atlante Fund, which has helped revive the
NPLs market. Its shareholders have been courageous enough to put together resources
and share the eﬀort to solve their common problems. One has to acknowledge this
merit. Likewise, one should also acknowledge the personal commitment of those di-
rectors who have tried to ﬁnd market solutions to overt crises.
We can say that the worst is over. But we have to be aware that the ﬁnancial cri-
sis of the last several years has spread across Europe a strong propensity to risk re-
38 FiNaNce For groWTH: moViNg THe ageNda oNWards
duction. Yesterday, Ecoﬁn draw its conclusions in a report on the actions to be ta-
ken in Europe and by member states in order to make it easier for banks to reduce
the volume of non-performing loans and return to proﬁtability, to free up capital to
be used for funding the economy and forestall the risk of distress of worst-case banks.
The report identiﬁes four areas of intervention: powers of supervision; impediments
to the development of an eﬃcient secondary market; reform of foreclosure and ban-
kruptcy procedures; exit from the market. There follows another policy implication:
in this framework, it is necessary for banks to be resolute and incisive in actively ma-
naging their outstanding balance and deﬁne a credible strategy for a progressive re-
duction of the amount of NPLs.
In conclusion, on this theme, the possibility to take action in a range of diﬀerent
ways highlights that the European regulatory framework has ensured room for ﬂe-
xibility, so much so that the bail-in has not been used in the three cases tackled in
Italy; senior bondholders and depositors have been protected and the funding of the
real economy has been safeguarded, just like employment levels. Moreover, these
cases have emphasized a number of criticalities in the European construction, to be
faced and solved in the coming months, as part of the completion of the Banking Union.
The completion of the Banking Union is certainly crucial in the process of European
integration. We all need European integration. It is the answer to the growing chal-
lenges of global competition and to the new geopolitical scenario. Paradoxically, we
are faced with a new window of opportunity:
• economic: because the growth that is stabilizing globally makes is easier, but also
all the more necessary, to have a new wave of structural reforms; 
• political: because it oﬀers a perspective of integration and opening as compared
to the nationalism and bilateralism that seems to prevail in some cases.
Italy and the Italian Government have prepared specific proposals to contribute to
the debate on the future of Europe. This debate originated from the report of the five
presidents and the discussion paper on the deepening of the economic and mone-
tary union recently produced by the Commission.
I wish to remind some aspects which the European agenda for the coming ye-
ars should include, according to the Government:
• the banking union should be completed by balancing risk-reducing and risk-sha-
ring measures;
• the instruments to support private investments should be enhanced, starting from
Industry 4.0 and the Juncker plan, the results of which are better than expec-
ted, but which should extend its scope of action, including in terms of geogra-
phies covered; 
• solutions should be found allowing to increase public investments, which are in-
dispensable in order to bridge geographic and social gaps, though within the con-
text of European public ﬁnance. 
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A reform of common accounts is desirable, which, looking forward, can be gover-
ned by a European Finance Minister subject to the democratic control of the Euro-
pean Parliament. The European Finance Minister should also govern the funding of
European public assets, like the construction of physical and digital infrastructures,
border protection, homeland security and migrants’ flows. 
The countries that are best positioned in terms of economy and employment fear
that risk-sharing measures can entail a permanent transfer of resources to the wea-
ker economies. This concern can be tackled with formulas allowing to recover over
time the funds employed, while overcoming the crisis. But integration can and must
be pursued only in the presence of a strong political commitment to promote the re-
allocation of resources and the ability to make citizens perceive long-term beneﬁts.
All of the European Union member countries must give their contribution in terms
of resources and joint eﬀorts. 
Against an international backdrop in which democracy is being challenged on
many fronts, Europe is uniquely positioned. The development model built in our con-
tinent has enhanced the role of citizens, promoted equal opportunities and protec-
ted the weakest. However, these achievements must not be taken for granted. Eu-
rope remains the best solution to respond to the challenge of the global system; still,
in order for it to be eﬀective, Europe must transform itself, its structure and its in-
stitutions. 
I say it again, the Italian banking system has reached a turning point: it can and
must become a fundamental component for accelerating the pace of growth; at the
same time, it must ﬁnalise adjustments inside the Banking Union. Also, the econo-
my is changing: in recent years, it has moved forward along a narrow path, hemmed
in between the need to strengthen public ﬁnance and slash debt and the need to sup-
port growth: it cannot be denied that the main avenue to slash debt is more growth.
These two strategic lines must be fully supported within a European scenario that
requires a response to the reform eﬀorts, in both structural and institutional terms;
domestic and European reform eﬀorts are fundamental in order to translate the cy-
clic recovery underway into an increase in the potential GDP, productivity, investments
and hence a long-lasting and sustainable expansion. This window of opportunity must
not be wasted.

seTTiNg our sigHTs oN THe FuTure
Pierre Gramegna*
One could say that the choice of this topic clearly illustrates the fact that we have de-
finitely moved on from the crisis debate and are now firmly setting our sights on the
future.
I believe that the most important thing in an environment such as the one we are
currently experiencing and which is characterized by a certain amount of uncertainty
is to restore conﬁdence – the conﬁdence of citizens, consumers, investors and mar-
kets. 
First of all, allow me to highlight that, unlike many commentators or outside ob-
servers, my view of the current economic environment and the future outlook in Eu-
rope has always been and will continue to be positive, despite the events we have
witnessed throughout 2016. We have skillfully weathered the most acute phase of
the crisis that erupted many years ago in the US and we are witnessing today a na-
scent recovery all across Europe.
To illustrate my point and being in Rome today, it might be worth to look at a few
facts regarding the Italian economy. In 2016, Italy is expected to have achieved a pri-
mary budgetary surplus of 1.5% of GDP. After years of signiﬁcant increases, public
debt is now expected to stabilize around 133% of GDP and should in fact decline si-
gniﬁcantly by the end of the decade. Finally, employment has been gaining pace sin-
ce 2013, with over 600’000 new jobs having been added and this pace is even ex-
pected to continue going forward. I could obviously continue with this list, but the
message is clear: the Italian economy is slowly recovering.
Yet, when you have a look at the international press since the constitutional re-
ferendum in Italy, you would be tempted to think otherwise. It is always important
to be critical and vigilant; especially as policy-makers we need to be forward-looking
and tackling all relevant challenges for the beneﬁt of our citizens, but one should ne-
ver let “negativity” gain the upper hand.
To sketch out a new “Vision for Europe” – as the title of this session suggests –
ﬁrst and foremost, I ﬁrmly believe that we need to sketch a positive outlook for the
future. At the same time, it is of course just as important to remain mindful of the
challenges that persist.
* Minister of Finance, Luxembourg.
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In Europe, we can undoubtedly say that strong foundations have already been
laid for the future when it comes to ﬁnance and its contribution to long-term growth.
Banking Union, SSM, SRM… to name but a few. But they also need to be comple-
ted, such as through the establishment of a common European deposit insurance sche-
me, also known by its acronym EDIS. So, collectively, the EU member states have stren-
gthened the resilience of their ﬁnancial systems as a result of the crisis, but policy
makers need to look ahead now.
Building on the experience of the last few years, there is perhaps a need to “re-
adjust the screws” where some measures may have been over-ambitious or where
they might have in fact have hampered growth and job creation. I regularly tell my
colleagues at the ECOFIN Council meetings in Brussels that we need to be mindful
of the eﬀects that any new measure can have on the competitiveness of Europe vis-
à-vis the rest of the world. We should not get ahead of ourselves but ensure a level-
playing ﬁeld wherever possible at the global level, and thus preserve the attractiveness
of Europe as a whole for international investors.
At the same time, it is also vital that companies and SMEs continue to have ac-
cess to suﬃcient resources for their investments into infrastructure, research and in-
novation. Here, I am notably thinking of the Capital Markets Union, which plays an
important part in mobilizing ﬁnance for growth and diversifying the sources of fun-
ding. Non-bank based ﬁnancing – in addition to the existing bank channel – can be
a catalyst for growth in the future, but for this market to develop we need to move
ahead with this ambitious project.
Looking at all other relevant facets of growth, one quickly realizes that the right
policy mix is key. Monetary policy cannot do everything, but the very accommoda-
tive policy of the ECB, under the skillful chairmanship of its President Mario Dra-
ghi, has provided ample breathing space. It needs to be used wisely. 
Structural reforms should also be continuously implemented to boost produc-
tivity and to create a supportive environment for investments, notably by removing
any existing barriers or bottlenecks. I believe that investments, by both the public
and the private sector are key. In this context, the so-called Juncker Plan brings to-
gether the best of both worlds and shows promising ﬁrst results. We are therefore
considering to double the volume of this Plan.
My colleagues in Brussels – and speciﬁcally Pier Carlo, with whom I discuss this
subject regularly – know that for me, “more” and “better” investments are key to ac-
celerate growth in Europe. With the Juncker Plan and the added ﬂexibility in the bud-
getary rules, the EU has made a huge leap forward to increase public investments
in a wide range of areas such as infrastructure or education.
But the public sector cannot do everything. 
The private sector needs to be able to step up its eﬀorts too. In particular, because
it is the private sector that will have to create the jobs so dearly needed in many parts
of Europe. So, in addition to the eﬀorts to strengthen the availability of ﬁnance and
to diversify the sources of funding – i.e. the supply side of the story –, I return to the
main point that I made at the beginning of my speech: conﬁdence. Because conﬁ-
dence is key for a new Vision for Europe and conﬁdence is necessary for the demand
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side of the story, given that we need new and exciting investment projects to go hand
in hand with the improved availability of ﬁnancing.
With a vibrant young generation in Italy and all across Europe, a generation full
of ideas and motivation, it is important to nurture a positive outlook and lay solid
foundations for the future.
Structural reforms in areas such as education and business regulation are indeed
necessary to create a favorable environment for new companies to set up shop and
new ideas to develop. The public sector should pair up with the private sector whe-
rever possible and thus support the development of such new businesses.
FinTech is one of those areas, I am thinking of here – where we have made enor-
mous eﬀorts in Luxembourg over the past months and in which I personally take a
keen interest. But there are many other exciting ﬁelds that decision makers should
look at to bring the best out of ﬁnance in order to support growth for the future.
To conclude, I believe that Europe has made signiﬁcant eﬀorts over the recent
past, which are clearly bearing their fruits today. I am conﬁdent that all relevant sta-
keholders will now seize the many exciting opportunities that lie ahead of us.

THe cHalleNge oF regulaTory reForms iN europe
Maurizio Sella*
Since the financial crisis, rules governing world financial markets have undergone
a major overhaul, in the main following the regulatory agenda set by the G-20 and
Financial Stability Board (FSB).
The impact of regulatory reform on the economy has been seen as benign sin-
ce reform I quote FSB would “promote a safer, sounder and more resilient ﬁnancial
system […], rebuilding conﬁdence and reducing pro-cyclicality […], which will en-
hance the system’s ability to intermediate ﬁnancial ﬂows through the cycle and for
diﬀerent investment horizons” (FSB 2014).
However, over time some aspects of regulatory reform have come to the fore for
their possibly adverse direct impact on incentives to lend and borrow long– term,
as well as short and medium term.
In Europe, given the paramount weight of banks in the ﬁnancing of the econo-
my, these concerns relate ﬁrst and foremost to the strengthened capital requirements
under Basel III Accords, including stronger expected-loss provisioning.
It has been argued that higher capital requirements and stronger provisioning
according to the expected-loss approach will inevitably constrain the supply of cre-
dit. Others have argued that it is unclear whether forcing banks to hold more equi-
ty would raise the cost of credit to the economy, as the reduction of the risk premia
paid by banks for their (non-deposit) funding could well compensate for forgone in-
terest-rate tax deductions on their debts.
In any case, more stringent regulatory requirements should be designed so to lead
to a reduction in ‘ﬁnancialization’ rather than lending to the real economy.
This is, indeed, the core of the ongoing debate about the revision of global ban-
king regulation, through the evolution of the “Basel III” package.
The main (technical) issue under discussion by regulators is how banks can use
their internal models to determine the riskiness of their loans. In particular, the Ba-
sel Committee is about to introduce two ﬂoors (input and output ﬂoors) that will stron-
gly limit the use of internal ratings. Cited by Dr. Gualtieri.
In the view of regulators, the proposed measures aim at reducing excessive va-
riability in risk-weighted assets and, by doing so, avoiding the possibility by banks
of ‘gaming’ the rules.
* Chairman Assonime; President, Fondazione Istituto Einaudi per gli studi bancari, finanziari
e assicurativi.
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However, the goal of the regulators of achieving higher harmonisation of existing
risk-weighted systems, and reducing diﬀerences between diﬀerent banking systems
should not result in a disruption of the ﬁnancing of the real economy. A more gradual
approach in the implementation of the reform, with speciﬁc steps clearly identiﬁed
by regulators, might help to reduce market pressure to anticipate the ﬁnal outcome.
For banks who have already invested considerable resources in the last decade
to develop and implement complex internal ratings systems to revise their capital
and credit portfolios, there is the fear that the new rules would result in an additional
burden that will strongly limit their lending ability.
In particular, European banks are especially sensible to the topic since many of
them rely on internal ratings, while most American banks, which continue to follow
the standard models, are actually less worried.
Additional capital requirements and stronger provisioning by the Basel committee
should not have a signiﬁcant impact in any region, including Europe, in order not
to alter the global playing ﬁeld in banking.
The resilience of the banking system is the key issue for the European economy
and it is the necessary condition for creating ﬁnancial markets more supportive of
long-term growth strategies by all the actors, both investors and issuers.
The 2016 EU Banking Reform package proposed by the Commission (to review
the CRR/CRD IV, the BRRD and the SRM) aims at building a regulatory framework
more conducive to growth in the EU, but there are elements that must be carefully
reviewed in order to create an eﬃciently regulated single market for ﬁnance in which
European banks are not put in a competitive disadvantage.
The introduction of additional capital requirements for the implementation of
the international standards will result in heavier constraints on banks’ lending abi-
lity, not only for large banking groups, and further limit their proﬁtability in a still
too fragile recovery environment.
Those measures are only partially compensated by the prevision of lower re-
quirements for bank lending to SMEs and for funding infrastructure projects that in-
stead go into the direction of increasing funding for the real economy.
The outcome of the regulatory debate is even more crucial for the Eurozone sin-
ce it is still plagued by severe imbalances in its banking system.
According to a 2016 IMF's Global Financial Stability Report, one in three banks
in the Eurozone must confront severe challenges due to legacy issues (900 billion
of non-performing loans and an unspeciﬁed amount of toxic assets), and the need
to revise business models to respond to a sharply modiﬁed economic environment,
and adapt to taxing regulatory changes.
Moreover, there is also an issue of low proﬁtability of many Eurozone banks which
are constrained by the low level of interest rates on one side, and increasing capi-
tal requirements on the other side.
The topic is relevant also with respect to bail-in and resolution framework: un-
der the current interpretation of burden-sharing rules by competent authorities, this
situation may be perceived by investors as foreshadowing the risk of write-down or
conversion of banks’ debt instruments.
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In particular, once it is acknowledged that the banking industry has to confront
head-on its substantial requirements for fresh capital, and that private sources of ca-
pital may be insuﬃcient, then the competent authorities should be ready to open the
way to well-designed precautionary recapitalisations, supported by public back-stops.
Many member states in the Eurozone and the European Union are still enmeshed
in stagnating economic conditions, which are due in no small part to the inability
to tackle decisively the structural weaknesses of banks and restore their ability to sup-
port the real economy with adequate lending.
Resolving this issue cannot and should not be delayed by an unduly restrictive
interpretation of EU rules, which already contain all the required margins of ﬂexi-
bility.

FixiNg aNd compleTiNg THe ecoNomic aNd moNeTary
uNioN: THe cosTs oF aN uNFiNisHed BaNKiNg uNioN

NexT sTeps ToWards THe BaNKiNg uNioN: 
cHalleNges aNd measures
Roberto Gualtieri*
The Banking Union is a fundamental pillar of the monetary and economic Union, and
the foundation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Me-
chanism in the framework of the Single Rulebook, objectively representing the in-
stitutional innovation of major importance so far, after the introduction of the Euro.
These institutional changes have remarkably underpinned the faith in the Europe-
an banking system, its solidity and its capacity to provide resources to the real eco-
nomy.
Nevertheless, the Banking Union is still young and incomplete. With the aim of
completely reaching its goals (i.e. fixing financial stability, sustaining the credit sup-
ply, endorsing the transmission of monetary policy, allocating capital efficiently, con-
tributing to shock absorption) we need to face three challenges, which require to find
some delicate equilibria between stability and growth, between traditional differences
among member states’ banking systems and a higher level of integration, and finally
between risk reduction and risk sharing. In essence, the above-mentioned challen-
ges attain to the realm of politics, rules, and institutions. 
The first is related to the capacity of defining concretely an effective pattern of
supervision and resolution. The results achieved can be judged positively, both un-
der the perspective of the operative functioning and of the quality of supervision,
even though some critical points remain, such as the excessive imbalance between
the high attention given to credit risk and the insufficient capacity to measure and
to value bank’s financial portfolios starting with level 3 assets. Moreover, at all levels
it is still difficult to coherently define a unifying trend of supervision. Finally, the-
se problems are sometimes even worsened by a not so clear distinction – I am referring
to the NPL issue, for example – between supervisory competences and management
methods.
At the same time, certain significant improvements that should not to be un-
dervalued have been recorded. 
For instance, the reform of second pillar capital requirements (Basel regulation),
solicited by the European Parliament, due to the split between requirements and gui-
dance, appears to be a positive innovation, and one which has already contributed
to the stabilisation of the capital requirements under the recently finalised new SREP
* Chair of ECON Committee, European Parliament. 
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cycle. These innovations seem to reinforce the picture of a significantly recapitali-
sed and sounder banking system, both at European and national level. 
In addition, and concerning specifically troublesome situations, it appears that
the awareness of the possibility and the opportunity to use the narrow flexibility mar-
gins allowed by the current legislation for the recovery and resolution of credit in-
stitutions and by current State-aid discipline has finally matured. These margins al-
low implementing measures of precautionary recapitalization to solvent institutions,
whenever it is necessary to preserve their financial stability. 
In this framework, even if the possibility of exempting subordinated creditors from
the application of burden sharing, originally contemplated in the 2013 Communi-
cation on the Banking Sector, has been materially supressed by State-aid orientations
one notes the recognition of the need to secure a significant level of reimbursement
to bondholders. 
Even if long overdue, these developments indicate a positive evolution in the cur-
rent debate, and a first step towards the much needed overcoming of a purely ideo-
logical and abstract vision in favour of a more realistic acknowledgement of the li-
mits and the implications of the BRRD, and as well as the too rigid and restrictive
standards of the ESM direct recapitalization instrument for banks. 
The second challenge concerns the completion and refinement of the regulato-
ry framework provided in Basel, through the legislative package presented a few we-
eks ago by the Commission (CRR/CRD update and TLAC/MREL integration) and the
ongoing review of the banking book by the BIS. It is a demanding challenge, because
it requires to expand the solidity of the system of rules, closing the remaining gaps,
and at the same time not to compress, but enforce the capacity of the banking sy-
stem to sustain the real economy. The first steps accomplished so far seem to be en-
couraging. The Commission’s legislative proposals are well balanced and contain dif-
ferent positive elements, some of which strongly demanded by the European Par-
liament. I am thinking, for example, about the extension of the SME Supporting Fac-
tor, and the reduction of the capital requirements for the exposures related to the
financing of some infrastructure projects. 
Also, the proposed measures for the TLAC/MREL are balanced, starting from the
articulation of the MREL in requirement and guidance, even if in my opinion there
are some margins along the ongoing co-decision procedure which could allow us to
introduce improvements in order to avoid an excessive and sharp increase of the fun-
ding cost. In the first place, the guidance should not imply subordination requirements,
while regarding requirements, that apply to non-systemic institutions, these requi-
rements should be avoided or be introduced with proportionality in mind. Finally,
it would be useful to introduce an appropriate transitoryphase, and avoide a con-
tradiction between current MREL calculation methods adopted by the SRB and the
new criteria from the FSB. 
It is widely known that the ongoing negotiation in Basel on risk weighted average
has generated and is still generating serious worries. It is necessary to clarify that
robust global standards are essential, especially if faced with threats posed by uni-
lateralism like those emerged after the American elections or from the British refe-
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rendum. Furthermore, it is undoubtable that the excessive variability of risk weighted
assets is real and should be reduced. 
All the measures we have mentioned should take place preserving the pruden-
tial supervision sensitivity to risk, and respecting the principle according to which
the revision should not determine a substantial increase in capital requirements, nor
have an asymmetric impact that penalizes the European banking system, which is
far more based on (bank) credit than any other jurisdiction. 
As a matter of fact, the original proposal presented by Basel did not meet these
characteristics, but let me say that during the past few years the European institu-
tions were able to react in an effective way. It is well known that the negotiation is
still ongoing and the sensitive issue of the output floor is still unfixed. However, and
referring to operational and credit risks, we have to recognize that significant im-
provements have been made. Therefore, I hope that an acceptable agreement about
the floor can be reached and that it will allow for a positive conclusion of the whole
negotiation, as well as the final conclusion of the negotiations on the overall regu-
latory framework for prudential requirements.
If the challenge posed by the different policies and rules has in the meantime re-
corded importantsteps forward, certainly the most complex one remains the insti-
tutional challenge posed by the completion of the Banking Union. 
The present asymmetry between common rules and institutions and national re-
sources does not only determine an imbalance between risk reduction and risk sha-
ring, but ultimately it undermines the same risk reduction efforts and the stated will
of breaking the doom-loop between banks and sovereigns. This is why we need to
proceed without hesitation towards the realisation of a backstop for the Single Re-
solution Fund, and swiftly proceed to finally build the third pillar of the Banking Union.
In fact, currency is largely created by bank deposits. As a consequence, and for the
currency to be effectively unique, the level of confidence in deposit protection sche-
mes needs to be the same regardless of their geographiclocation. 
Certainly, one needs to be aware of the extreme political sensitivity concerning
this issue, as well as the difficulty of connecting different principles and demands,
including those that provide for efficient institutional protection schemes, already
able to manage alternative and precautionarymeasures. In order to obtain this re-
sult, we should avoid taking the wrong path, such as the unilateral intervention over
exposures in sovereign bonds.
To discourage this kind of intervention, an objective cost-benefit analysis of the
different options that have been proposed would be sufficient. However, in all the
cases discussed by the working group of the Council disadvantages (costs) are likely
to overweigh advantages(benefits). Fortunately, the Council, the Commission, and
the Parliament share an orientation of wise cautiousness, and the question has been
transferred to Basel, even if we will continue to supervise in order to prevent the re-
vival of improper conditions when discussing the EDIS framework. 
On the contrary, in the legislative process that we have started around this the-
me we will concentrate on the “internal” problems raised by the European propo-
sal of EDIS, and we will try to regulate intervals and methods of our work in order
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not to let our efforts run aground. While keeping in mind the busy European poli-
tical agenda, we will not however be settling for any watered-down solutions. In this
regard, the text that will probably appear in the Conclusions of the European Coun-
cil – speaking of the necessity to make progress both on the risk reduction and the
risk sharing side with the presented package– could represent a positive albeit not
fully sufficient element.
Clearly, the path towards the completion of the Banking Union is intimately con-
nected with the more general and difficult issue of the rebuilding of European citi-
zens’ faith in European institutions. The elements needed for such a rebuilding exer-
cise are different. However, one of the key factors is the capacity of re-launching growth
and reinforce social and regional cohesion. This is why one needs to break the vicious
circle between expectations of low growth and low investments, before it compro-
mises the potential for economic growth. Also, we need to endorse the expansionary
monetary policy with a policy mix of fiscal and structural policies that are more growth
oriented. In order to achieve an effective policy mix, it is essential to have a healthy
financial system, which can allocate the savings in an efficient way and lead them
towards productive investments. 
This forum certainly represents an important occasion to establish this vision and
to push forward an agenda which promotes finance as a true element of growth and
development. 
FocusiNg europeaN reForms oN groWTH 
aNd compeTiTiVeNess
Vincenzo Boccia*
By way of introduction, I wish to start my talk with a paradigm of thought: it is fun-
damental to define together the effects that we want to bring about in the real eco-
nomy, identify the resources and instruments needed and then take action on bud-
get balances in respect of an issue that affects Europe and Italy alike, in a world whe-
re sector averages are no longer meaningful and the data mentioned by President
Abete is the algebraic sum of the gap that exists between enterprises, citizens and
countries. We have to counter inequalities and poverty with the notion of an inclu-
sive society, be more ambitious when it comes to our purposes, combat neo protec-
tionism through a more integrated Europe in order to foster growth. Also, in a geo-
economic dimension that becomes geo-political, we have to enhance the value of the
central role of Italy, set between Europe and the Mediterranean.
In recent years, an impressive reform process has swept through the European fi-
nancial and credit system, one that aims to ensure that the entire financial system gains
stability, by boosting its resistance to crises. The establishment of the Banking Union
is a milestone of such reform process. We have highlighted since the beginning that
the Union was an unavoidable step forward in the planning of its construction. 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) came into being two years ago. Sin-
ce then, it has enhanced the transparency of accounts; also, it can spread confidence
in the system. Still, alongside this has come the revision of the supervisory rules, which
may potentially tighten the credit supply.
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) has come on stream recently but, whi-
le there have been implementation issues, it has put systemic stability at risk. The-
re is no such a thing as a single deposit insurance scheme and debate is rife over its
design. 
The Banking Union as has been implemented so far is therefore neither perfect
nor complete. Those who, like us, see it as being a must and take its destiny to he-
art, should work with fresh determination to strengthen it. Still, in order to do so,
it is necessary to think over the criticalities that have emerged in this initial stage,
what has remained unaccomplished, the pressure brought to bear against the in-
troduction of new rules that would make even more fragile the ambitious construction
we are working on.
* Chairman, Confindustria. 
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First of all, I believe it is necessary to make a few remarks about the European
Banking Resolution Mechanism (which, amongst others, also provides for bail-in)
and the recent European norms on aids to banks. Under the SRM, banks will be re-
quired to keep a certain amount of eligible debts in the event of a bail-in. Overall,
subsequent to such reform the cost of funding might increase and loans to enterprises
might be curbed.
The new rules, which are at the center of a debate in these months, have been
gradually phased in starting from 2013 and, overall, they have led to a regulatory
framework that prevents public intervention unless action is first taken by the banks’
shareholders, bondholders and even current account holders. However, this occurred
after other European countries – Germany, but also the United Kingdom, France, Spain,
Ireland and Portugal – had forged sizeable plans to bail out their respective dome-
stic banking systems. The problems of the Italian system – which, in any case, prior
to 2012 could not have taken significant action in respect of banks due to the sove-
reign debt crisis and public finance issues – have surfaced, showing their real size,
after 2013, i.e. when, in the absence of a stable economic recovery and with loan
recovery timings well above the European average, matters came to a head relati-
ve to NPLs in the balance sheets of banks.
On balance, Italy, as compared to the other EU core countries, is the one that has
allocated the lowest amount of resources to support banks. The goal of the new ru-
les was not to place the burden upon the taxpayers. However, this goal should be pur-
sued in the long term, only after the European system has been made safe. Above
all, one should consider the effect of systemic difficulties, which may increase and,
as a result, it may not be possible to curb the costs for taxpayers. Indeed, if the cri-
sis were limited to just one bank, the bail-in could act as a deterrent against moral
hazard and thus be an acceptable instrument.
Still, in the event of a systemic crisis sprawling across the whole of the banking
industry, taxpayers would have to “pay the bill” four times. First, as their assets would
be impaired due to the collapse of stock prices and housing prices; second, as a re-
sult of income erosion; third, because of job loss and, fourth, subsequent to the in-
crease in taxation and/or public spending cuts required to cover the public deficit
caused by the worsening state of the economy.
Regardless of any thoughts on a possible revision of bail-in (necessary as such
thoughts are, however, not so much in respect of the situation of a given country but
because of the misevaluation of its real economic effects, which are by all means coun-
terproductive vis-à-vis the understandable reasons that have led to its introduction)
flexibility is required (the very flexibility that both the rules on banks’ bailout and
those on State aids to banks provide for in relation to the cases in which the finan-
cial stability of one or more European Regions is at risk rather than the continuity
of a single bank).
Hopefully, where the market solutions that are being considered for Italian banks
do not produce the expected outcomes, a shared European solution will promptly be
found so as to overcome the current problems of the Italian banking system, as has
been the case before in other countries and especially to safeguard household savings.
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The Banking Union must be completed with the elements that were provided for
in its original design. The single resolution fund has been set up, but the contribu-
tions paid in by banks, initially split into national compartments, will only be sha-
red in the long term; there seems to be no clear determination to actually use it.
Besides, as pointed out on several occasions by Confindustria, a third component
is still missing, i.e. a “Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism” going beyond the exi-
sting domestic guarantee schemes, thus ensuring more protection, thanks to an in-
crease in the resources available, for all deposit holders of the banks that are sub-
ject to ECB supervision. The European Commission has presented a proposal, but
this one as well will feature a long period of transition. What is missing in both ca-
ses is the European public financial support already foreseen in the 2012 Report and
which is indispensable for the Banking Union to ensure systemic stability.
The European deposit insurance scheme appears to be stuck due to the resistance
of countries that maintain that they are concerned by the existence of cases of prior
difficulties in the banking sector and which intend to bind completion to the reduction
of the exposure of banks to their country’s sovereign risk, so as to help, according
to them, break the vicious circle between banks’ debt and sovereign debt. Having re-
gard to this, a digressive rating has been proposed for government bonds so that the
market would judge the solvency of a country and there would be no limits to the
purchases of government bonds by Eurozone banks. Both hypotheses are a critica-
lity for Italy and for the European periphery. Also, where there is a criticality for one
Member State, to us, it means that there is a criticality for Europe.
The point is that, even when the Banking Union will have been completed, the
banking systems will in any case remain linked to their respective local dynamics,
meaning that the cost of funding will still be tied to the returns of the government
bonds of each country, including in the event that banks held a lesser amount of go-
vernment bonds.
Indeed, Italy (and other countries) feature a very tight correlation between the
returns of sovereign bonds (in particular, the return of the reference bond, i.e. the
10-year BTP) and the returns of bank bonds. If the exposure of banks in their balance
sheets to the government bonds of each country were to be expressly capped or if
the weighting of such bonds were to be increased, compared to its current zero-le-
vel, in the construction of risk-weighted assets required to calculate the banking ca-
pital ratio, a major source of demand for such bonds would be missing, especially
in the Eurozone countries that feature higher public debt levels. This would in turn
translate into higher government bonds returns and would impact the cost of len-
ding in such countries, which would limit access to credit and curb growth.
It should be borne in mind that Italian banks have massively purchased natio-
nal sovereign bonds when the crisis was at its worst, with their portfolio shifting from
€205bn at the end of 2011 up to €402bn in June 2013 and not declining since then.
This has limited the increase in the returns of sovereign bonds, which were al-
ready way above the values warranted by the actual country risk and has allowed
banks to improve their accounts. If banks had had to limit their purchases, Italian
banks would have had to face more difficulties and therefore the credit crunch would
58 FocusiNg europeaN reForms oN groWTH aNd compeTiTiVeNess
have been worse and the higher returns on government bonds would have adver-
sely impacted public accounts and economic performance.
Finally, it will be of strategic importance to discuss in depth the macro-econo-
mic impact of the international regulation that governs the credit and financial sy-
stems. Concerns on this front are real: further restrictions are being discussed in-
ternationally.
I therefore believe that it is vital for enterprises, banks and institutions to work
together to correct the rules that restrict credit supply and to avoid the introduction
of new rules which are doomed to have the same effect. In particular, I’m referring
to the revisions proposed by the Basel Committee which, amongst others, provide
that the internal rating models of banks be replaced by the standardized method.
With respect to this, we are working with our colleagues of the European general con-
federations of industry to ensure that the new rules will be actually aimed at eco-
nomic growth, forestalling further adverse effects on enterprises. 
Though the Committee had committed not to make changes that might entail
a significant increase in the capital requirements for banks, according to the estimates
of the European Banking Federation, the risk is there that the proposals put forward,
as a whole, may result in a significant increase in capital requirements. Furthermore,
the potential impact would be even worse if one also takes into account the new TLAC
standards, i.e. an additional capital requirement for systemically relevant global banks
aimed to reduce the risk of contagion within the financial system should a system
bank face a crisis.
Therefore, while financial stability must be ensured, it is also necessary to avoid
in all possible manners that the banks’ capital requirements are too stringent as this
would bring along a new and further credit crunch. 
Finally, on the regulatory front, I can but reinstate the importance of the proposal
put forward by the Commission to retain the SME Supporting Factor and remove the
cap in respect of €1.5mn loans. Confindustria has been working for a long time on
this proposal alongside ABI: it is fundamental for it to be approved in order to sup-
port lending to SMEs.
Hopefully, in the end common sense and a focus on the real economy will pre-
vail upon rules. They are decisive for stability, which in turn only makes sense if re-
lated to growth.
compleTiNg THe BaNKiNg uNioN: 
opporTuNiTies, risKs aNd oBsTacles
Valeria Sannucci*
The Single Supervisory Mechanism, which was completed in an extraordinarily short
period of time, entails very extensive and deep integration of national authorities.
While the Monetary Union mostly consisted in the sharing of decision making, the
SSM envisages the integration of daily operational processes to be carried out at na-
tional and centralized level. Its establishment could have been a prelude to a para-
digm shift in the level of European integration. However, this has not yet materia-
lized. On the contrary, the Banking Union is still under construction and significant
obstacles remain on the path to its completion. 
It was no accident that the original blueprint for Banking Union rested on three
pillars (banking supervision, crisis management, and deposit insurance): each one
is an integral part of the financial architecture needed to safeguard the soundness
and the stability of any banking system, and to break the vicious circle between banks
and sovereigns. 
If the Banking Union were to remain as it is today, the result would neither be
compliant with best practices, nor would it have achieved its intended effects. In fact,
as Dirk Schoenmaker put it, now that the immediate crisis is past, 'governments have
started to shop selectively on the Banking Union list’.1 In this ‘à la carte’ Banking Union,
the absence of common deposit insurance increases the risk of contagion, while a
blunt implementation of the resolution framework with no public backstop in pla-
ce would heighten financial stability risks. 
European leaders must therefore not lose sight of the end goal and instead com-
plete the project in a reasonable timeframe. The need to press ahead is made even
more urgent by the fact that while the European banking and financial system has
demonstrated its resilience, its stability is still at risk.
Indeed, risks to Europe’s macro-financial stability have recently intensified. Whi-
le the expansionary monetary policy stance is supporting the liquidity of financial
markets, curbing tensions on government securities, and easing bank funding con-
ditions, uncertainties have nevertheless increased following the UK referendum and,
though perhaps less so, the Italian referendum. Nor, given political events, expec-
ted policy changes in the United States, and fragilities in emerging economies, are
* Deputy Governor, Bank of Italy.
1. Schoenmaker D., “Firmer foundations for a stronger European banking union”, Bruegel Wor-
king Paper, 2015/13, November 2015. 
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they likely to be dispelled over the medium term. European banks’ profitability and
their business model are under extraordinary pressure, due to sluggish growth, low
interest rates and, to a differing extent across countries and banks, excess capacity,
large stocks of non-performing loans and difficult-to-value (level 3) assets. Mean-
while, low nominal interest rates are squeezing the profit margins of European in-
surance companies and pension funds. 
While they are more solid today than they were in the pre-crisis period, in the ab-
sence of an adequate, proportionate and properly functioning safety net, Europe’s banks
are also more exposed than before to substantial risks to their individual stability.
A common EU deposit guarantee scheme is a crucial component of the safety net
and should be set up as swiftly as possible. While its introduction is generally accepted
in principle, controversy has arisen recently regarding its timing and negotiations
are at a standstill due to the opposition of some countries. 
Introducing common deposit insurance is not enough, though. In order to bol-
ster public confidence and to ensure that the Banking Union has the capacity to sa-
feguard financial stability in adverse circumstances, we also need a common public
backstop covering both resolution and deposit insurance. 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the ability of the new EU re-
solution framework to counter systemic crises has been somewhat overstated, espe-
cially when combined with the European Commission’s approach to competition and
State aid. A 2016 paper by Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart warns against
large-scale, bail-in centred, recapitalizations and illustrates the “danger of over-re-
liance on bail-ins’ by providing a very insightful description of the risks involved in
triggering the bail-in process when risk is not idiosyncratic.2 While the bail-in tool
is actually well-designed for addressing the crisis of individual banks, in the event
of a systemic crisis its use risks exacerbating the threats to financial stability rather
than stabilizing the system. In those circumstances, the possibility of temporary pu-
blic support, without necessarily involving banks” creditors, should not only be con-
sidered but favoured, to dispel the fear of contagion and prevent the seeds of ano-
ther crisis from being sown. 
Of course, envisaging public support in exceptional circumstances should not un-
dermine efforts to reduce forms of moral hazard. The risk of imprudent behaviour
by banks can be tackled by strengthening the prudential framework, by adapting the
structure of remuneration schemes to reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking, and
by making management fully liable in the event of the failure of an institution. At
the same time, the burden for taxpayers could be lightened by requiring that public
funds be recouped from the banking system at a later stage, when financial stabili-
ty is no longer at risk – as envisaged by the Financial Stability Board.3
2 Avgouleas E., C.Goodhart, “An anatomy of bank bail-ins – Why the Eurozone needs a fiscal
backstop for the banking sector”, European Economy, 2016.2., 5 December 2016.
3. Financial Stability Board, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial In-
stitutions”, principle 6.5, 2011. 
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Let me stress that an incomplete Banking Union is a source of risk in itself. If ne-
glected for too long, it will discourage banks’ reorganizations and consolidation pro-
cesses as the cost of funding and capital remain subject to excessive uncertainty, with
likely undesirable effects on banks’ ability to support both investment and consumer
spending. In this transitional phase, when banks are still building up adequate loss-
absorbing buffers and Governments are without their traditional tools of interven-
tion, the risks are even greater. 
As it is a priority per se, completing the Banking Union should not be conditio-
nal on other interventions. I refer, in particular, to the much debated possible chan-
ge of prudential treatment for sovereign exposures, which is among the measures
called for in order to move forward with the creation of the EDIS. A draft report pre-
sented to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Par-
liaments (ECON)4 makes the entry into force of the insurance phase of EDIS conditional
on reducing risks in the banking sector. In this regard, while recognising that chan-
ging the prudential treatment for sovereign exposures could help to break the bank-
sovereign nexus, I believe that it should not be considered as a pre-condition for, or
an alternative to, the completion of Banking Union. 
A clear timeline for deposit insurance, as we had for the Single Supervisory Me-
chanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, would help reassure markets as to
the soundness of the overall banking framework and the willingness of Member Sta-
tes to pursue the final design of the Union. 
In the meantime, the Single Supervisory Mechanism should continue to focus
on further strengthening the resilience of the banking sector. However, we should
avoid over-calibration and possible inconsistencies between different measures that
might impair the ability of European banks to support the real economy. 
A path must be identified to guide banks towards adequate levels of capital and
loss-absorbing capacity to increase their stability and readiness to withstand adverse
market conditions without compromising their capacity to finance the economy and
sustain the economic recovery. This is especially true today when banks’ profitabi-
lity remains low and the recovery in the EU is still struggling to gain momentum.
After substantially strengthening capital levels in recent years, EU banks will now
be required to increase their loss-absorbing capacity to meet the minimum requi-
rements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). In this regard policymakers
face a trade-off: on the one hand, large stocks of liabilities that can feasibly and cre-
dibly absorb losses in resolutions contribute to the resolvability of banks and to fi-
nancial stability, while simultaneously protecting taxpayers; on the other hand, the
build-up of adequate buffers of loss-absorbing capacity may be very costly for banks,
impair their lending capacity to the real economy, and require time. The review of
4. See European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Working Document
on EDIS and Draft Report on the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Depo-
sit Insurance Scheme (COM(2015)0586 – C8-0371/2015 – 2015/0270(COD), Rapporteur
Esther De Lange. 
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the legislative framework, starting with the European Commission’s proposals, should
strike the right balance. In any event, it is indispensable to avoid a needlessly high
MREL requirement disproportionate to the effective needs of a resolution.5
Let me conclude with two quotations. In a 2016 speech at the EMU Forum, Pe-
ter Praet said “Completing the union is sometimes framed in terms of a trade-off bet-
ween risk sharing and risk reduction […] I believe both routes need to be followed
and to move forward in parallel […]. A European Deposit Insurance Scheme would
enhance overall depositor confidence … This is the very foundation of insurance:
by pooling resources and risks across a larger and more diverse group, the overall
shock-absorbing capacity of the system increases. In this sense, risk sharing turns into
risk reduction”.6
In a working paper published a few months ago on the economic governance of
the euro area, a group of researchers at the Bank of Italy reviewed the measures ta-
ken concerning sovereigns and banks since 2010 and concluded that Europe is now
at a crossroads: “either it finds the strength to return to its roots and embraces a se-
cond (and deeper) round of reforms based on enhanced risk sharing, or it risks run-
ning into pro-cyclical excesses that may finally tear it apart”.7
This forum may therefore provide a valuable contribution to enhancing the awa-
reness of policymakers about the dramatic, yet possible outcomes of a piecemeal,
short-sighted approach to the completion of Banking Union.
5 Bank of Italy, Financial Stability Report No. 2 / 2016, November 2016, p. 36-37.
6. “The importance of a genuine banking union for monetary policy”, Vienna, 24 November 2016.
7. Balassone et al., “Economic governance in the euro area: balancing risk reduction and risk sha-
ring”, Occasional Papers, Banca d’Italia, 344, 2016.
resilieNce, sTaBiliTy aNd social coNseNsus
Francesco Mazzaferro*
I would like today to briefly discuss three questions. 
First, has EU financial regulation already increased resilience to the point that
markets have learned how to withstand important political shocks? Second, how can
we help create a Europe-wide social consensus on the macroprudential agenda? And
third, how can the ESRB contribute to more stable financial conditions in the sin-
gle market?
On the first point, let me first observe that we have recently witnessed a num-
ber of unprecedented geopolitical events. The United Kingdom, the largest finan-
cial market of the European Union – and the European country that is home to the
European Union’s lingua franca – is unfortunately leaving the EU, as a political pro-
ject and as a single market. The result of the recent US presidential election was a
surprise to most of us, not least given the extent to which the key planks of the elec-
toral platform differed from the themes and priorities that had become consolidated
over time. Given this precedent, the markets might well expect the results of for-
thcoming political events in a number of other EU countries to be equally surpri-
sing. 
Some of us may remember how – a few decades ago – political events led to pro-
longed periods of market turbulence. Take, for instance, Denmark’s refusal to rati-
fy the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992. That confounded all expectations of a smo-
oth transition from the European Monetary System to the single currency and ope-
ned up a long period of exchange rate instability which led first to the exit of the Uni-
ted Kingdom from the exchange rate mechanism in September 1992, and soon af-
ter to a period of high volatility among core EU member states, which lasted until
1995. We may well be wondering why no such financial shock has materialised now.
Of course, with the single currency tensions cannot translate directly into effects on
the exchange rate, at least within the euro area. But they can affect other indicators,
like spreads, and lead occasionally to overshooting. As we can observe, market mo-
vements have been much more moderate in recent times. It is in the markets’ natu-
re to be volatile, and there is no problem with that, provided that volatility does not
spiral into fundamental disruptions and even, at worst, into the disappearance at ti-
mes of transactions in some segments of financial markets, as in 2010-2011. 
* Head of the ESRB Secretariat, ECB.
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Well, that has not happened recently, in spite of the unprecedented shocks. Per-
haps this is because the new regulations governing financial markets in general – the
packages of rules which were first agreed at the international level, like the ones on
banking, but also those governing other areas at the EU level (therefore going be-
yond international agreements), like solvency requirements for the insurance sec-
tor – are delivering exactly what was expected: more resilience. I also think that –
despite the surprise factors already mentioned – risks and vulnerabilities are better
identified now and corporate governance within the financial sector is generally stron-
ger. The markets can therefore focus more on fundamentals. As today’s conference
is hosted by the financial sector, I would like to call for a greater appreciation of the
medium and long-term merits of a strong regulatory framework: without such a fra-
mework, we would perhaps be confronted with more imminent risks of market di-
slocation.
Turning now to the second topic, let me observe – in a frank and candid way –
that almost all of the speakers before me have signalled a sort of national consen-
sus around priorities to complete the European agenda. They have also expressed
similar views about certain aspects of EU regulation (for example, the bail-in rules)
which are clearly creating concern in this forum. As an Italian citizen living abroad,
it is my duty to explain, with respect, that these concerns are not shared elsewhe-
re. For some time now, I have been reflecting on the cultural factors that underpin
our work to support financial stability across the European Union. I am more and
more convinced that the difficulty of identifying common responses to crucial issues
(how to reduce financial risk? what risks to share?) is above all due to the different
narratives voiced by public opinion in each of our countries. More than the diver-
gence in views, what is really striking is the ease with which a domestic consensus
can be created in different countries around different priorities. In this respect, we
are faced not only with technical questions, but also with diverse social preferences.
If this conference had been held in a different location, but – in terms of professio-
nal and sociological composition – with the same set of participating institutions, most
probably the general tone of the discussion would have been similar. The conclusion,
however, would have been very different: in some cases, diametrically opposite. This
must be a matter of serious concern for anyone wishing to pursue our common Eu-
ropean endeavour.
If there are such differences in public opinion across Europe, the duty of all tho-
se searching for a European solution must be – first and foremost – to understand
the arguments of the other side. This implies that those in favour of risk sharing should
consider that they have to work towards risk reduction as well, and must be aware
that risk reduction should be proportionate to the risk concerned. In this country,
debt is mostly issued by government, in other countries borrowers are mostly hou-
seholds and businesses. Across Europe it is our common duty to think about mea-
sures that would reduce the incentives for indebtedness – with a few exceptions, we
are over-indebted economies – and correctly price the risks that arise when the eco-
nomy generates vulnerabilities. It should be our duty as citizens of this country to
think openly – in conferences like this one – about whether sovereign exposures need
to be differently treated in regulatory terms, and what commitments we would be
ready to propose in this respect. Rejecting any discussion will not help us reach con-
sensus.
Finally, let me turn to my third point. One of the features of financial markets
in Europe in recent years has been the perceived scarcity of safe assets. In fact, in the
periods when this perception was strongest, there was only one international safe
asset in Europe at the disposal of global financial markets: the Bund, that is, the bonds
issued by the Federal Republic of Germany. This has produced a situation where the
perception of changes in risk assessment has led to capital movements to Germany,
transforming changes in risk sentiment into cross-border transactions. That is why
the ESRB has been working – as also explained in a 2016 public consultation – on
ways to establish securitised debt representing different tranches of the same set of
government debts. The synthetic European bond, which would represent a non-mu-
tualised basket of European public bonds, would consist of senior tranches – offe-
ring security – and more junior tranches – offering higher yields. Buying and selling
these tranches, market operators would express their investment behaviour in terms
of diverse risk sentiment vis-à-vis the same countries and not express national pre-
ferences. Work is still ongoing and I hope it will be possible to make more detailed
announcements one year from now.

FixiNg emu aNd sTreNgHTeNiNg europeaN iNsTiTuTioNs
José-Manuel González-Páramo*
Several years have passed since the outburst of the worst financial crisis in decades
and its length and depth have put literally our European economic and political in-
stitutions at risk, forcing them to make decisions and take steps into uncharted ter-
ritory. In 2012, when Europe was on the edge of the cliff, our authorities rightly re-
cognized that the construction of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
was flawed and that we required further strengthening of European institutions.
On the financial side of these reforms, Banking Union emerged as a quantum leap
for the monetary union, a major stride towards financial integration and towards the
completion of the construction of the euro. The progress so far on achieving Ban-
king Union has been tremendous, indeed inconceivable just a few years ago, as it re-
presents a significant transfer of sovereignty from those countries sharing the com-
mon currency to the new supranational authorities. This agreement relies on an un-
precedented extent of the solidarity since the birth of the euro. As of today, the first
three pillars of the Banking Union – the Single Rule Book, the Single Supervisory
Mechanism, and the Single Resolution Mechanism – are up and running. But Ban-
king Union remains unfinished. A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is still
missing, as well as a common public backstop to the new Single Resolution Fund.
While starting the Banking Union without EDIS or a public backstop was accepted
* Executive Board Member, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria.
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temporarily as a lesser evil in order to get Banking Union under way in 2015, it will
need to be completed in the near future. 
Deposit insurance mechanisms were already established in most advanced coun-
tries after the Great Depression of the 1930s. The rationale for insuring bank deposits
has always been quite evident; it seeks to reduce the risk of devastating bank runs,
such as those which occurred repeatedly during crises in the past. In the particular
case of the Eurozone, area-wide supervision and resolution arrangements call for
an area-wide deposit insurance scheme which would guarantee that each euro de-
posited in a bank is equivalent throughout the Eurozone, regardless of the geogra-
phic location of the bank that received it. 
In November 2015, the European Commission made a proposal for an EDIS: the
idea is to build on the basis of the existing national schemes, gradually moving to-
wards a European-wide mutualised system.1 After more than a year of discussions,
there are strong opposing views on this proposal. The main objections are related
to the idea that EDIS implies a risk transfer from weak financial systems to sound
financial systems, increasing moral hazard problems. Critics argue that a mutuali-
sed scheme cannot be put in place until the risks inherent in the national banking
sectors have been contained and have become more homogeneous. They argue that
progress on EDIS should be conditioned on the introduction of more risk reduction
measures, particularly regarding the treatment of sovereign exposures for pruden-
tial purposes. 
In October 2016, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur for EDIS proposed an
alternative approach which eliminates the idea of a fully mutualised system. Inste-
ad, this alternative proposes a more limited mutualisation with a stronger national
component. This alternative would not help to break the sovereign-bank nexus, which
is one of the main objectives of the Banking Union. Furthermore, in order to move
along different stages in EDIS, this alternative introduces strong conditions in terms
of risk reduction (including the revision of sovereign’s treatment).
While these concerns, in terms of risk reduction, have to be taken seriously, two
facts should be borne in mind. First, the European Commission already launched in
November 2016 a comprehensive set of risk reduction measures focused on increasing
the resilience of EU institutions and enhancing financial stability, so-called CRD5.2
Second, the debate regarding sovereign exposures intersects with discussions held
by global regulators in Basel. This debate has just started and different approaches
are on the table. The Basel Committee may lead to the establishment of an international
1. Three steps are foreseen in the Commission’s proposal. The starting point is a re-insurance
mechanism built on top of the national schemes. The second step would see the re-insuran-
ce mechanism progressively evolving into a co-insurance arrangement with an increasing sha-
re of mutualisation. The third step would be taken in 2024: from then on, EDIS would fully
insure all deposits in the euro area.
2. For example, more risk-sensitive capital requirements, in particular in the area of market risk,
counterparty credit risk, introducing a binding leverage ratio, Net Stable Funding Ratio and
new loss absorbing requirements – TLAC and MREL.
69
standard in the following years and any change in Europe should be consistent with
the global framework to maintain the level playing field. 
Ultimately, the asymmetry of the current incomplete Banking Union is paramount
and should be solved in the near future. While decisions on supervision and reso-
lution are taken at European level, the mechanisms to protect depositors are still pu-
rely national – further perpetuating the sovereign-bank nexus. Therefore, in order
to speed the progress on EDIS and complete the banking union, it should not be tied
to a specific risk reduction measure, particularly sovereign exposures. It is essential
to keep these lines of work decoupled. Pursuing them in parallel as conditioning the
progress on EDIS to the revision of sovereign treatment will unnecessarily compli-
cate both. Nevertheless, if conditioning EDIS to some risk reduction measures is ul-
timately the chosen path, specific and realistic milestones should be set in order to
prevent any unnecessary delay on the implementation of EDIS. 
Taking a broader view, leaving the Banking Union unfinished is in itself the op-
posite of risk reduction. In fact, it would increase the fragmentation among finan-
cial systems of the member states. As long as national governments remain liable for
depositors’ protection, markets will discriminate banks based on their location, per-
petuating the sovereign-bank vicious circle. Conversely, in a perfect Banking Union,
credit rates will keep converging and funding conditions will depend more on the
fundamentals of the banks rather than on the country in which they are located. To
that effect, transnational banks could operate freely in a broader market of more than
300 million potential customers, which in turn, would benefit from increased com-
petition. 
Several experts regard the lack of a safe security as a major weakness in the euro
area architecture3. They believe it fuels the vicious circle between governments and
banks, as well as destabilising capital flows between member states, particularly in
times of crisis. In this vein it is important to note the work that is being developed
by the ESRB regarding the potential creation of European Safe Bonds (ESBies). ESBies
are the senior tranche of a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds. The-
se new assets could work as a solution to this problem, since they would constitute
a new safe euro area security class without an explicit mutualisation of risks (the com-
bination between diversification and tranches is what confers ESBies the conside-
ration of risk-free asset).
Either way, completing the Banking Union is one of the prerequisites for the long-
term economic, financial and social stability of the European Union. Something that
becomes more needed than ever when geopolitics threatens less coordination and
3. In a 2016 article Brunnermeier, Langfield, Pagano, Reis, Van Nieuwerburgh and Dimitri Va-
yanos (“ESBies: Safety in the tranches” VOX, 2016) argue that in the absence of a union-wide
safe asset, the Eurozone would be subject to cross-border capital flights when facing finan-
cial stress. This situation has the potential of creating important distortions within the Eurozone.
On a related paper Brunnermeier, et al. (“The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies” The
American Economic Review, 2016) find that the creation of a safe asset would enhance financial
stability, and help in the transmission of monetary policy.
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more financial fragmentation. As ECB’s President Mario Draghi said, “One impor-
tant lesson from the crisis is that a half-built house is not stable, it is fragile”4. Seen
from a broader perspective, the process towards a deeper EMU has to be a common
challenge: we need a closer economic and political integration in Europe. Europe-
an Authorities need to tackle the unavoidable, but complex, review of the Europe-
an Union's Treaties and the necessary transfer of sovereignty to strengthen fiscal and
political union. They should focus on more ambitious aims that require a profound
rethinking of European and national institutions. However, European countries have
expressed differences in terms of their long-term goal with divergent levels of am-
bition, which could be a stumbling block on the road ahead. Current challenges need
all the ability and the far-sightedness of the European political authorities. 
The global financial crisis and the euro area crisis have triggered a fundamen-
tal reform of banking regulation, but eventually financial stability has been unde-
niably strengthened and confidence has increased as the link between banks and their
sovereigns has eroded. Currently, the context of Brexit and many other Euroscep-
tic events point to the imperative to act quickly to further strengthen the Eurozone.
It is vital to complete the work begun to fully enjoy the benefits of Banking Union.
There can be only one rational and sensible European approach to this unfortuna-
te and sad turn of events: a programme to deliver key reforms and to fix an irreversible
and demanding timeline, which will help over time to restore the European Unio-
n’s political and economic confidence among citizens. Europe must not relent or wea-
ken when faced with new uncertainties, but should press forward even more urgently
with its key financial reforms. Nothing seems more urgent or necessary at the cur-
rent juncture.
4. Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament,
Brussels, 28 November 2016, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/
html/sp161128_1.en.html.
BeTTer regulaTioN aNd THe FiNaNciNg 
oF THe real ecoNomy
Giovanni Sabatini*
It is a notable opportunity to share with you our concerns about the future not only
of the banking industry but of the European economy as a whole, considering the
close links between them. 
I’ll address you in my capacity as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
European Banking Federation, as I believe the issues we face today – namely getting
the European economy back too stable, sustainable, and inclusive growth – need a
banking sector that’s efficient and profitable at European level, governed by ap-
propriate and balanced regulation. 
Let me emphasise that in Europe, where almost 80% of SME funding is based on
bank credit rather than on capital market fund raising as it is in the US, we cannot
ignore the importance of a stable, profitable and competitive banking sector for su-
stainable economic growth – the latter being one of the main objectives of the Eu-
ropean Union, as clearly expressed in the Constitutional Treaty. 
After seven years of new rules and important results, such as the creation of the
Banking Union (with regard to the two pillars already completed), I believe that to
find the right way forward, a major task facing us is to assess the consistency of cur-
rent regulation and supervision against the so-called “better regulation” principles. 
This is not a theoretical issue for academics, but an aspect that has real practi-
cal consequences, of which I will give some examples. 
The five main principles of better regulation are accountability – on the part of
the regulator and the supervisor – transparency, consistency, proportionality and the
focus of the regulations. 
In each of these fields there is, unfortunately, still a lot of work to do: before pro-
ceeding to produce new rules, I think we should consider whether the current re-
gulatory and supervisory environment is effective and able to produce the best pos-
sible results. 
The first issue is accountability: the current supervisory framework provides for
the European authorities’ accountability to Parliament and to the mandate assigned
to them. 
The first thought that comes to my mind on this issue, and on the issue of the
relationship, within the ECB, between the supervisory function and the monetary
* Chairman, Executive Committee of the European Banking Federation – EBF; Director Gene-
ral, Italian Banking Association – ABI.
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policy function, is the following: are we sure that the mandate of the SSM – which
focuses only on stability, without considering how the search for stability impacts
on growth – is not due for a rethink? 
The issue is the relationship between monetary policy, which – given the weakness
of growth and levels of inflation still far from the ECB target – remains extremely
expansionary in its efforts to transmit liquidity to the economy, and supervisory po-
licy, whose increasingly detailed rules lead it to constrict the channels that bring this
liquidity flow to the economy. 
This brings us to the second theme of consistency: are we are sure that the who-
le regulatory framework, informed by the urgency and emergency of the crisis, is whol-
ly consistent? 
A Basel Committee publication includes data showing that in 2015 120 documents
(including consultative papers and new rules) were issued: a document virtually eve-
ry two days! Is this really necessary? 
I believe the answer to this question also depends on finding the right balance
between what needs to be regulated, what needs to be subject to supervision and what,
if anything, needs to be subject to enforcement. 
The rules should specify and regulate the average behavior of intermediaries –
rather than consider every possible dissimilar behavior – including those in the tail
of the distribution; otherwise the result is excessive regulation. 
It seems that the supervisor, not trusting his supervisory and enforcement ca-
pacities, leverages a huge set of rules that can detect all deviant behavior, and the
consequence is what we are seeing today: the gradual blurring of the boundary bet-
ween supervisory regulation and management of intermediaries. 
Without going into the details of the non-performing loans management gui-
delines, put to consultation by the ECB, I will merely observe that the document gets
so detailed as to recommend how many phone calls you must make to the debtor in
a past due or impaired or non-performing situation. This is no longer just supervi-
sion, it is management. 
The third principle of transparency is required, for example, in relation to su-
pervisory processes such as the SREP. The requirement is not there in order to know
the method to be able to bypass it, as some argue. On the contrary, it exists to help
show us how banks are evaluated, or to strengthen the aspects that will be subject
to supervision. Transparency also means knowing the competitors against which bank
ratios are compared in order to assess the sustainability of the bank business mo-
del. 
Proportionality is also important, meaning that the measures taken must be pro-
portional to the risk being prevented. 
I believe that each of these themes must be assessed and discussed. 
One example of something that, in my view, does not reflect the principle of tran-
sparency and consistency is the new package of rules proposed by the Basel Com-
mittee. It focuses on the output floor, aiming to fix the banks’ minimum capital le-
vels using the Internal Rating Based (IRB) models rather than the standardized ap-
proach. It is still an open issue and may be subject to compromise. The point is that
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the output floor tends to overlap with another prudential requirement, the levera-
ge ratio, without any clear consistency between these two standards. 
Finally, I’d like to comment on the issue of weighting of sovereign risk exposu-
re, which has long been the subject of far-reaching discussions across Europe. I think
it is only a European issue. We talked about it in the context of the IBfed – the In-
ternational Federation of the national banking associations – at a meeting in Beijing:
Americans, Canadians, Indians and Japanese, for example, do not consider it an im-
portant issue. They said, "Why do you have this problem? You are the only ones with
this problem" 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the Basel Committee working group dealing with
this matter is not making great progress. Also, I think this issue needs careful thought
in order to establish whether it is appropriate and indeed necessary to amend the
existing regulatory framework; i.e. we need to assess the actual risks and possible
implications of sovereign risk weighting. 
In conclusion, before proceeding to propose new rules, I think it would appro-
priate to pause to reflect and to develop a “comprehensive assessment” of what has
been done. This does not mean being critical in a destructive way. Indeed, I belie-
ve that strengthening the existing institutional and regulatory frameworks, in line
with the general principles of better regulation, is in the best interests of the rele-
vant institutions, to strengthen their credibility and their understanding and acceptance
by European citizens.

FiNaNce For iNNoVaTioN aNd iNFrasTrucTure

THe role oF iNsuraNce For loNg-Term iNVesTmeNT
Maria Bianca Farina*
At present, the issues of innovation and infrastructure are crucial: in a globalized eco-
nomy, they represent two key drivers for a country’s competitiveness and growth.
They are also linked to the issue of sustainable development.
As far as Italy is concerned, the infrastructure gap is a well-known problem and
we are aware that a lot remains to be done; the same is true for innovation.
In order to progress in these two areas, an adequate flow of financial resources
is needed, aiming at supporting future projects in a long-term perspective.
At the moment, however, financial flows are largely insufficient, both at priva-
te and public level (in this latter case, also because of budget constraints). In short,
supply and demand for long-term financing do not fully meet.
In my speech I would like to say a few words about this issue, seen from the per-
spective of the industry I am representing, namely insurance.
iNsuraNce aNd loNg-Term iNVesTmeNTs
Official data confirm the importance of insurance companies as institutional inve-
stors: nearly 700 billion euro were invested by Italian insurers in 2015, mostly in the
financial market.
Another important feature is that the insurance business model – especially for
life insurers – is typically based on a long-term horizon. In other words, the long du-
ration of commitments towards policyholders reduces – in comparison with other
intermediaries – the insurers’ exposure to liquidity risk and allows the adoption of
long-term investment strategies.
In addition to this "structural" feature, some other factors are at work: they are lin-
ked to the current economic and financial situation and explain why the insurance
industry is more interested than in the past in some specific forms of investment: for
instance, the financing of small/medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or of infrastructure
projects. I am referring to the current scenario of low interest rates, which urges in-
surers to look for alternative investments, in search of higher returns. As a matter
* President, Italian National Association of Insurers Companies – ANIA.
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of fact, such returns are necessary in order to cope with commitments towards po-
licyholders and to achieve a wider portfolio diversification.
But let’s stick to the Italian case, where the current scenario of low interest ra-
tes is putting insurance segregated funds returns under heavy pressure. At the end
of 2015, guaranteed savings represented 73% of total life insurance products, whi-
le investments covering such savings were still concentrated (66% of the total) on
Government bonds.
This situation emphasizes the need to pursue further diversification, both for in-
surance products and the related investments.
a sTill limiTed iNVolVemeNT
Therefore, at least in principle, we have the required conditions for greater involvement
of insurers in infrastructure and innovation projects financing. However, figures show
that the involvement is still limited, both in Italy and in Europe.
At European level, some big players1 have already made a step towards an increased
diversification of asset allocation: while Government bonds represent roughly 40%
and corporate securities 30-40% of total assets, the weight of alternative investments
is growing and accounting for 12-14% of the total.
However, there is still room for further growth.
At present, for example, the insurance industry globally contributes for only 8%
to private equity investments. More important, but still with further potential for
growth, is the insurance participation to the private debt market (about 14% of the
total).
As to the Italian insurance market, the results of a sample survey – carried out
by ANIA in 2016 – showed that insurers have invested about 7% of total assets co-
vering technical provisions in alternative investments, exposed to credit risk, largely
represented by private placement.
Despite the real interest, both infrastructure and SMEs financing from insurers
still have a modest extent.
What are the reasons? 
An answer is partly provided by a 2016 survey carried out by Insurance Europe
– the Federation of European insurers – on the issue of infrastructure financing2.
On the one hand, the survey has confirmed insurers’ interest in such forms of in-
vestment; on the other hand, it has also shown a serious flaw, concerning the real
supply/availability of infrastructure projects eligible for investments.
The Juncker plan has represented an important step to ease the flow of private
funds towards long-term financing. However, despite recent improvements both in
1. Reference here is to Allianz, Axa and Zurich.
2. Insurance Europe, “Survey: Insurers’ interest in investing in infrastructure growing, but sup-
ply of suitable assets must increase”, Bruxelles, 19 Dec. 2016. 
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transparency and accessibility, the visibility of such projects is still insufficient. Be-
sides, the associated political risk is high.
WHy regulaTioN is imporTaNT
When assessing the still limited insurers’ involvement in SMEs and infrastructure fi-
nancing, another issue to be considered is regulation.
As it is known, several regulatory changes have been introduced in Italy during
the last two years, aimed at broadening the investment opportunities for the insu-
rance industry (for example, through the "Competitiveness" Decree” in 2014). Fur-
thermore – on the European side – the “Solvency II” framework took effect on Jan.
1st, 2016, establishing a direct link between investment risks and capital require-
ments.
As regards infrastructures, for instance, the original calibration of capital re-
quirements treated them – depending on their technical form – as investments in bonds
or in unlisted equities, with heavy charges in terms of required capital (for instan-
ce, referring to unlisted shares, the capital requirement is calculated on a shock as-
sumption of 49%). 
A "last-minute" change in the Delegated Acts has improved the treatment of in-
vestments in "eligible infrastructure" (those featuring a better risk profile), which
now differ from ordinary investments in bonds and equity. However, definition cri-
teria for “eligible” investments are still very restrictive, with the result that only a few
infrastructure projects can be included.
Besides, further work is foreseen in order to improve investments in infrastruc-
ture corporates, currently excluded from the "eligible" category.
Further progress in the regulatory framework might derive from the “Capital Mar-
kets Union” project: the introduction of a specific treatment for “Straight, Transpa-
rent and Standardized Securitization” (STS) is envisaged, as well as a review of the
treatment applied to private placement and private equity.
In the regulatory field, an important initiative for the insurance industry is the
“Solvency II Review”, to be completed not later than 2018. The Review should be an
opportunity to refine the current prudential framework, in order to remove any un-
justified constraints on long-term investment. In that context, an improvement of
the treatment of equity investments, for example, should be carefully considered.
coNclusioNs
In all countries, infrastructure and innovation projects represent two major drivers
for competitiveness in a globalized economy.
In Italy, the infrastructure gap is still high and innovation is held back by lack of
adequate financial resources.
80 THe role oF iNsuraNce For loNg-Term iNVesTmeNT
It is necessary to support and develop initiatives in these two areas, through an
adequate flow of long-term funds.
The insurance industry is a major institutional investor, and some peculiar struc-
tural/economic features (nature of the business model, prolonged scenario of low
interest rates) increase the appetite for alternative forms of investment.
At the moment, however, the involvement in infrastructure and SMEs financing
is quite limited, given the still scarce supply – in Italy as in Europe – of “suitable” pro-
jects (in terms of risk/return/transparency). Besides, the European legislation is still
penalizing long-term investments.
We need to work together to overcome these difficulties, encouraging investments
aimed at supporting firms and economic growth, a source of benefit for the whole
Country.
THe europeaN parliameNT Focus oN FiNaNciNg
iNFrasTrucTures aNd iNNoVaTioN
Simona Bonafé*
Today I am taking the floor as the Vice-president of the Long Term Investment and
Reindustrialisation Intergroup. A few words to present this experience. The Intergroup
was created in 2014, at the very beginning of this legislature. At that time, the discussion
on the effects of the austerity dogma was ready to begin. We were well aware of the
huge work ahead of us, in view of facing both a deeply damaged economic situation
under the effects of the crisis and an impressive investment gap. Without a strong bo-
ost to investments, the desirable return to growth would have never been possible. For
this reason, with other colleagues from different political groups, we took the initia-
tive of constituting a cross-party context where promoting vibrant debates on inve-
stments and on the real economy. The Intergroup was therefore created in the full kno-
wledge that the lack of investments was not only linked to the crisis but also to struc-
tural and regulatory limits of the European economic and financial architecture. 
Our main goal was, and remains, to gather around the same table those actors
that, through structured discussion and coordination, can make the right choice for
Europe in terms of boosting and promoting investments; I am talking about decision
makers, investors as well as project makers.
Coming back to the actual topic of the panel, I believe that the strategic role fi-
nance can play in the infrastructure’s modernization process is a paramount point
in the context of this debate. When discussing infrastructure, the role of material fa-
cilities, such as roads, ports and railways, essential in stimulating national econo-
mies, isn´t the only variable at play. Digital infrastructures, as broadband internet,
digital platforms or networks, are key sectors to look out for when planning of the
economy of the future. Moreover, global challenges are closely linked to infrastructure’s
developments: first among all, the fight against climate change. Supporting the ener-
gy transition, aiming at a low carbon and resource efficient society in accordance with
our commitment following the Paris agreement requires, beforehand, the develop-
ment of new smart infrastructure. Focusing on infrastructure is not only about mo-
dernisation, but it also means working on interconnection within a truly European
dimension. And, turning back to energy, the potential of an efficient Energy Union
with strong interconnections is more than promising, both in terms of security of sup-
ply and savings for consumers. 
* Vice-President, Long-Term Investment and Reindustrialisation Intergroup, European Parlia-
ment.
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There is inevitably a reason why I´m bringing these points to your attention: we
all know that one of the financing streams of the new EFSI will be devoted to the so-
called green infrastructure. 
Obviously, the challenge posed by infrastructure cannot be faced by public bud-
gets alone. As of today, the EU budget is still extremely weak and constantly expo-
sed to new emergencies: let us recall the migration crisis or the natural disasters, such
as the extremely damaging series of earthquakes, which have recently shaken up Ita-
ly or the floods in Germany. On top of that, Member States´ budgets are characte-
rized by an increasing asymmetry, further widened by the crisis. In this situation,
we must value developments at the European level in the field of investments. In this
way, the European Fund for Strategic Investments is now reality, together with the
important Communication on flexibility, a concrete first step forward, though still
inadequate. 
Have we solved our investment problem through the EFSI? Clearly not. The depth
of the current gap would require initiatives on a completely different scale. Howe-
ver, the "Juncker Plan", with its logic of combining public guarantees with private
investments, is finally giving its contribution in “pressuring” the political level onto
dealing with the most controversial points regarding European investments. This in-
cludes strengthening related projects and their visibility, facilitating private investors´
participation and, last but not least, implementing the blending of funds while dif-
ferentiating the sources of financing. 
On the quality of projects, the Advisory Hub set up under EFSI is up and running,
but still presents some space for improvement; to this regard, the Commission has
expressed its intention to extend the Plan in view of further improving and stren-
gthening its functioning. A first priority would need to be set to strengthen the in-
teraction with financial institutions characterized by a more rooted knowledge, such
as National Promotional Banks. 
Coming to the private contribution to infrastructure´s modernisation, the pe-
culiarity of such investments should be properly assessed in terms of risks. While in
the context of Solvency II some progress has been made within the insurance field,
there are strong concerns that under the revision of Basel 3 there might be some ne-
gative effects on the involvement of banks. Under political responsibility, we value
the importance of prudential criteria; however, we need to remember that being una-
ble to differentiate among different types of exposures can potentially generate ne-
gative effects. 
Finally, turning to the issue of financing sources. The current European system
is still highly centred on bank credit. If we compare our situation with the one of the
United States, our delay is quite evident. The US share of investments collected through
venture capital is currently five time higher than ours. A Commission´s initiative un-
der the work-in-progress Capital Market Union would be more than welcomed. On
the same level, we will keep our eyes focused on the implementation of the blending
of different funds, especially Structural Funds and EFSI.
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Moving from infrastructures to innovation, once again it easily comes to mind
the explicit reference to "reindustrialisation" our Intergroup calls for in its name. Our
concept of industry is based on innovation: let´s call it an industry 4.0. If we really
want the industrial sector to get back representing the 20% of the overall Europe-
an GDP, we will have to move away from traditional tracks and make arrangements
in order to proceed at a fast pace. This also means creating the right conditions to
allow the most dynamic sectors, which have shown impressive growth potential on
global markets, to prosper also within the European economic framework. 
From decision makers´ point of view, this requires efforts in drawing up a con-
sistent and forward-looking legislative framework. When dealing with structural chan-
ges within the industrial and economic paradigm, we need to be very clear on ru-
les and targets or, otherwise, the EU investments´ level cannot be expected to rise
up again at its pre-crisis levels. 
In conclusion, given that the greatest incentives for innovation usually come from
within market, we need to focus our attention on how hard it is for European inno-
vative enterprises to see their projects properly financed. During today´s debate, the
topic will be discussed in all its aspects. Progress in the field of the capital market,
steps to be taken in the Single Market, diversification of financing sources, stan-
dardisation for more attractive and measurable investment opportunities as well as
the completion of the Banking Union, are only a few among the many priorities. Fi-
nally, yet importantly, let me also mention the need for more uniform fiscal rules,
which could put the EU on the right path towards a more effective Economic and Mo-
netary Union.
A few words on innovation: in 2016 we have held in Brussels a debate with the
founder of Bla Bla Car, one of the most promising realities born in Europe in the field
of the digital economy. He clearly explained the company´s difficulty in facing 28
different regulatory frameworks. Now, if for a successful case, deemed to reach a tur-
nover of over 2 billion euro, this represents a serious challenge, I´ll leave to you to
imagine what this can mean for a start-up moving its first steps. 
Coming to my conclusions, it is worth repeating that economic growth must re-
flect developments in the real economy. If this link is not preserved, any political pro-
jects will face social unrest as well as the lack of perspectives for citizens. Anyone fa-
miliar with the European institutions should keep this in mind, by drawing atten-
tion to this essential condition among the priorities in Brussels' political agenda. 
The EU is currently going through one of the most challenging periods of its young
history, and that especially within its relations with its own citizens: for the first time,
the European project is perceived more as a limit than as an opportunity. This trend
can and must be inverted. 
On the International scene, only united we can count and, therefore, guarantee
precious growth opportunities to our citizens. For this reason, it is not the time to
be shy. We must move forward with ambitious projects, such as the completion of
the Banking Union, the Capital market Union and the strengthening of the Econo-
mic and Monetary Union´s goals. Those are the only steps that can provide real op-
portunities of growth and development. 

a NeW paradigm oN iNVesTmeNT
Valeria Ronzitti*
iNTroducTioN
CEEP represents, at EU level, employers and providers of public services and SGI,
active in sectors such as central & local administrations, healthcare, education, wa-
ste management, energy, transport, water, environment and telecommunications.
As one of the three general cross-industry social partners (alongside with the ETUC
and BUSINESSEUROPE), CEEP is active in the European Social Dialogue, exchan-
ging on a regular basis with the EU institutions on the investment strategy set in pla-
ce by the European Commission.
Since 2014 and the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European
Commission, the mindset changed at EU level. The focus slowly but surely moved
away from deficit reduction and budget cuts, and bringing investments back to Eu-
rope became a new priority. A “virtuous triangle of structural reforms, responsible
fiscal policies and investment”1 has been put in place. Two years later, we will be able
to assess the new policy mix, and see how we could improve it, by engaging in fur-
ther reflections on the macro-economic governance of the European Union.
a NeW paradigm oN iNVesTmeNTs
For the past few years, the narrative and the policy choices made around “investment”
has drastically changed. Since Jean-Claude Juncker and his team entered the European
Commission, a clear impetus has been given to trigger investments in the EU. Laun-
ched in 2014, the Investment Plan for Europe best showed the new political will, with
a vision and a call to act quickly. So far, the balance sheet of the European Fund for
Strategic Investments can be seen as fairly positive. Since December 2016, investments
related to EFSI have been approved for a total of €163.9 bln. However, we believe
* Secretary General, European Centre of Employers and Enterprises Providing Public Services
– CEEP.
1. COM(2016) 359 final – Europe Investing Again – Taking Stock of the Investment Plan for Eu-
rope and Next Steps, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com-
mittee of the Regions.
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that not enough is being done regarding social infrastructures, accounting for less
than 5% of that total, and not enough is done for investment in innovation, compared
with ”classic” physical infrastructures.
There are obviously exceptions, and some projects which received funding through
the Investment Plan promote a
different vision, such as the project on Smart Public Building in Greece and the
project promoting the development and the better use of Internet of Things te-
chnologies in public buildings. Those remain exceptions, and are all too rare since
the launch of the Plan in 2014.
In this context, CEEP welcomes the proposal of the European Commission to pro-
long the lifespan of the EFSI, and believes that a step forward should be taken by fi-
xing the loopholes observed in the first version of the plan. Providers and employers
of public services call for:
An increased focus on the additionality principle;
An improved coordination between EFSI and the other financial instruments (ESIF,
Horizon 2020, Connecting Europe Facility, structural funds);
A reinforcement of the diversity of the geographic coverage.
a call For a HoNesT aNd NoN-dogmaTic reVieW oF THe sTaBiliTy 
aNd groWTH pacT
However, the Investment Plan alone will not be enough. Investments in social in-
frastructures, and in general all kinds of investments in public infrastructures, will
not reach the desired level if policy makers do not adopt a comprehensive approach
to tackle the obstacles to investment. There is a paradox at EU decision-making le-
vel between the calls for increasing budgetary discipline, and pointing out at the same
time to the lack of investments as one of the main reason for the persistent slow pace
of the economic recovery.
We must now end the stagnation in the public capital stock which we have wit-
nessed since the crisis. Investments aimed at increasing productivity is the best way
to achieve this. It seems at times as if we suffer from a lack of understanding of the
added value of public investments. For example, in the field of education and health
care, investments contribute to reinforcing the human capital stock, enhancing the
supply side of the economy and contributing to growth. However, it is still mostly
considered to be current expenditure rather than investment.
The main problem is that the fiscal rules do not make a distinction between ope-
rational expenditures and investments. The situation has become even worse sin-
ce the application of the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA
2010, in force since September 2014). It means in practice that public investments
are calculated in the Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit and debt criteria over the
short period of the construction duration, whereas they should rather be conside-
red as long-term investments, and be written off over a far longer period of 15 to
20 years.
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This issue may only be the tip of the iceberg when we consider the full conse-
quences of the Stability and Growth Pact on public investment in Europe. To address
this issue, we must now take a step back and decide collectively which form of ex-
penses are indispensable to our relaunch and should accordingly be supported by
the EU and Member States, not only politically but also technically. This implies an
honest and non-dogmatic review of SGPs, including its interpretative communica-
tion of 2015.
coNclusioN
In conclusion, we can try together to figure out what the missing link is. The evidence
supporting the call for investments is clear. The academic case calling for increased
investment to support economic growth has been made. Only the political will to go
further must be tackled. My advice would be to use events such as the Rome Inve-
stment Forum as a means of pressure. We need to stop “speaking to ourselves”, and
now need to reach out to those who still need to be convinced.

THe case For aN iNVesTmeNT/producTiViTy compacT 
iN THe emu
Rainer Masera*
A key feature of the macroprudential paradigm of political economy is the focus on:
(i) the links and interactions of the various economic policies (and, therefore, the
effectiveness and potency of the policy mix), (ii) the role of fallacies of composi-
tion/division and (iii) the prominence of a medium term reference framework, to
capture transition and aggregation processes. In the Euroarea, this complex approach
goes beyond political economy and addresses directly the issue of political union.
The Eurozone must be seen as a network of economic policies, governance and po-
litical integration. This broad approach should not however become an excuse to avoid
a critical analysis of the economic policies pursued since 1999: there is the need for
an in-depth rethink of the Euroarea economic policies. A key point is the alleged “fact”
that a close relationship exists between the monetary base, money supply and pri-
ces. 
The links between fiscal, monetary, credit and bank capital policies should be
reassessed, without putting into question the objectives of fiscal rehabilitation, pri-
ce stability and sustainable growth. The issue is not so much that of flexibility, but
primarily of redefinition of the appropriate policy mix, which now puts an excessi-
ve reliance on monetary policy, and may ultimately result in perverse effects on sy-
stemic risks, and possibly – over time – on inflation itself.
The overburdening of monetary policy opens up also the issue of corporate go-
vernance of the ECB, which has full institutional responsibilities for monetary, liquidity,
and bank surveillance policies and de facto plays key roles in lending of last resort,
in macro prudential policy and in the elaboration of the Basel capital standard re-
gulatory framework. Additionally, with the EAPP, it has acquired important insti-
tutional spillovers (which fall outside the traditional domain of central banking) and
external role, notably in respect of the exchange rate of the Euro (according to Art.
111 of the Treaty foreign exchange policies should be jointly decided by the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the ECB). All these competencies may lead to potential conflicts
of interest. In any event, the approach of the Maastricht Treaty (single instrument,
single goal, fully independent central banking) requires review.
A central point is represented by the contradictory effects of (i) ever increasing
capital/liquidity and other requirements on banks – including incomplete/unsati-
* Dean of the Business School, Guglielmo Marconi University.
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sfactory rule-making on resolution mechanisms –, and (ii) the simultaneous pursue
of continued loosening of monetary policy/negative interest rates. The constraints
on banks affected and continue to affect growth. This creates a vicious circle. The
aim of microprudential safety and soundness becomes contradictory with the ma-
cro prudential requirement of balanced growth. Financial stability requires soundness
of the banking system. But, financial stability also requires growth: the trade-off bet-
ween regulation and growth is an issue of social cost-benefit analysis: the EU (one-
size-fits-all) approach has gone too far in increasing requirements on banks. This af-
fected growth and thwarted monetary policy. Also of great concern is the “collate-
ral damage” resulting from the conjunction of: (i) the EC untired banking regula-
tion and (ii) the ECB negative interest rate policy. This has a profound negative ef-
fect on the profitability of banks, and notably of “traditional” small and medium si-
zed banks, and hence on their possibility to raise fresh capital. On the other hand,
wholesale-finance specialty banks (notably leasing, factoring, consumer loans…) be-
nefit from the availability of low-interest funding from the Central Bank and the pa-
rallel decline in borrowing and lending rates.
The United States experience offers evidence of a radically different approach
to these issues (TARP, GSE, temporary suspension of mark-to-market accounting, sup-
port to securitisations and, above all, a tiered regulatory framework). The tiered ap-
proach is in the realm of the American law balancing principle. It is somewhat sur-
prising that the corresponding German (Prussian) proportionality model has not been
followed in the area of (level 1) Banking Regulation by the EU. An important reco-
gnition of the need to reassess the regulation/growth trade-off had been made by
the former Commissioner Hill.
A second clear instance of a wrong policy mix is offered by monetary and fiscal
policies. Fiscal rehabilitation and the reduction of debt/income ratios are a highly
desirable objective, but the austerity approach – as concretely applied, with emphasis
on the short-term budget balance in all countries simultaneously – contributed to
vicious loops. The outcome in terms of lower output and higher unemployment has
been underestimated: hence, the ratios of debt to income increased in many coun-
tries with high debt ratios. In Italy, for instance, the increase in the ratio was espe-
cially high during the austerity-driven Monti and Letta governments. These perverse
effects were heightened because of (i) the insufficient thrust of consistent structu-
ral policies, (ii) the inappropriate burden of the banking regulation concretely im-
plemented in the Banking Union framework, and (iii) the fact that certain countries
have been characterised by very high current account surpluses which exacerbated
the paradox of saving (let it be recalled that the cumulative current account surplus
of Germany and Netherlands since the introduction of the Euro is close to €3 trillion.
The burden on monetary policy to avoid deflation/depression became higher and
higher: the ECB had to stand alone for nearly a decade to prevent the dissolution of
the Euro, but the collateral negative effects create increasing damage.
There is a clear need to combine the appropriate fiscal and monetary actions with
well-designed, mutually consistent structural policies. This underlines the medium
term nature of economic policy processes. A key structural policy to be adopted through
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a concerted action by Eurozone countries would consist in ensuring tax neutrality
of debt and equity, which is key to overcoming the paradox of de-leveraging in the
private sector. This is especially important now: the perverse effects of the combi-
nation of very low/negative interest rates and of tax incentives for debt are evident:
financial bubbles may put at risk the long-term stability of the Euroarea. Saving is
penalised in the attempt to reduce the imbalance between saving and investment!
More specifically, pursuit in the area of a single overburdened monetary policy, of
constrained fiscal impulses and of uncoordinated structural policies may prove in-
consistent with complementarities over time and space of successful trajectories of
structural change, and therefore with an effective inclusive political economy of in-
terdependence.
It has been argued that interest rates are negative in the Euroarea fundamentally
because of an excess of saving over investment. Also from this point of view, it is ne-
cessary to foster investment from the lows recorded in the past decade. The Euro-
pean investment plan – as is certified by the EFSI and the EIB – shows that there are
ample opportunities for public and private investments in infrastructure, human ca-
pital, the environment, innovation, with positive social and private returns. These
investments also yield significant returns in mitigating the adverse impact on low
income groups of fiscal consolidations.
If public investment projects are rigorously selected and undertaken on the ba-
sis of economic return, effectiveness and cost-efficiency – preferably within a PPP
framework – public and private investment become fundamentally complementa-
ry. Under the conditions outlined, public capital has a crowding-in effect on priva-
te investment: increases in public capital raise the marginal productivity of private
capital. These arguments carry special weight in the current situation of excess sa-
ving, negative nominal interest rates, and slowing multi-factor productivity. The Ri-
cardian equivalence preoccupations recede (the marginal productivity of new in-
vestment outlays is higher than the nominal and the real cost of funding).
A compelling case can therefore be made to adopt now in the Euroarea a, say,
three-year productivity-investment compact to reinforce the Juncker Plan. More spe-
cifically, public investments selected by the EFSI – with direct country contributions
to its capital, in the form of guarantees or cash – would be exempted from the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, possibly up to predetermined ceilings. The proposal made
here: (i) ensures the effectiveness and productivity of new public capital, financed
at negative interest rates; (ii) helps overcome the current market failures and inap-
propriate burden of monetary policy; (iii) ensures that EFSI – financed projects are
allocated on their merits in a European perspective, and not on the basis of natio-
nal keys. The problem of “juste retour” would thus be overcome. Under the special
circumstances of the EMU process and the vital need to foster growth, innovation,
productivity, a forward-looking D/Y fiscal policy framework would therefore tem-
porarily be adopted (with the emphasis on the sustainable decline of the ratio, and
not on the actual decline of the stock of public debt). Admittedly, this might requi-
re in Germany a rescheduling of the debt-brake policy at the federal level (e.g. from
2016 to 2020 as already envisaged at the level of the regional governments). As in-
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dicated, this programme would be accompanied by precise commitments of Mem-
ber Countries to ensure coordinated in-depth structural reforms to help raise su-
stainable, inclusive economic growth, and to enact the Capital Markets Union. 
A final point is the need to reconsider also the international financial architec-
ture in which Eurozone policies are necessarily inserted: in particular, the simpli-
stic approach to the exchange rate and to external imbalances must be questioned.
The assumption according to which the market is left to determine the Euro exchange
rate, so that the ECB can direct money and credit policies to the domestic objective
is evidently reductive. EMU growth should be anchored to sustainable expansion of
domestic demand in the internal market, not to net exports and a depreciating Euro.
FiNaNce For compeTiTiVeNess, eNTrepreNeursHip 
aNd small eNTerprises

compeTiTiVeNess aNd smes iN THe coNTexT oF capiTal
marKeTs uNioN
Steven Maijoor*
I am delighted to have been invited to discuss the issues of competitiveness and Small
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the context of the Capital Markets Union or CMU. 
As you are no doubt aware, the objective of the CMU is to develop stronger and
deeper capital markets in the EU to allow funds to flow to European companies, be-
nefiting the real economy, through growth and investment. In light of the relative-
ly recent vote in the United Kingdom, I believe it is crucial to maintain, and even in-
crease, the momentum of the CMU. I say this because while the European economy
needs to be able to rely on funding provided by the banking system, the current over-
dependence on banks is not optimal for developing our businesses and consequen-
tly, economic growth.
There are, of course, a number of alternative sources of finance which together
can create a more diversified system of funding, with greater involvement from in-
stitutional and non-bank investors. I will focus shortly on the opportunities which
crowd funding, asset management and FinTech can offer to help us accomplish this
funding diversification and the work we at ESMA are doing in these areas. Increa-
sing the role of the non-banking sector will not only help businesses access much nee-
ded capital but should also help the EU in making a shift from debt to equity fun-
ding. This is an important shift to make if we are to remove the barriers that prevent
our entrepreneurs and SMEs from flourishing.
The CMU is so important for SMEs because they are an important source of eco-
nomic growth and job creation, yet many of them face challenges accessing finan-
cing. In the EU, less than half of SMEs (44% in 2016 compared to 41% in 2015) say
that they do not feel there are limitations on their access to finance and indeed, SMEs
do not enjoy the same level of direct access to capital markets as large companies do.
In the EU especially, where bank financing has the lion’s share, they remain overly
reliant on bank credit. 
Credit conditions have generally improved recently thanks to an accommoda-
tive monetary policy. However, while interest rates have tended to trend downward,
the interest rate spread between loans to SMEs and to large companies remains high
when compared to pre-crisis levels, suggesting that banks remain wary of SME fi-
nancing. Also, conditions vary greatly across countries in the EU. In Italy, SME in-
* Chairman, European Securities Market Authority – ESMA.
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terest rates declined by 21% between 2012 and 2014 but the interest rate spread bet-
ween loans to SMEs and to large enterprises is three times what it was in 2007.
Against this backdrop, access to finance, and the need for alternative funding chan-
nels, facilitating this access for start-ups and other unlisted firms, including SMEs,
is more acute than ever. So now let me turn to some of these alternatives and ESMA’s
work on them, starting with crowdfunding.
croWdFuNdiNg
Crowdfunding enables small businesses and SMEs to raise finance directly from the
public, potentially at a relatively low cost and in the current climate may be the only
way these firms can raise capital, e.g. because of their small size, elevated default
risk or high associated costs. Crowdfunding, therefore, provides a much needed al-
ternative to traditional funding sources and by offering an online marketplace to match
potential investors and businesses, crowdfunding can bring more competition into
retail and capital markets.
That being said, and although crowdfunding is growing quickly, capital raised
in this way remains limited compared to other financing sources. 2016 estimates sug-
gest that between EUR 4.1 and EUR 5.2 billion were raised through crowdfunding
platforms in 2015 across the EU. Investment-based crowdfunding alone – the focus
of ESMA – accounted for about EUR 0.5 to 0.6 billion, i.e. around 10% of the total.
Business finance, i.e. financing provided to businesses, represented EUR 0.5 billion
and 9,442 businesses. Those figures are pretty small when compared to other sour-
ces of funding. For example, stocks of loans to businesses from EU banks totalled EUR
5.3 trillion at the end of 2014; the amount of venture capital invested in European
private equity totalled EUR 5.3 billion in 2015.
Also, crowdfunding is not exempt from risks. In ESMA’s 2014 Opinion and Ad-
vice, we highlighted those risks, such as the significant potential for investors to lose
some or all of their capital, the lack of exit options and the limited information avai-
lable on the investment. We also advised EU legislators to consider the gaps and is-
sues in the current regulatory framework in relation to crowdfunding with a view
to both supporting the growth of the industry in the EU and addressing the risks that
may emerge. 
prospecTus
Let me now turn to prospectuses, those documents which are often seen as the ga-
teway to capital markets.
On 7 December, the European Council and Parliament agreed on a new set of
rules that support companies raising money on capital markets. These new rules will
exempt the smallest capital raisings from the burden of producing a lengthy and ex-
pensive prospectus: start-ups and SMEs will be able raise up to EUR 1 million on lo-
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cal markets without a prospectus. Member States will also be able to set higher thre-
sholds of up to EUR 8 million to support growth in their domestic markets. 
There will also be a new EU growth prospectus for SMEs and mid-caps which want
to raise money across the EU. While the broad parameters of this growth prospec-
tus have been set out by the co-legislators, ESMA is developing the precise disclo-
sure that will be required in such a document and we aim to consult on the precise
provisions towards the middle of 2017. The disclosure burden of this document should
be significantly alleviated in comparison to issuers seeking to raise funds on regu-
lated markets.
asseT maNagemeNT
In addition to our work on crowdfunding and prospectuses, earlier this year ESMA
started developing what it considers to be the key elements of a common Europe-
an framework for loan origination by investment funds as another strand to foste-
ring a more diversified range of funding in the EU. In April we published an Opinion
on this issue.
In the Opinion, we made some suggestions regarding organisational requirements
for managers of loan originating funds. These recommendations take account of the
fact that direct lending is an activity that requires specific expertise and internal struc-
tures. While it would not be appropriate to impose exactly the same rules as those
which apply to banks, there are certain key elements which we believe should be in
place before a fund can originate loans. These include having the requisite policies,
processes and procedures with respect to credit monitoring, renewal and refinan-
cing, assessment and scoring of borrowers, and identification of problem debt ma-
nagement. Such requirements should help reduce the risks that could arise from li-
quidity and maturity transformation, as well as imprudent lending. 
As a final remark on this topic, I would like to highlight our recommendations
on eligible debtors of loan funds. In line with one of the overall objectives of CMU
to increase funding to the real economy, we took the view that loan funds should not
be able to grant credit to financial institutions, other investment funds or the alter-
native investment fund manager itself. 
Looking to the future, to help increase competitiveness in the asset management
sector overall, which is a key goal of the CMU Action Plan, ESMA will shortly em-
bark, together with the other European Supervisory Authorities, on an exercise to
bring greater transparency to the fees and performance of long term retail investment
products. Providing European investors with a better basis for comparing investment
alternatives is expected to be useful for investors as well as for supervisors, notably
to identify areas of weaknesses across the EU. In doing so, this exercise will also shi-
ne a light on the level of competitiveness in the asset management sector. 
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FiNaNcial iNNoVaTioN 
In terms of competitiveness more generally, ESMA does not have a mandate to sup-
port competition as such but we do have an objective to ensure market integrity, and
as part of this objective, we focus on safeguarding a level playing field for market par-
ticipants.
Technological innovation in financial services is not new but FinTech investments
have sky rocketed recently: KPMG estimates that they have risen six-fold in the past
three years globally. We see FinTech as another evolutionary step in the long histo-
ry of financial innovation rather than an abrupt departure. In the FinTech sector the-
re are many start-up firms which may compete with or collaborate with established
firms as well as established firms also developing FinTech innovations themselves.
Although the level and pace of FinTech disruption varies across sectors and pro-
ducts, three elements are common to the broad range of FinTech phenomena, na-
mely (i) improved service and convenience, (ii) greater efficiency and (iii) decen-
tralisation and disintermediation. These three elements support greater competition
in the market place and help create better outcomes for customers.
From a regulatory standpoint, FinTech poses specific challenges to regulators as
existing regulation was not designed with these innovations in mind. We have ta-
ken a balanced approach to innovation in general and FinTech in particular. We are
vigilant in analysing any new risks that the technology may introduce that threaten
our objectives of investor protection, financial stability and orderly markets. At the
same time, we do not want to stifle innovations that will benefit consumers and mar-
kets. 
Specifically in the FinTech context, we are looking at areas such as automated
advice and distributed ledger technology (DLT), both in terms of the risks that are
inherent in both and their potential to make it easier for parties to transact directly
with one another, thereby reducing the costs of intermediation. 
Let me very briefly conclude by saying that the CMU is an ambitious initiative
which pushes in the right direction. The combination of the initatives that I have men-
tioned today should go some way in terms of making capital easier to access for small
business and SMEs. 
susTaiNaBle loNg-Term iNVesTmeNT aNd THe paN-europeaN
persoNal peNsioN producT
Gabriel Bernardino*
In my intervention I would like to point out:
• First, the EIOPA’s work linked with long-term infrastructure investment. 
• Second, EIOPA’s work on a Pan-European Personal Pension Product, the PEPP,
in the context of the Capital Market Union. 
To my first point, about EIOPA’s work linked with long-term infrastructure investment. 
Solvency II is a huge step forward in policyholder protection but also a game chan-
ger as regards the capacity of insurers to invest over the long-term. In fact, the im-
plementation of a risk-based capital regime comes with profound changes in the way
investments are treated from a regulatory perspective. First, the prudent person prin-
ciple eliminates regulatory restrictions and limits on investments but creates the re-
sponsibility for insurance undertakings to establish their own limits and investments
restrictions. Second, there are now granular capital requirements for individual in-
vestments. They reflect the underlying risks and are calibrated to the overall confi-
dence level established in the Solvency II Directive. While differences in risk char-
ges based on differences in the risk profile can influence investment behaviour they
are not “designed” to provide incentives for any specific asset. Concerns were rai-
sed that the standard formula calibration did not contain enough granularity and
so it was not reflecting the lower risk profile of infrastructure investments. EIOPA
looked into the matter and performed a very thorough and evidence-based analy-
sis. We consulted representatives of public authorities, insurance undertakings, in-
vestment managers and academics in a very transparent process. As a result, EIO-
PA developed a pioneer approach with the creation of a separate asset class under
Solvency II standard formula for investments in infrastructure projects allowing a
specific treatment for qualifying infrastructure project debt and equity. The quali-
fying infrastructure investments need to satisfy conditions relating to the predicta-
bility of the cash flows, the robustness of the contractual framework, and their abi-
lity to withstand relevant stress scenarios. Regarding calibrations, EIOPA recommended
changing the spread risk charge within the Solvency II standard formula for quali-
fying infrastructure debt investments according to a modified credit risk approach
* Chairman, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority – EIOPA.
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resulting in a reduction of around 30% in the risk charge for BBB rated qualifying
infrastructure. Risk charges for infrastructure equity investments were proposed to
be in a range between 30% and 39%. In terms of risk management, insurers should
in particular conduct adequate due diligence prior to the investment; establish writ-
ten procedures to monitor the performance of their exposures and regularly perform
stress tests on the cash flows and collateral values supporting the infrastructure pro-
ject. This has been incorporated in the Solvency II legal framework. In a next step
EIOPA recommended to extend the new asset class in two ways: First, to allow cer-
tain infrastructure corporates to qualify for the treatment for infrastructure projects
provided that there is an equivalent level of risk. Second, to create a separate dif-
ferentiated treatment for equity investments in high-quality infrastructure corporates.
In this work we followed an important principle: asset risk calibration in Solvency
II should not be used to privilege or incentive any specific asset class. If the regime
creates incentives that are not properly aligned with risks we will see the emergen-
ce of price distortions and vulnerabilities that will ultimately create financial stabi-
lity risks. I believe that Solvency II brings the right approach to investment by insurers.
The risks arising from a mismatch in the duration of assets and liabilities are reflected
in a higher regulatory capital requirement. This can be seen as an incentive to invest
in the longer term. Moreover, asset diversification is recognised as a key prudential
element. EIOPA will closely monitor the consequences of the Solvency II imple-
mentation on the asset side in order to ensure that long-term investments in infra-
structure are made on a sustainable basis. 
To my second point, EIOPA’s work on a Pan-European Personal Pension Product,
the PEPP, in the context of the Capital Markets Union.
One of the major challenges for countries in the European Union is the provision
of safe, adequate and sustainable pensions to their citizens. While there is a broad
consensus that both private occupational and personal pensions can play an important
role in diversifying the sources of retirement income on top of the public pension re-
gimes, the context of labour and demographic changes and the prolonged low in-
terest rate environment creates particular challenges also to private regimes. At the
same time, particularly in the area of long-term retirement savings, it is evident that
the European Union internal market is far from delivering its full potential. There
is a huge fragmentation of products available to consumers, from low-performing
deposits, to very often too complex and costly life insurance and mutual funds, many
of them not truly retirement saving products. Also consumer protection rules are very
different in the various European Union Member States. This fragmentation is a se-
rious obstacle to cross-border business, increases the costs, reduces the average re-
turns for savers and ultimately undermines consumer confidence in private pension
provision. This year, in February, EIOPA submitted to the European Commission its
final technical advice on a Pan-European Personal Pension Product, the PEPP, a safe,
transparent and cost-effective personal savings product. In our view the PEPP could
be the catalyst for efficiency gains through economies of scale and opportunities for
risk diversification as well for competition and innovation for the benefit of consu-
mers. We proposed a number of standardised and flexible features for the PEPP: 
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• Standardised information provision 
• Standardised limited investment choices, with one core “default” investment op-
tion, where the investment strategy takes into account the link between accu-
mulation and decumulation 
• Regulated, flexible caps on costs and charges
• Flexible biometric and financial guarantees 
The PEPP should have a long-term perspective in its investment policy to better re-
flect the long-term nature of retirement savings. This is particularly welcomed from
a macro-perspective because long-term investors are needed to provide stable fun-
ding to the European Union economy. In order to allow this long-term investment
horizon, the PEPP should envisage minimum holding periods to mitigate the surrender
risk. Sustainable investment in illiquid assets should match liabilities with a corre-
spondent illiquid profile. The analysis conducted brought us to the conclusion that
the PEPP, enacted through a 2nd regime, is a powerful tool to close the pension sa-
vings gap in Europe. This conclusion has been supported by the vast majority of sta-
keholders that responded to our public consultation. From the development of a Ca-
pital Markets Union the PEPP can be one of the most tangible outcomes and bene-
fits for European Union citizens. Together, we have to do everything to regain the
trust of Europe’s citizens in the European Union and its financial services industry.
Europeans request concrete solutions to their very pertinent problems such as the
lack of adequate retirement savings. With the PEPP European citizens could see the
benefits of building a true single market for capital. EIOPA stands ready to continue
to work on PEPP, namely in the design of „product pilots“. We intend to explore pure
individual Defined Contribution Schemes but also collective Profit Sharing Products.
While pure individual Defined Contribution Schemes can be designed to adjust in-
vestment risk throughout the live of the contract, thus reducing risk for members,
the development of collective Profit Sharing Products could allow the pooling of in-
vestments with the smoothing of returns across members of the pool, so that all mem-
bers benefit from average long-term returns of the fund and are protected from ex-
tremely negative outcomes in stressed market situations. 
The design of the PEPP “product pilots” need to ensure conditions to allow Eu-
ropean Union citizens to invest in a balanced portfolio that should include assets such
as equities, property, infrastructure and green technologies. With the appropriate
safeguards, this will provide a good chance to accumulate a pension that outperforms
inflation and grows to levels that can provide a decent standard of living. Provided
that by design these collective Profit Sharing Products avoid the exposure to short-
term market volatility the regulatory treatment in Solvency II could be aligned to the
risks effectively incurred, resulting possibly in lower capital requirements. Finally,
the PEPP “product pilots” need to be designed in a way to ensure the highest stan-
dards in transparency, fairness, governance and risk management. Very importan-
tly, in my view, the Capital Markets Union can only succeed if we are capable of re-
gaining confidence of the European Union citizens in the financial markets. In this
sense I strongly believe that supervisory convergence needs to be a high priority of
102 susTaiNaBle loNg-Term iNVesTmeNT
the Capital Markets Union. The implementation of the Capital Markets Union needs
to be accompanied with an evolution in the powers and tools available to EIOPA. To
break the current market fragmentation and to increase cross-border provision of
services we need to ensure that there are proper arrangements to achieve high qua-
lity supervision across the European Union. This should entail an appropriate mix
of centralised powers and tools and a clear mandate to reinforce supervisory con-
vergence. 
Financing long-term Europe needs to be a common objective; an objective that
preserves sustainability of businesses; an objective that benefits citizens. 
early sTage iNVesTors: THe H-Farm experieNce iN iTaly
Paolo Cuniberti*
H-FARM is an innovative platform that supports the creation of new business mo-
dels, implementing new digital systems and education programs for young people
and Italian companies. We started 12 years ago, from the idea of our visionary foun-
der, Riccardo Donadon, one of the most influential Italian entrepreneurs, who had
already established his reputation in the digital market with great achievements. Being
early stage investors in Italy is almost as crazy as bungee jumping from the Shuttle.
We are in a market that is almost non-existing, there is not a spread culture of investing
and betting on innovative ideas, as there is in the U.S., for example. Here people tend
to finance their own companies, and invest in what they know instead of taking the
risk on something new and with high potential. In Italy, Venture Capital investments
are only 0,002% of GDP and compared to European countries, we are on the last po-
sitions. We started in 2005, so in only twelve years of life we have transformed our-
selves, in order to become a sustainable financial institution, which is in fact what
we are now. 
Choosing the companies to accelerate is crucial: there is both a bit of science and
a bit of heart in our decisions. On average, we receive more than 300 applications
per acceleration program. We invite here 20 of them to present their project to our
investment committee and then we select 5 startups for a 4-months acceleration pro-
gram. During this period, startups define their vision, the structure of the team, and
their business plan. We have developed a corporate accelerator program. Basically
the sponsor is a corporation, that together with us defines a brief. Benefits are for
both sides: this process allows us to charge the expenses to the corporation and the
corporation is outsourcing its R&D or part of it. We believe that if a company wants
to disrupt its own business, it usually does not get disrupted by its own people, but
it needs to go out and start looking for external talents who can disrupt the company.
The idea is to team up with the corporation and define a way to operate and to par-
tnership with other companies. This approach is becoming the new best practice among
accelerators. In Europe, 80% of accelerators’ revenues is coming from corporate par-
tnerships and sponsorships. We keep startups together in our campus, for 4 months,
and then they fly out of the nest to became a huge company, or to become part of a
corporation. Therefore, in this way we create labour, we generate employment and
* CEO and Executive Vice Chairman, H-Farm.
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form professionals. Hopefully some of those entrepreneurs will turn into the next
Zuckerberg or Bill Gates, but that’s not the purpose: the idea is to create entrepre-
neurs, big or small doesn’t matter, as long as they are going to be independent and
effective members of this society (and produce taxes). 
Statistically, 1 out of 5 startup per program have a successful story, and by that
we do not mean Google-like successful story: we are not in Silicon Valley. Anyway,
we like to think in this way: we are located by a river called Sile, and we are next to
the “valle” (the valley), that in Venetian is the lagoon, so we are Sile-con-valle! 
Thanks to a number of visionary investors and entrepreneurs we have created
this business. Last year, we decided to raise more money and become financially more
sustainable: we want to produce ebitda and not just dreams, binary or digital payouts.
We decided to go public, so we got listed in the Italian AIM, which has been a significant
experience for us. AIM has provided us with new institutional investors, and has in-
creased the awareness of our brand. We have been able to raise money, permanent
capital, in order to follow and keep on following all the ventures we want to finan-
ce. 
We do not consider ourselves a subsidised venture: we are privately funded, equal-
ly, we managed to get the recognition of State’s institutions to be sustainable fun-
ded. We have just launched a very large infrastructure project, H-CAMPUS, that will
underpin our growth. It is a form of private
public investment, huge and meaningful in the sector we are investing in: Edu-
cation. Yes, education… because once you are crazy you just go for it! We want to
produce winners, we want to support those winners, both from an educational and
a financial point of view. Offering resources to young talents has always been our
job, from the beginning. So that’s what we are doing, with positive attitude and ener-
gy.
priVaTe equiTy aNd VeNTure capiTal supporTiNg
iNNoVaTioN
Gabriele Todesca*
The developments in the economies of Western Europe over the past decade have
raised the profile of European public finance institutions, on one hand by broade-
ning their scope of action with new funding and new activities, on the other by rai-
sing public awareness and scrutiny of the role of these institutions. 
This is especially the case for the investment arm of the European Union, the Eu-
ropean Investment Bank Group. The Group’s entity that is focusing more proactively
on the finance of innovation and SMEs is the European Investment Fund, a subsi-
diary of the European Investment Bank which also includes the European Commission
and a number of private and public financial institutions as its shareholders.
The European Investment Fund pursues its objective through two primary sets
of financial instruments: on one side, structured finance and securitisation instru-
ments, targeting mainly portfolios of loans to European SMEs; on the other, equity
instruments mainly in the form of investments into private equity and venture ca-
pital funds. 
My intervention focuses on the role of private equity and venture capital in the
support of innovation, in particular from the perspective of a public finance insti-
tution such as the European Investment Fund. In this respect, there are three main
points that I believe are important to address: the primary role of equity (rather than
debt) finance in the innovation ecosystem, the need to ensure that finance made avai-
lable by policy institutions reaches the right end-beneficiaries, and the role of non-
financial factors in the support of equity investments. Each of these points will be
discussed below in more detail.
Debt finance has never been as cheap in Europe and globally as over the past de-
cade. Policy institutions and central banks globally have provided a monetary stimulus
of unprecedented scale, which contributed to keeping afloat the global economy du-
ring the crisis. However, there are limits to what can be achieved through the pro-
vision of cheap debt finance. In fact, the small companies and start-ups that are the
backbone of a dynamic and innovative economy are arguably also those that have
the least need of debt finance. These companies tend to finance their product de-
velopment and growth plans with equity capital, mainly because of the flexibility
it provides and its longer-term investment horizon. Therefore, the massive monetary
* Head of NPI Platform, European Investment Fund – EIF.
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stimulus put in place in the past years by governments worldwide had to be com-
plemented by an equally strong support for the real economy in the form of equity
finance. At the EU level, this was one of the objectives of the Investment Plan for Eu-
rope (also known as the “Juncker Plan”), a EUR 315bn investment programme laun-
ched by the European Commission in co-operation with the European Investment
Bank Group, which among its key areas of focus includes the provision of junior debt
and equity finance to SMEs and other innovative companies. The success of the Eu-
ropean Investment Bank Group in delivering equity finance to end-beneficiaries over
the first two years of the Juncker Plan led to a proposal in September 2016 to extend
its duration and increase its funding.
The second point that I would like to address is about ensuring a correct tran-
smission mechanism of equity capital from the public finance providers to the end-
beneficiaries. In this respect, it is noted that investing equity in a company involves
a complex financial and commercial assessment, usually achieved through a due di-
ligence exercise on the target company. The complexity of this exercise makes this
activity difficult to scale, when performed directly by a financial institution. This is
one of the reasons why the European Investment Fund chose as its main delivery mo-
del an intermediated mechanism, operating as an investor in private equity and ven-
ture capital funds managed by independent fund managers, which in turn invest in
end-beneficiaries. This solution allows the European Investment Fund to multiply
its effort and to reach significant scale, funding thousands of innovative companies
through its network of fund managers. However, the other side of the coin in using
this indirect delivery model is the limited degree of control on the actual investment
decisions made by fund managers, raising the question of how to ensure that equi-
ty finance is made available to the right end-beneficiaries. The European Investment
Fund achieves this objective through two control mechanisms: on the one hand, by
negotiating clear and binding investment guidelines with fund managers, ensuring
they invest in companies that not only offer a good financial return, but also corre-
spond to a specific profile targeted by the European Investment Fund and other in-
vestors. On the other hand, the European Investment Fund sees its indirect delive-
ry model as a partnership with its network of fund managers, where each partner
must be correctly incentivised. This is primarily achieved through ensuring a full ali-
gnment of interests with fund managers, which benefit when investments are suc-
cessful, and are penalised when investments are unsuccessful. Sometimes investments
involve other stakeholders, like other private investors or sponsoring institutions, and
in all cases the European Investment Fund seeks to ensure that each party is correctly
incentivised and that the right alignment of interest is achieved among the different
stakeholders.
The third and last point that I would like to address is the key role of non-financial
factors in stimulating the growth of equity finance. It is evident that the supply of
capital acts as a catalyst for the industry but the growth of equity finance in Euro-
pe cannot only rely on the supply of new funding by public or private investors. Most
importantly, the legal and regulatory framework must be supportive of this type of
investments. Examples of such support are to be found in government actions, such
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as for instance the legal framework on Innovative Start-ups put in place by the Ita-
lian government in 2012. This framework acts at various levels of legislation (ad-
ministrative simplification, labour law, tax law, insolvency law) in order to define
a favourable regulatory regime for innovative companies that meet certain requi-
rements. Support can also be provided by making it easier or more interesting for
private investors to invest in private equity or venture capital funds: an example of
such action can be found in Italy in the Budget Law for 2017, which introduces a num-
ber of tax advantages (deductibility from an investor’s tax base of investments in start-
ups, tax breaks for capital gains on investments in unquoted companies) that make
investments in the asset class more interesting for investors. The second non-financial
factor that is worth mentioning is the economic environment and more particular-
ly the approach to risk-taking of investors, business owners and entrepreneurs. In
today’s Europe, entrepreneurs and investors tend to have a more conservative ap-
proach to risk-taking than in other markets. What an investor (often rightly) consi-
ders as sound financial management can sometimes be a hindrance to the rapid growth
and development of a European start-up company, which is potentially competing
with peers developing the same product or market in faraway places in Silicon Val-
ley or Asia, which may have vastly larger financial resources at their disposal. More
generally, a business environment that encourages risk-taking may lead to more fai-
lures, but also more and larger successes. 
By focusing on three aspects of innovation financing – the trade-off of equity and
debt finance, the need to align interests with stakeholders, and the need to put in
place the right non-financial incentives – I tried to illustrate the fact that the provi-
sion of funding is not and should never be considered as an end in itself. It is only
one of the measures (necessary but not sufficient) to be put in place for supporting
a dynamic and innovative economy.

FiNaNce For THe NeW risK sceNarios 
aNd gloBal resilieNce

poliTics aNd leadersHip iN THe Time oF uNcerTaiNTies:
gloBal aNd europeaN respoNses
Bernard Spitz*
We have entered the Time of Uncertainties. Only a year ago, the FT’s "Forecasting
the world in 2016" roundup predicted that Hillary Clinton would win. That the Uni-
ted Kingdom would not leave the EU. That by Christmas 2016, Angela Merkel would
no longer be Chancellor. And that Belgium would win the Euro.
In all fairness, most of us would not have done better. Nothing is happening as
planned. This is a worrying issue for our financial sector, which hates uncertainty
above all else. And it is a particularly sensitive issue in my own industry, insurance,
which must precisely adapt to this uncertain world and efficiently manage its risks.
Furthermore, it must do so within its own horizon: the long-term horizon.
Nothing is happening as planned in politics. We witnessed it in the United Kin-
gdom as well as in the United States. This year, five Eurozone countries, as well as
Russia and Turkey, face key elections. 
If anything, 2016 taught us that politics matters. The disastrous image of poli-
tical parties, abstentionism, the new influence of social networks all contribute to
the downgrading of politics. It is politics that stripped their European citizenship away
from the British young generations. Similarly, politics, by giving the Europhobes the
power to call for referendums, can unravel European construction.
In three months’ time, here in Rome, we shall celebrate the 60th anniversary of
the treaty that gave birth to Europe. Yet we cannot see any adequate political response
today to meet this challenge. There’s no leadership in Brussels. Confusion in Lon-
don. In all major continental capitals, the focus remains on short-term and resolu-
tely national issues. All populist scenarios remain possible. Rightly, markets keep re-
evaluating political risk ahead of any investment policy.
Nothing is happening as planned in politics. Nor in economics! We did learn the
lessons of the Great Depression: we did decide on unconventional quantitative ea-
sing policies. Central banks have been printing money. This led to negative rates in
order to avoid deflation and re-establish financing channels. Three months ago, you
saw that Henkel and Sanofi became the first private companies to borrow at nega-
tive rates. This policy has been effective. But it has toxic side effects: on the profi-
tability of banks, on the commitment of the states to carry out their structural re-
forms, on the risk-return scales; And, in particular, on life insurance yields, within
the asphyxiating framework imposed by Solvency II.
* President International & Europe, MEDEF; President, French Federation of Insurance – FFA.
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Traditional economic mechanisms no longer work. Low rates combined with lo-
wer oil prices did not stimulate investment and growth. Heavily indebted states have
been content to see the cost of their debt stabilize, without using this reprieve to re-
form. Monetary creation did not bring inflation. Some, Larry Summers or Daniel Co-
hen along them, endorse the thesis of secular stagnation. Others are waiting for Ja-
net Yellen and the Fed to start rising rates. Others still imagine increasingly heterodox
solutions: no cash societies, helicopter money. In Europe, there is no alignment bet-
ween the ECB and the main member countries.
Then markets were suddenly unlocked, not because of monetary, nor economic,
but political change. Donald Trump’s election, contrary to all expectations, heralds
a return of inflation. Ironically, Trump succeeds where central banks have failed. How?
Simply by waving the prospect of a Keynesian policy, however unorthodox in the cur-
rent employment levels in the United States. The four determinants of stimulus ac-
cording to Trump are:
• major infrastructure investment programs;
• expectations that the promised tax cuts will be re-injected into the economy;
• anticipating of wage increases, subject to a restrictive immigration policy;
• rising prices of goods resulting from trade protectionism.
Long-term US interest rates have therefore actually increased since the election, from
1.8 to 2.35% for 10-year government bonds. At the same time, we see a spontane-
ous and moderate rise in inflation, which is at a two-year high in the euro area and
the United States. In China, ex-factory prices rose for the first time since 2012. Mar-
kets shifted from deflation in February to a rise in inflation, mostly due to com-
modities’ rising prices and OPEC's shift in policy, extended for the first time to in-
clude a dozen non-OPEC countries. In Europe, rates will be capped by the intervention
of the ECB, normally expected to last until the end of 2017. They will remain at hi-
storically low levels; but still with some countries – present today – experiencing
a wider spread relative to the Bund, essentially based on assessments of their re-
spective political situations, as well of the uncertainty related to the upcoming elec-
tions.
Politics matters, not only because it carries in itself risks, but also because it may
solve economic conundrums. Almost all risks are in my view contingent on politics.
Not necessarily because of their nature, but because we look at them, talk them up
or down, deal with them in ways from which politics is never absent.
I do not need to stress that the terrorist risk is political par excellence. Other risks
indeed do not belong to the strict realm of political phenomena: I mean natural risks,
technological risks and regulatory risks. Take natural disasters risk. These risks will
increase with climate disruption. Last year, led by the French insurers’ Federation,
insurers from 26 countries launched a Climate Appeal at the COP 21 Paris summit,
stressing the urgency of our fight against global warming. 
The tools we offer to manage this new climate situation are prevention, insurance
and risk culture education, all of which fall under public policy. Allow me to express
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regrets, by the way, that European policy in this matter is practically non-existent,
whereas natural hazards do not stop at borders and therefore should concern us all.
Take technological risks and, first and foremost, cyber-risks caused by reckles-
sness, maliciousness, crime, not to mention attacks from hostile states or terrorist
organizations. In these matters, Europe’s awareness is only awaking now. The EU
has only made a start to unify its legal framework. Every day, businesses are the first
victims of cybercrime, but states are no less at risk. By way of illustration, Lloyd's has
estimated the damage of an attack on 70 power stations on the East Coast of the Uni-
ted States at $1 trillion.
Finally, we should take a hard look at regulatory risk. It is massive and strongly
shaped by politics. Europe’s Solvency II regulation of insurance companies is ina-
dequate: all of us here in this room know it. It is short-termist, to the disadvantage
of long-term investment. It discourages infrastructure financing. It removes insurers
from the real economy. It disadvantages equity investment. 
Worse, the new PRIIPS regulation is about to replace Solvency II as the worst thre-
at ever looming over on European savers. The European Parliament rejected it by an
overwhelming majority of 602 votes to 4. But this political victory is only an opti-
cal effect: if PRIIPS were to be adopted as it is, all of life insurance in Europe, par-
ticularly in France and Italy, would be badly affected by it. 
Policy issues require policy responses. Some will be national. This is both una-
voidable and desirable. Others will be collective. I hope that Europe will be able to
invent them for itself and that the anniversary of the Treaty of Rome will provide an
opportunity for a revival of the Union. Time is short and we must hurry.
Global questions that call for global responses. They bring us back to analysing
the political risk affecting so many countries and continents. We know the causes:
a feeling of exclusion among the richest countries’ middle classes. The rise of ine-
qualities. Fear of migration. A persistent mass unemployment among younger and
older workers. The fear of downward social mobility as new technologies change the
face of work. The rejection of globalization and free trade. We also know, only too
well, where, in history, xenophobia, inward looking attitudes, protectionism, na-
tionalism have all led.
These global trends call for a global response, linking economic progress and so-
cial progress. After the Second World War, the Bretton Woods Agreements laid the
foundations for a new type of global economic and financial governance. Other ma-
jor issues were dealt with at that time: diplomacy with the UN, as well as culture and
health. More recently, we started tackling together environmental issues, with the
success of the COP 21. But social issues, so evidently important in today’s crisis, lag-
ged behind, relegated to a framework of international institutions dating mainly from
the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.
The time has come to respond to the fear running through our public opinions.
Such a response can only come from members of the G20, via a process that would
set social issues at the heart of policy decisions, eventually under the auspices of UN.
We must construct a new Bretton Woods devoted to key social issues. This French
proposal was one of the highlights of the Berlin B20 that brought together repre-
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sentatives of business in the 20, only a few days ago. Why not make it the major thrust
of the G20 in Germany next year? To do so with, together, business leaders in the
B20 and major unions in the L20 could bring about decisive change.
As the first formal initiative of a postcolonial, post-Cold War and post-populist
globalized world, such an initiative, calling for for an international New Deal, would
have the merit of voicing the kind of political response that our fellow citizens have
been expecting. Until then, we must beware. The rise of inflation could be benefi-
cial at first. But it would place debtor countries in a situation where their debt will
become increasingly difficult to finance. The only real long-term solution for global
resilience therefore lies in decisively reconciling politics with economics. Politics, by
recognizing the need for a better social inclusion. Economics, by creating the con-
ditions for sustained growth, firmly grounded in productivity gains and innovation.
THe NeW laNdscape For iNFrasTrucTure FiNaNce
Sonja Gibbs*
cHaNges For THe BaNKiNg secTor
I would like to start with a few thoughts on the outlook for the banking sector in the
post-crisis regulatory environment. The push for higher bank capital requirements
has been a fundamental element of the post-crisis regulatory agenda. The rationa-
le for asking for banks to hold more capital comes in part from the Modigliani-Mil-
ler theorem, which is predicated on capital structure irrelevance – meaning that hi-
gher capital levels should reduce balance sheet leverage and risk, leading to a de-
cline in the cost of equity capital. In practice, however, there are tradeoffs. Although
much capital has been raised for global banks (Tier 1 capital has risen from around
8% in 2000-2007 to over 14% – Chart 1), the cost of bank capital has actually risen,
from 8-9% to 13-15% – a bit less for U.S. banks, and more for European banks. Why?
Certainly, concerns about legacy problems on balance sheet – NPLs, bad assets etc.,
have played a role. Balance sheet vulnerabilities also prompt concerns about the abi-
lity to cope with shocks – one reason for the emphasis on stress testing. But at a more
basic level, the lack of profitability in recent years challenges Modigliani-Miller. Re-
turn on equity has dropped from 15% pre-crisis to 8% for U.S. banks and 5-6% for
European banks (Chart 2). This poor profitability, coupled with uncertainty about
future earnings, has depressed bank valuations. For example, price-to-book ratios
are still well below 1x for European banks – pushing up the cost of equity (Chart 3).
There is also evidence that investors will not accept utility-like returns from banks
given their central role in the economy, which implies an inherent cyclicality and vo-
latility in earnings. 
Hence increasing capital and related requirements beyond some point – which
many believe has already been reached – could do more to reduce the volume and
increase the cost of lending than to increase stability in the system. This is a key con-
cern as discussions of proposed reforms to Basel III continue: although not intended
to raise capital requirements significantly, these reforms could well do so, not least
here in Europe.
So, what can the financial sector do to support growth and increase resilience?
A complex question, but the first step is clearly to be able to fulfill the basic function
* Senior Director Global Capital Markets Department, Institute of International Finance – IIF.
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of financing the economy, whether via traditional bank lending, capital markets fun-
ding, or new innovations – e.g. digital finance which in many countries is helping
promote financial inclusion. Both public and private sector efforts will be needed –
to address balance sheet issues including troubled assets, to build forward-looking
business models making full use of new financial technologies, and to ensure a ba-
lanced and effective regulatory framework. 
Chart 1: U.S. and Euro Area Banks – Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Source: Bloomberg, IIF.
Chart 2: U.S. and Euro Area Banks – Return on Equity
Source: Bloomberg, IIF.
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International consistency in regulation is also vital to strengthen the international
financial architecture, allowing capital to flow efficiently across borders. However,
given the growing risk that multilateralism will give way to more fragmentation in
policymaking, achieving international consistency in financial regulation may be-
come even more challenging. The momentous events of the past year, including Bre-
xit and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President may well represent additio-
nal obstacles to cross-border coordination. More broadly, these events highlight the
growing importance of political risk as a key factor in strategic planning and inve-
stment decisions (Chart 4). We cannot work to improve growth and resilience wi-
thout understanding political risk and its underlying causes (including income ine-
quality and hollowing-out of the middle class).
Chart 3: U.S. and Euro Area Banks--Price-to-Book Ratio
Source: Bloomberg, IIF.
Chart 4: Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Source: Bloomberg, IIF.
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iNFrasTrucTure as a source oF groWTH
Infrastructure has tremendous potential to improve economic growth prospects in
both the short and the long term. For many countries – particularly those with hi-
ghly efficient public investment – the multiplier effect of infrastructure spending is
significant. For example, for the Euro Area one euro of infrastructure spending is esti-
mated to deliver two euros in additional economic growth. 
At the same time, the need for infrastructure finance – particularly if we incor-
porate commitments to a lower-carbon environment (including green buildings, tran-
sport, and energy provision) – is estimated to be over $90 billion through 2030. Even
this vast sum does not include investment in social infrastructure, such as health, edu-
cation, and digital infrastructure. This type of investment is essential to improve fu-
ture social welfare and to propel countries into the digital era.
While the public sector and banks will continue to play a key role, expanding the
investor base – in particular, to channel more funding from institutional investors
–will be an essential element of addressing the infrastructure gap. Developing in-
frastructure as a full-fledged asset class, with a spectrum of investment opportuni-
ties  –including project/infrastructure bonds, listed and unlisted infrastructure se-
curities, open-ended funds, and securitization – will help mobilize private capital to
foster sustainable growth, reduce poverty and combat climate change.
This helps explain why the G20, the European Union, international institutions
and governments around the world are so focused on promoting infrastructure in-
vestment. Currently, the gap between projected needs and available funding is esti-
mated at about $3.5 trillion per year through 2030. But with debt-to-GDP in many
countries at very high levels across mature economies, governments no longer have
as much fiscal space to support infrastructure spending as they have had in the past
(Chart 5). Hence without more private sector involvement, there are limitations to
what can be accomplished, both in financial and in political terms. 
Changing circumstances have also limited bank participation in infrastructure
finance. Market and regulatory changes have led to significant deleveraging since
2007, with disincentives to longer-term, more illiquid investments. The landscape
for global project finance has thus changed significantly since the financial crisis, with
an overall decline in the volume of private bank loans – especially in greenfield and
to emerging market infrastructure. 
role oF iNsTiTuTioNal iNVesTors 
As public sector and bank financing for infrastructure diminished in the wake of the
financial crisis, capital markets financing has provided some offset. However, for emer-
ging markets, all forms of private sector participation in infrastructure financing de-
clined in 2015-16 with the fall in commodity prices and increase in political uncertainty
(Chart 6). Along with efforts to develop capital markets more broadly, such as de-
signing hedging instruments to facilitate local currency financing or facilitating ca-
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pital mobility, it will be vital to develop the infrastructure market to help channel
funding from institutional investors – both in mature and emerging markets. 
Raising awareness and improving the transparency of funding and co-funding
arrangements will help expand the investor base and support new infrastructure pro-
jects. As active players in infrastructure financing have a range of objectives, time
horizons and investment preferences, their diverse profiles allow for flexibility in risk
sharing:
• National governments: Despite pressure for fiscal consolidation, national go-
vernments will reman a key source of funding, able to absorb idiosyncratic risks,
Chart 5: General Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio
Source: IIF Global Debt Monitor. 
Chart 6: Private Participation in Infrastructure in EMs
Source: World Bank, IIF. 2016 = H1 annualized.
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offset cyclicality and collaborate with the private sector. Moreover, national go-
vernments have the capacity to create a conducive regulatory and investment en-
vironment, helping to channel resources to projects able to bring benefits to the
economy.
• Multilaterals, regional, national development banks: these are well-positioned
not only to provide financing, risk sharing and credit enhancement tools, but also
to promote best practices and disseminate information, bridging the gap between
project development, project finance and investors.
• Banks: Traditionally the dominant force in project finance, banks maintain a deep
repository of deal structuring expertise and close ties with project sponsors. De-
spite de-risking and retrenchment in recent years, they will continue to play a
major role.
• Large institutional investors, including insurers, pension funds, asset managers
and sovereign wealth funds may benefit most from establishing benchmarks and
developing infrastructure as an asset class more broadly.
• More specialized investors such as private equity firms are increasingly active in
infrastructure, including on the more illiquid end of the investment spectrum.
Establishing benchmarks and setting out the range of available instruments could
greatly facilitate further engagement, improving liquidity of secondary markets.
• Retail investors too have become more involved in infrastructure, including via
listed infrastructure equities and innovative mechanisms like crowdfunding.
cHalleNges iN aTTracTiNg more priVaTe secTor iNVesTmeNT
More progress is needed in building a pipeline of bankable/investible projects and
providing a supportive regulatory framework. Ensuring a continuum of infrastruc-
Chart 7: Sources of Infrastructure Project Finance
Source: World Bank, IIF.
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ture investment vehicles across the risk and liquidity spectrum is crucial. Given the
unique risk-reward profile of the asset class (offering yield, duration and portfolio
diversification, along with an inflation hedge), scaling the asset class would grea-
tly improve prospects for more portfolio allocations to infrastructure. Surveys sug-
gest that large pension funds, for example, have a desired allocation of about 5% for
infrastructure, but are only allocating about 1%. With estimated global assets un-
der management near $70 trillion, even a small increase in allocations would shift
hundreds of billions of dollars toward funding the infrastructure gap. 
A full spectrum of investment vehicles, including highly illiquid stakes, unlisted
and listed infrastructure securities, open-ended funds along with more risk sharing
options (including more standardized project bonds, partnerships between banks
and institutional investors; securitizations, REITs, etc.) would propel infrastructu-
re investment and channel resources to underfunded projects. For instance, while
attractive brownfield projects in mature markets are often many times oversubscribed,
greenfield investment and infrastructure in emerging markets tend to be much har-
der to fund. Such projects involve more complex assets, management challenges, deal
structuring, and potential downstream exposures that require monitoring. Green-
field investment also tends to entail more environmental, contractual and counterparty
risks.
Other important steps that will help channel more private-sector funding to in-
frastructure include a greater range of partnerships between banks and institutio-
nal investors; revitalizing securitization markets with an emphasis on infrastructu-
re debt; development of specialized derivatives products that can help mitigate risks
related to infrastructure investment; and development of local infrastructure mar-
kets, including in emerging markets.
supporTiNg more allocaTioN To iNFrasTrucTure iNVesTmeNT 
The OECD estimates that Basel III will more than triple the capital reserves that banks
must hold against losses. Proposed Basel III reforms – should they move ahead – could
further raise charges on infrastructure financing. More broadly, the net stable fun-
ding ratio (NSFR) requires that long-term lending be matched with long-term lia-
bilities – this has been a key driver of the reduction in allocations to long-term len-
ding, including infrastructure. Of note, the average maturity of infrastructure loans
in Europe is now about 7 years vs. 15 years before the crisis. 
In sum, addressing the gap between demand for and available supply of infra-
structure funding is a complex and challenging task. Important steps include ensuring
a fair and stable regulatory framework; better transparency around bankable/investible
project pipelines; efficient government coordination; promoting sound and stable
macroeconomic policy, and supporting investor/creditor rights including via a ro-
bust framework for dispute resolution.

risK sceNarios aNd groWTH opporTuNiTies: THe ouTlooK
Carlo Cottarelli*
A discussion of risk scenarios and global resilience must necessarily start with an as-
sessment of the global growth baseline around which risks may materialize. 
The growth projections published by the International Monetary Fund in January
2017, which essentially confirm for the whole world, if not for specific economies,
the September 2016 projections available at the time of the Rome Investment Fo-
rum, give a mixed picture of the growth outlook. The world is projected to grown,
in real terms, by 3.4 percent in 2017, a bit above the preliminary estimate for 2016
(3.1 percent) and a bit below the growth rate projected for 2018 (3.6 percent). In
spite of the repeated references, including by the International Monetary Fund and
the G20 community, to an “anemic growth”, these growth rates are not particular-
ly low by historical standards, especially in per capita terms. Granted, in the run up
to the 2008-09 financial and economic crash, global GDP growth was much higher,
averaging 4.5 percent per year during 2000-07. But that was, indeed, before the crash
and thanks, at least in part, to the macroeconomic policies, including expansiona-
ry monetary policies, that contributed to the crash. If, instead, we look at the pre-
vious thirty years, the world growth rates were much more contained: in the ave-
rage of the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s, the world economy grew by 3.6 per-
cent per year in absolute terms and by 2.3 percent in per capita terms, against an an-
nual per capita growth rate of 2.4 percent projected for 2016-17.
So, the good news is that growth rates are not too bad for the global economy.
The bad news is that the growth rate of advanced economies is much lower, and not
only with respect to that of emerging markets, but also with respect to their own past.
Advanced economies are projected to growth at an annual rate of 1.7 percent in 2016-
17, well below the growth rate recorded in the 1970-99 period (3.1 percent). That
is not all. This lower growth rate is achieved in spite of the extremely expansiona-
ry monetary policies undertaken by the central banks of all major advanced economies
since the 2008-09 crisis, pointing at a severe underlying weakness of aggregate de-
mand. Such weakness could have different origins: on the one hand, private sector
indebtedness (further discussed below) and the related deleveraging attempts im-
ply higher saving rates by the household sector, as well as prudence in undertaking
new investment projects by the business sector; on the other hand, the deep chan-
* Executive Director, International Monetary Fund – IMF.
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ges in income distribution occurred over the last few decades (also discussed below)
may have weakened structurally the ability of the middle class of advanced econo-
mies to consume.
Given the relative weakness of growth in the baseline projections for advanced
economies, it is even more important than usual to look at possible sources of risks
around the baseline, as well as at the resilience of the growth process to shocks. 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of risks: those arising from shocks that
are not anticipated in the baseline; and those arising from the difficulty of managing
the exit from the current very supportive macroeconomic policies and, hence, to the
inadequacy of the economic policies assumed in the baseline.
Prominent among the first group are the political risks. While, in the immedia-
te future, these risks are closely connected to some high-profile political elections
(first and foremost the forthcoming general elections in France and Germany), the
underlying theme is the rise of populism, intended as anti-establishment political
movements that benefit from a widespread feeling of unhappiness, impoveri-
shment and lack of economic prospects. Globalization and the related process of in-
come redistribution towards the “rich” that has emerged over the last two-three de-
cades in several advanced economies (including in the United States) has been a key
factor behind the rise of populism. The world is changing rapidly and not everyone
has been winning, especially in advanced economies. Uncertainties related to the
Trump presidency, not unrelated to the rise of populism, are also high, and give us
perhaps an early taste of the kind of risks coming from other elections ahead of us.
In the specific case of the United States key geopolitical risks arise from the possi-
ble deterioration of its relationship with China, as well as with other smaller coun-
tries like Mexico and Iran (the latter with potentially severe developments for oil pri-
ces). The medium-term risks arising from Brexit should also not be underestimated,
although, under normal circumstances and assuming no domino effect within the
EU, those risks could remain confined primarily to the United Kingdom itself.
Among the second group of risks, the most important ones relate to the exit from
the super expansionary monetary policies that have characterized the last few ye-
ars, coupled with the potential risks arising from unusually high levels of public debt,
including for euro area countries. At present, the liquidity overhang in bank portfolios
is unprecedented. Since 2008 the increase in base money (the sum of banknotes in
circulation and commercial banks’ deposits at central banks) has been in the range
of 300-400 percent in real terms (at least using the CPI deflator) in the main advanced
economies (the increase has been a bit lower in the euro area, which is, however, cat-
ching up rapidly). This surge in liquidity has taken place primarily through the pur-
chase of government securities by central banks. Alongside, money market interest
rates have fallen sharply, and, while edging up, are still close to zero in most coun-
tries. The reasons why this surge in liquidity has not had much effect on economic
activity are not yet well understood. It may have a lot to do with the tightening of
capital requirements that has made commercial banks very cautious in extending
new loans: not only capital requirements have been raised over the last ten years,
but there is still a lot of uncertainty about how much they will be raised in the fu-
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ture, including in the context of the so-called Basel 3.5 or Basel 4. At the same time,
the cost of bank equity has increased, as bank profits have been depressed, especially
in the retail sector, by low interest rates. Be this as it may, there will be sooner or la-
ter a need to exit from these super expansionary monetary policies and the exit may
not be too smooth. To start with, these policies may have given rise to bubbles in as-
set prices, which may be pricked by the eventual monetary tightening. Moreover, when
interest rates start rising, the full implications of the post-2008 public debt surge will
become apparent. All this could cause renewed pressures on the countries that are
failing in bringing their government primary surplus to a level sufficient to put their
public debt-to-GDP ratio on a clearly downward trajectory.
How resilient is the world economy to these shocks? Not much, I am afraid. The
main issue is the accumulation of debt and the related balance sheet vulnerabilities.
The last issue of the International Monetary Fund’s Fiscal Monitor (dated October
2016) informed us that “The global debt of the nonfinancial sector has more than
doubled in nominal terms since the turn of the century, reaching $152 trillion in 2015.
About two-thirds of this debt consists of liabilities of the private sector… current debt
levels, at 225 percent of world GDP… are at an all-time high.” 
High private sector debt implies the exposure of part of the private sector to in-
terest rates shocks. The public debt is also exposed to the risks of interest rates hi-
kes, the risk is particularly high for those high-debt countries which may suffer not
so much from a gradual interest rate increases but from a sudden surge in spreads
with respect to countries with higher credibility. This said, high public debt may con-
strain the action of most countries. The average public debt-to-GDP ratio of advan-
ced economies has increased by almost 40 percentage points between the end of 2007
and the end of 2016, and is now close to 110 percent. High public debt means that,
in case of shocks hitting the whole economy, the public sector will have limited or,
in some cases, no fiscal space to support the economy. including its financial sector.
There are of course some countries where fiscal space does exist (for example, Ger-
many, Korea, Canada), but the majority of countries do not have much room, taking
also into account demographic pressures, and the related sizable implicit public debt.
Monetary policy’s capability to respond to exogenous shocks remains constrained
by a transmission mechanism that, for whatever reason, is not working as in the past.
Monetary policy could become more effective if financial regulations were relaxed
but that would be unlikely to happen (as it would probably be seen negatively and
perhaps counterproductive) if that relaxation occurred at a time when financial mar-
kets are hit by a confidence shock,
Altogether, the baseline growth is not great, at least in advanced countries, dow-
nside risks are sizable, the degree of resilience of advanced economies is not high,
and policy ammunitions to muffle the shocks are limited. In a nutshell, it is not re-
ally a great outlook.

approacHiNg NeW risKs aNd improViNg resilieNce: 
a pracTiTioNer’s perspecTiVe
Mark Garvin*
I would like to take a practitioner’s perspective on the new risks we are facing and
how we can improve our resilience to them. Addressing resiliency issues is a prere-
quisite to facilitating jobs and growth in Europe and safeguarding the so-called ‘real
economy’. While much has been done in improving the resiliency of the financial sy-
stem, we have more work ahead. Likewise, policymakers are dealing with major po-
litical challenges and risks. We need to improve resiliency on both fronts as this is
a prerequisite to the growth for which we all yearn.
marKeT coNdiTioNs aNd liquidiTy
One of these risks is market liquidity. An evolution in market structure, combined
with changes to participant behaviour, new participants, new regulations and mo-
netary policy have impacted liquidity dynamics in fixed income markets. The pro-
liferation of multilateral trading facilities and the increased automation of markets
have contributed to this trend, especially as many of these platforms are new with
untested robustness. And there is evidence of this trend:
• Banks’ liquidity portfolios are growing: 
The largest banks hold about 20 percent of their balance sheet in the form of li-
quid assets, nearly double the share they held pre-crisis.
Markets have become more volatile, especially in response to political events. Recent
examples include: 
• October Pound Flash Crash: The GBP dropped more than 8% from $1.26 to
$1.1491 in just eight minutes – the worst one-day drop since the 10% fall in the
immediate aftermath of the result of the Brexit vote in June. Just 30 minutes la-
ter the pound had recovered to $1.24.
While the cause has yet to be oﬃcially established, Brexit uncertainty would not
have helped. 
* Vice Chairman Corporate & Investment Bank, J.P. Morgan.
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This is important because, without a market, investors have few options and can get
stuck with big losses. This has a direct impact on decisions around issuance and pri-
cing. It is encouraging that the European Commission has recognised this problem
in their 2016 follow-up report on the cumulative impact of financial regulation. Ho-
wever, some forthcoming requirements will likely further constrain liquidity. 
• Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC): The increased issuance of bank debt may
crowd-out demand for subordinated corporate debt, potentially resulting in higher
rates for corporates. This assumes, however, that investors view TLAC debt as safe;
the ultimate effects on market liquidity remain unknown. This would be especially
concerning in the EU if it impedes development of a Capital Markets Union.
• Fundamental Review of The Trading Book (FRTB): The final version of Basel’s
FRTB resulted in a notable rise in industry aggregate capital requirements for
market risk. As firms adjust to this new constraint, it could potentially put fur-
ther pressure on market depth and business revenue.
• MiFID II/ MiFIR: Post-trade reporting requirements under MiFID II could also
put at risk the capacity or willingness of intermediaries to execute in size in thin-
ly-traded securities.
• Money Market Funds rules: SEC rules have seen dramatic shift of investment from
prime MMFs (those investing in corporate bonds) to government MMFs (inve-
sting predominately US Treasuries). This has led to a significant widening of cre-
dit spreads in the short end of the curve and increased difficulty for corporate
issuers in financing short term paper. EU rules will also have an impact but still
not entirely clear.
The prospect of further constraints on market liquidity is even more worrying con-
sidering the macroeconomic environment, specifically the possibility of rising dol-
lar interest rates. Rising rates are often correlated with increased volatility and stres-
ses in the system. 
geopoliTical risKs
So all of these changes have already weakened markets. Then you have to layer on
the intrusion of heightened geopolitical risk and shocks. This risk is not new. It is so-
mething which we as a firm have always tried to monitor and manage. However, over
the past year, it has taken on a new form; in some ways, it has shifted from the re-
alm of risk to the realm of uncertainty. 
Brexit is a democratic decision and we should, and do, respect that. However,
it produces a degree of risk and uncertainty that could hurt European jobs, growth,
markets and the real economy if not managed correctly. The terms of Britain’s exit
will be decided (hopefully in an amicable and constructive environment) between
UK and EU politicians. As a firm, we believe continued access to the EU Single Mar-
ket for UK-based firms would be the best outcome, however challenging. 
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But whatever the final terms of the UK’s departure from the EU, it is only sensi-
ble that the transition to that end state is managed in such a way as to preserve Eu-
ropean jobs and growth and limit market uncertainty. There is no excuse for a Bre-
xit outcome that is both damaging in the end and damaging in the means. That is
why we ask the UK and the EU to agree to preserve the status quo for a minimum
of 3 years from the end of negotiations so that there is time to implement any ne-
cessary changes on an informed basis, and avoid a “cliff-edge”. This makes as much
sense for the European financial stability and economics as it does for the UK. 
As Carney said in 2016, “Additional risks to the euro area could emerge as a con-
sequence of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union. Banks located in the UK
supply over half of debt and equity issuance by continental firms, and account for
over three quarters of foreign exchange and derivatives activity in the EU… If the-
se UK-based firms have to adjust their activities in a short time frame, there could
be a greater risk of disruption to services provided to the European real economy,
some of which could spill back to the UK economy through trade and financial lin-
kages”.
A sensible transition period would help create a safer situation for all Europe-
an financial markets. How are we going to achieve Juncker Plan goals of increased
investment if we’re simultaneously damaging Europe’s financial markets? What would
be the implications for European jobs and growth? All of these are reliant on well-
functioning markets. How can we expect to achieve the ambitious objectives of the
Capital Markets Union (CMU) project in that environment? We have to be careful
not to allow the fragmentation and Balkanisation of capital markets. For example,
new European Commission proposals could require non-EU banks to establish an EU-
located Intermediate Holding Company (IHC). This could put barriers in place for
firms willing to commit capital to Europe’s capital markets and could precipitate de-
cisions by firms about whether certain activities remain economically viable, redu-
cing the number of market participants/competition. This, as well as Brexit and the
election of President Trump, may hint at a broader question of whether we are hea-
ding towards some sort of financial regulatory de-globalisation. 
However, while we work on managing Brexit, we should not let Brexit suck the
oxygen out of the room from all the other issues that are already on the table. 
cyBer-resilieNce
One of these is cyber security. As banking assets are increasingly digitised and as the
sector becomes more interconnected, often through the introduction of new infra-
structure, cybersecurity has become a growing concern for the industry and poli-
cymakers alike. Cyber risks present new challenges to all market participants as no
entity is safe from a cyber attack. 
Banks have responded to cyber threats with greater cybersecurity oversight, ma-
nagement, controls, and expenditure. J.P. Morgan’s own investment in cybersecu-
rity will be about $600 million in 2016. At the same time, cybersecurity has beco-
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me a government-wide concern across the globe, with law enforcement, intelligence
agencies, legislators, and financial regulators all making cybersecurity a top policy
priority. Greater collaboration is needed between industry and regulators, as well
as among regulators across different jurisdictions, to ensure that we do not end up
with fragmented and duplicative approaches to cyber that do not leverage the col-
lective knowledge and skills from across the globe. The U.S. National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework is widely regarded as a best
practice across sectors – and should serve as the foundation of a globally collaborative
and consistent policy approach to cybersecurity. Moreover, we support a common-
ly accepted penetration testing framework that enables regulators and firms to use
testing events and results to satisfy multiple firm self-assessment and regulatory su-
pervisory objectives, and to provide a common standard for comparison.
ceNTral couNTerparTies 
The use of central counterparties (CCPs) is now mandated by G20 commitment, ma-
king them a concentration point of risk in the financial markets. Moreover, we ex-
pect CCP activity to grow further over the next couple of years. It is critical that CCP
recovery & resolution are addressed in a manner that limits market contagion (the
ultimate goal of the market reforms), provides clarity and confidence to market par-
ticipants, avoids pro-cyclicality, moral hazard within CCPs and ensures the continuity
of critical financial market functions.
The global nature of CCPs makes a globally consistent regulatory framework im-
perative. Cross-border cooperation is critical. To this end, we support the work of
both CPMI-IOSCO and FSB on resiliency & recovery standards, and resolution gui-
dance. We also support the European Commissions’ work in this area. The Europe-
an Commission just published a legislative proposal on November 28th. These pro-
posals will be discussed and amended by the European Parliament and EU Member
States. We’re hopeful that this process stays aligned to the global work streams and
encourages sound CCP governance, and discourages moral hazard. Rules should con-
tain well-calibrated resolution tools and provides transparency around recovery and
resolution to allow the market to plan and adjust appropriately.
coNclusioN
I have laid out some of the new risks and uncertainties we face and some thoughts
on how we could respond and remain resilient to them. As I said, it seems uncertainty
has become the new normal. While this situation is not ideal, we are in the business
of managing risk and most of these risks are largely manageable. We may not like
low interest rates, or anticipate volatility around rising rates, but we can deal with
them. We may not like to see a lack of liquidity in our markets, but we can help mi-
tigate this by crafting regulation with this in mind. Whatever our views on Brexit prior
131
to the referendum, now is the time to think intelligently and make it work. I do not
take this lightly, addressing these issues of course will involve a great deal of effort.
We would all prefer to be laser-focussed on creating jobs and economic growth in
Europe – we should not lose sight of important growth-driven measures. But if we
haven’t addressed uncertainty both to financial system and the political system, we
won’t see the economic growth we’d like.

THe NeW WaVe oF populism: THreaTs aNd respoNses
Rony Hamaui*
iNTroducTioN: WHaT do We meaN By populism?
Populist ideas and parties are present in every single historical epoch, in every re-
gion of the globe and under numerous ideologies. The “Peoples” were, for example,
a faction in the Roman senate, who wanted to govern through the mobilization of
Roman masses. Among the most famous populist we can remember Tiberio Grac-
co, Gaio Mario and Cesare Augusto, who used the referendum to bypass the Roman
Senate. In the modern age, populist ideas could be found during Protestant reform,
where groups such as the Anabaptists in Germany or the Puritans in England based
their policy on a theocratic ideological society in which peasants would be able to
read the Bible alone and to govern themselves1. Even during the French Revolution
many leaders, led by wealthy intellectuals, displayed populist ideas against the ex-
cessive privileges of the Ancient Regiment elite.
It is, however, in the middle of the nineteenth century where the first political-
cultural movement called the explicitly "populist" was born in Russia. The proponents
had identified in the peasants the revolutionary force capable of overthrowing the
authoritarian Tsarist system, moving directly to socialism without the need to pass
through the capitalist stage of industrialization. The United States also saw at the
end of the nineteenth century the birth of a “People's Party”, also known as the Po-
pulist Party, supporting the less wealthy southern classes and strongly opposing to
banks, railways and in general to elites.
Clear we can find populist connotations in the Italian Fascism and German Na-
zism, as well as, in many Latin American leaders such as Aprismo in Peru, Getúlio
Vargas in Brazil, Perón in Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, and Hugo Chavez
in Venezuela.
As we understand, at the basis of these different experiences are equally diver-
se ideologies, not always easily framed in a single scheme. All this makes very dif-
ficult to even define the concept of populism, a term frequently used in a questio-
* Chairman, Assifact.
1. T. Scott, “The Early Reformation in Germany: Between Secular Impact and Radical Vision”,
Ashgate, 2013. Christopher Hill, “The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas” in the En-
glish Revolution.
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nable way. The more general definition of populism emphasizes how these move-
ments use a very aggressive language to defend “the common man” against the pri-
vileged elites. Other authors, such as Dornbusch and Edwards, referring to South
American, call populist those political groups that, in the name of a fairer distribu-
tion of income, pursue hyper-expansive economic policies that end up harming the
poorest, or better, masked right wing interests with apparently leftist politics (lef-
tist bias)2. Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski of Harvard University then attempted
to build a taxonomy of populist policies based on ideologies, styles and strategies3.
THe BesT deFiNiTioN oF THe populisT applicaBle 
To moderN WesTerN couNTries
Perhaps, the best definition of the populist applicable to modern Western countries
is the one coined by Cas Muddle, according to which populist philosophies are a set
of ideas that contain three main components4:
1. Anti-establishment. That is a strong criticism of existing authorities, politicians,
media, elite, experts, multinationals, banks…, generally considered corrupt. The-
se strong powers are opposed to the honesty of ordinary people, who are seen
in a homogeneous and positive manner (the silent majority).
2. Authoritarianism. Almost always, populist movements are led by a charismatic
leader, who favors direct representation, referendums, and plebiscites. Indirect
representation and administrative bureaucratic structures are instead seriously
criticized.
3. Nationalism and Xenophobia. The defense of national interests over internatio-
nal cooperation, racism and border closure are then salient features of modern
populism.
This kind of conception contrast with a liberal cosmopolitan culture, in which the
values open borders are emphasized and where the diversity of peoples and cultu-
res are seen positively. In this framework the importance of the weights and coun-
terweights, typical of representative democracy, are highlighted. The values of to-
lerance and the protection of minorities are fundamental and equal rights to minorities,
women and homosexuals are the natural complement.
2. R. Dornbusch, and S. Edwards, eds. (1991) “The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin Ame-
rica”. J. Sachs, (1989) “Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America,” NBER Working
Paper No. 2897. See aloso D. Acemoglu, G. Egorov, K. Sonin (2011), “A Political Theory of
Populism” NBER Working Paper No. 17306.
3. Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski (2013), “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Re-
search Agenda”, Working Paper Series, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, No.13-0004.
4. C. Muddle (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe NY, Cambridge University Press.
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In this context the traditional contrast between left and right parties is overco-
me. Especially in the economic sphere. Indeed, populist parties often say that they
want to pursue leftist policies, which involve a significant state intervention, a strong
redistribution of income, and a non-district struggle for monopolies (Chart 2).
THe sTaTe oF populisT parTies iN europe
A 2016 inquiry into the parties’ nature of about thirty European countries shows that,
although in general, more open-minded formations tend to pursue Keynesian-sty-
le policies, the more populist parties are equally divided between right-wing and left
economic policies (Chart 2)5. On the front of parliamentary representation in the Eu-
ropean elections, Inglehart and Norris also show that the strong growth of the po-
pulist parties observed since the 1960s is almost equally distributed among those
pursuing right and left economic policies (Chart 3)6.
WHaT are THe reasoNs For groWTH oF populisT ideas?
In general terms it can be stated that there are three different schools of thought,
not necessarily incompatible, behind the reasons why the populist parties find a fer-
Chart 1: A heuristic model of party competition in Western societies
Source: Inglehart and Norris (2016).
5. Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014.
6. R. F. Inglehart and P. Norris, (2016), “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic have-
Nots and Cultural Backlash”, HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series, No RWP16-026.
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Chat 2: Classification of European parties
Source: 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey.
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tile ground for growth in some historical moments and countries. First, there are theo-
ries related to the structure and quality of institutions such as the nature of the con-
stitutional charter and the electoral law. In particular, proportional-based electoral
systems, often requiring the formation of large coalitions of parties, make it more
difficult for populist parties to emerge7.The same happens in uninominal colleges
system with ballots. 
Secondly, there are theories related to the offer of leaders and parties able to pro-
pose tempting alternatives in term political programs. For example, Michael Broning
argued that with the collapse of ideologies, both the left parties, such as Tony Blai-
r’s New Labor, and right parties, like Democratic Christians of Angela Markel, have
increased their centered connotations8. This allowed populist parties to pick up di-
scontent and represent the interests of the “defeated”. A sort of Darwinism that can
change the political landscape.
Finally, there are theories related to the demand side, that is related to the needs
of the people. The latter can be distinguished into economic theories, in which the
growth of populist movements depends on economic crises, increase in inequality
or transformation of productive structures caused by technological innovations or
Chart 3: The growth of populist right and left parties in Western countries 
Source: Calculated from Holger Döring and Philip Manow. 2016. Parliaments and governments da-
tabase (ParlGov) ‘Elections’ dataset: http://www.parlgov.org/.
7. A. Lijphart (1994), “Electoral Systems and Party Systems”, Oxford University Press. P. Nor-
ris (2005), “Electoral Engineering”, Cambridge University Press.
8. M. Broning (2016), “The rise of Populism in Europe”, Foreign Policy, June. 
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globalization, and theories where populist movements arise from changes in cultural
values, which some social groups cannot accept.
Many historians, sociologists and economists have thus explained the birth of
Nazism as a result of the economic crisis and the state of frustration and impoveri-
shment of the small bourgeoisie followed by the great war and German hyperinflation
of the 1920s. In the 1980s, Jeffrey Sachs pointed out that in Latin America, at the
base of both right and left populist governments, there were the huge inequalities
and the resulting social conflicts that characterize those countries. In this situation,
the poorest urban classes believed they could find a solution to their problems in po-
pulist leaders, who proposed strong stimulus to the economy. However, these poli-
cies, after a few years in which they appeared to have achieved good results, cau-
sed heavy deficits in the balance of payments, repeated currency crises, hyperinflation,
and ultimately a heavy reduction in real wages, which made nothing less than to in-
crease popular discontent.
More recently, the strong growth in inequality has been well documented by Tho-
mas Piketty, and Branko Milanovic9. The latter, with its famous elephant curve, shows
Chart 4: The Elephant Curve 
Source: MA. B. Milanovic (2016), “Global Inequality, A New Approach for the Age of Globaliza-
tion”, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
9. T. Piketty (2014), Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press. MA. B. Milanovic (2016), “Global Inequality, A New Approach for the
Age of Globalization”, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
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how between 1988 and 2008, while many of the poor in the Third World were able
to get out of poverty, and few rich in advanced countries showed growth rates clo-
se to 70%, Western middle classes were struggling to defend their purchasing po-
wer (Chart 4). Globalization, relocation, outsourcing, capital mobility, technologi-
cal change and consequently the automation of production processes and the de-
velopment of the so-called knowledge economy, as well as the weakening of trade
unions and parties traditionally defending the working class explain these dynamics.
The subsequent long and profound economic crisis and the austerity policies that,
above all in Europe, were followed by strong public deficits, have made nothing but
to impoverish and frighten a broad slice of middle and low classes. Thus increasing
inequalities in terms of income and wealth come together with the much more in-
sidious diminishing opportunities for the future.
However, since the late 1960s, the opulent Western societies have also experienced
an extraordinary change in cultural values. Attention to gender differences and se-
xual preferences, tolerance to diversity and minorities, secularization, multi-cultures
and environmentalism have become the central value of a wide range of well-educated
young people. For the first time, homosexual, ecologist and human rights movements
were born. Over time, these trends have also had an impressive effect on traditional
parties. So non-economic themes, typical of a post-materialist society, have taken on
a very significant weight in the political programs of all major parties (Chart 5).
Chart 5: Non-economic issues the party manifestos of Western Democracies
Source: Party Manifestos data from Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States, in Zakharov (2013).
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some coNclusioNs
It is evident that both economic and cultural explanations interact with each other,
making them sometimes indistinguishable from an empirical point of view. For exam-
ple, the economic crisis may have increased polarization between classes/groups with
different cultural values. So the middle class, bearer of traditional values, is obviously
more attracted to populist movements where its economic situation deteriorated in
relative terms: In the same way it is likely that young, precarious or uneducated per-
sons are more likely to be tempted by nationalistic populist movements and parties.
In some respects, it resembles the ancient Marxian memory discussion between struc-
tural and superstructure in a modern key, where, of course, we are no longer talking
about ideologies or religion, as Weber did, but about the values of a post-industrial
society.
Whatever the reasons, it is clear that populist movements are one of the major
threat that the rich Western societies are running. Risks to which the traditional right
wing and left wing parties are have not yet found adequate response.
disasTer risK reducTioN: a sHared respoNsiBiliTy
Paola Albrito*
In 2015 alone, 346 disasters were reported, 22,773 people lost their lives and 98.6
million people were affected by those disasters with US$66.5 billion of economic da-
mages. Globally, disaster losses have increased to $250-300 billion a year; over 80%
of economic losses from disasters are due to weather-related hazards. 
Last year in Europe, the number of hydrological disasters showed a 45% increase
compared to its decennial average. Still last year 19.2 million people were displaced
by natural hazards in 113 countries. 
This is a trend that heavily undermines development capacity of affected but also
neighboring countries and reverses hard-won development gains, whilst also driving
humanitarian needs. 
Europe is overall experiencing a challenging moment (migration crises, terro-
rism, conflict and diplomatic tensions). This situation has given way to the rising of
individualist, short term and “inside looking” approaches where values and princi-
ples needs to be constantly reminded.
The first consideration that I would like to share with you is that this particular
challenging moment requires dialogue, the application of humanitarian principles
and human rights approach to ensure a societal constructive commitment. Finding
the right narrative to stimulate positive responses to such challenges and addressing
their underlying causes has to be part of our common engagement. 
One positive development to build upon has been the international communi-
ty capacity to create coherence in the post-2015 international agendas (Sendai Fra-
mework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development,
and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the New Urban Agenda). The endor-
sement of these international agreements and their coherent and mutually reinforcing
approaches to their implementation allows avoiding programmatic overlapping of
activities and improving financial allocation. Taken together, they urge attention to
a wide range of risks facing communities around the world, guide public and pri-
vate investments towards greater resilience and push delivery towards maximum
impact. 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the first inter-
national agreement adopted in Sendai, Japan in March 2015, recognized that en-
* Chief Regional Office for Europe and Central Asia, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Re-
duction.
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suring credible links between these processes contributes to building resilience and
achieving the global goal to eradicate poverty in a changing climate.
Implementing disaster risk reduction activities addresses the underlying causes
of fragility including migration/crises situations. Displacement is often an indica-
tion of the breakdown of normal coping strategies when resilience is undermined
by a severe disaster event. The majority of displacement by natural hazards in 2015
was caused by extreme weather events due to a record number of droughts, wide-
spread flooding and 90 major tropical storms. Much of this was fuelled by a very strong
El Niño occurring in the context of climate change.
The recognized reality that disasters due to natural hazards have no borders has
allowed for disaster risk reduction to be a topic that has no diplomatic sensitives at-
tached to it, while national and regional dialogue is consistently valued.
The second consideration is that we are leaving in an interlink society where si-
los practices are not longer an option. The 2010 volcanic eruption in Iceland led to
major economic losses in travel, tourism and trade, amounting to $4.7 billion glo-
bally in just the first week. Similarly, the private sector bore about 95 per cent of the
colossal economic losses ($44 billion) incurred during the 2011 Thailand floods. The
Fukushima disaster proved the complexity of cascade effects – an earthquake com-
menced the incident, causing significant damage on land; the earthquake, then, trig-
gered a series of large tsunami waves; the tsunami caused a major nuclear accident
at the Fukushima nuclear power station – and reminded us of importance of ensu-
ring a multy hazard approach in viewing risks. The Great East Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami resulted in suspension of production in 80% of automotive plants in Japan,
at enormous economic cost, both in Japan and globally. Often, cascade effects of di-
sasters include damages to the ecosystem, to economic activities, disruption of ser-
vices and damages to cultural heritage, which are fundamental to the prosperity of
other economic activities not directly affected by the disaster but rather result from
the disruption of the social system of the community.
An interlinked society needs to reflect on the concept of shared responsibility.
Disaster risk is rarely made explicit to investors and is often only discovered in the
event of a disaster. The short-term profitability of speculative urban development
does not encourage consideration of disaster risks, which may only manifest as los-
ses after the development has been sold. Investors or developers rarely take re-
sponsibility or accountability for the disaster risk that may be generated and sold on.
It is therefore crucial to ensure an all-of-society inclusive approach in looking at di-
saster risk. The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) – a bien-
nial global assessment of disaster risk reduction and comprehensive review and ana-
lysis of the natural hazards that are affecting humanity – provides a number of com-
prehensive examples on the concept of shared responsibility of risks. In its 2013 edi-
tion dedicated to the private sector and disaster prevention, the GAR highlights in
particular the example of sea level risk and investments in Miami. 
My last consideration is that if we want to get ahead of the risk curve, we need
to ensure that new developments will be risk proof. This approach systematically ap-
plied in shaping up our built environment, our schools, our houses, our bridges and
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our roads will ensure that we avoid the creation of new risks in our society. This im-
portant reflection is at the heart of the Sendai Framework that outlines seven cle-
ar targets and four priorities for action to prevent new and reduce existing disaster
risks. It therefore goes without saying that steps towards a more sustainable responsible
finance can have a massive impact on economic, social and environmental standards
and developments. It equally implies that the private sector needs to be sensitized.
New approaches to sustainable urban development provide opportunities for engaging
private investors and the construction sector in new public-private partnerships for
resilient investments. It also allows for innovation to stretch its muscles and get ac-
tively applied. UNISDR has been working on this domain together with the private
sector through the ARISE – a private public partnership initiative facilitated by UNISDR
– aiming to facilitate risk-sensitive business investments.
Europe is going through a number of financial reforms and we know that reforms
are targeting financial requirement. Many of them are related to critical infrastructure:
hospital, schools, but also power plants. Let’s ensure that the decision taken will be
risk informed – this would be a solid step in helping their sustainability.
We need to ensure that a long term approach is applied in our decision making
with a constant reconciliation between values and interests. The implementation of
the Sendai Framework strongly contributes to the positive narrative in Europe al-
lowing for our society to engage in their resilient and sustainable future. 

HoW To address NeW risKs WiTHouT ForgeTTiNg 
aBouT THe old oNes
Carlos Ignacio Montalvo Rebuelta*
preFace
More than 2,000 years old, Insurance has been dealing with risk since inception…
to the extent that, providing risk coverage, was the service that the Sector was built
upon, with such concepts as Service becoming the logical evolution, in a more ma-
ture market, of the original idea. It goes without saying that, during these very ear-
ly days, Insurers were confronted with the challenge of addressing new risks. The
fact that Insurance remains playing the same role today is a tribute to their success
to constantly adapt to risk and to deliver protection, helping Society evolve.
To do so, the very same basics that apply today, namely identification of risk, its
quantification, management and mitigation (sometimes including transferring, al-
ways embedding law of large numbers and mutualization of risk) as the elements
used by Insurance undertakings to be able to take, absorb and place risk in the right
place at the right time. 
Lord Byron used to say that “the best of the prophets for the future is the past”,
and past performance of Insurance provides us with the much needed trust that it
will continue to deliver. 
THe BusiNess model: asseTs aNd liaBiliTies
Insurance, although originally focused on the liability part of its business, has gra-
dually balanced such situation, increasingly giving the importance it deserves to the
asset part of its balance sheet, maximizing (or at least trying to) the fact that, as a
direct consequence of its unique business model, and the embedded reversion of the
normal economic cycle (leading to premia being collected before claims are to be paid),
Insurance holds a unique liquidity position that should allow it to be active investors
for the Economy, thus creating a virtuous circle by which it takes, mitigates and holds
risks and at the same time it becomes a key institutional investor to the Economy,
with a privileged position, particularly in the Life Business, to take long term asset
risk (and earn a liquidity premium for it), enhancing profitability and, most interesting,
* Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers Spain.
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allowing it to reinvest part of this profit in reducing the price for risk to the Econo-
my, thus de facto taking more risk from it… at a better price. 
From a liability viewpoint, one question pops up immediately: Is Insurance able
to take all risks, including new ones for which not sufficient data and experience is
available? Although we will further elaborate this idea with the example of Cyber
risk in the next paragraphs, this seems to be the case… albeit the pricing issue re-
mains there. 
From an asset perspective, Is Insurance already playing its role as institutional
investor? The response is again affirmative, as any asset it holds, from Equities to Bonds,
is already financing the Economy. At the same time, the issue of how to properly fac-
tor in the way volatility should be treated remains a hot topic.
It goes without saying that all this can only be maximized with a proper ALM stra-
tegy that exploits opportunities in terms of earning liquidity premia and minimizes
the so called reinvestment risk created by a mismatch of assets and liabilities. Good
ALM is an integral part of any sound risk management policy by an insurer, and as
such needs to be approached… and even incentivized. 
THe siTuaTioN Today… aNd TomorroW
Today´s reality is a fascinating one for Insurance, yet perhaps the most challenging
one it has been confronted with during its long history. All the elements intrinsic to
Insurance, namely the risks, the products, the information available and, equally im-
portant, the client and his expectations, are changing at an unprecedented speed.
At the same time, external elements are changing as well, with political uncertain-
ty, monetary policy or demographics, inter alia, becoming powerful drivers for chan-
ge.
Interestingly enough, Insurance has been known as a Sector where risk aversion
is part of its DNA, particularly when it comes to change… So how will the two min-
gle will define the future of Insurance (not necessarily the way we know it today). 
Among the range of so called “new” risks that emerge in this period of time, I would
like to focus on two, as I consider them as particularly relevant as potential obsta-
cles to growth and development: Cyber risk and Climate risk.
Cyber risk is nothing more than the “dark side of the moon” when it comes to
Digital transformation and the underlying opportunities it brings. The European Com-
mission has quantified the opportunity in the range of 500 billion euro… whilst the
first quantifications of cyber risk are in the range of 400 billion, out of which bare-
ly 3 billion is covered by Insurance. It is paramount that cyber risk doesn’t stop di-
gital innovation, and Insurance must be there to help. However, there is still a long
way to go. The complexity of the subject, the lack of historic series and data, a pro-
per claims management system or the size of the tails are among the issues that need
to be addressed. The good news is that none of them should be a stopper, the bet-
ter news is that Insurance is approaching them with prudence, avoiding the unin-
tended consequences of a false “euphoria” triggered by the idea of a massive busi-
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ness opportunity, in a completely new area… without proper underwriting and con-
trols. There is no better way to exploit an opportunity than understanding it, and this
is precisely the journey Insurance is currently embarked on. A final consideration
on cyber risk: if we approach it as a pure IT issue, we will certainly get it wrong. Bo-
ard education and integration within the business model come as the right way for-
ward. 
Climate risk, although always present, has never been as prominent as today, nor
as potentially devastating to the Economy. It is worth mentioning that the protec-
tion gap has increased significantly in the last 20 years… even in developed markets!
Looking at different catastrophes in the last years, we can extract some findings: In
New Zealand, following its last earthquake, the GDP grew thanks to proper use of
Insurance money paid. Both the country´s high coverage and the smart and forward
looking thinking of the country and its society led to this outcome. In Nepal, however,
the impact was in the range of 40% GDP loss… still to be recovered, but this is no-
thing compared to the human dimension of it, with more than 8,000 casualties. Again,
insurance and reinsurance undertakings can be part of the solution, playing the so-
cial role that our sector has, and doing so under the assumption that, like with any
other business, it can be done with a profit. Diversification of risk as a way to take
more risk, of course, but also knowledge and pre-emption, shall become success fac-
tors in this race to close the current gap. Private-public initiatives such as the IDF (In-
surance Development Forum) are steps in the right direction. 
THe “HiddeN risK” oF FocusiNg oN NeW risKs
As relevant as it is to make sure that sufficient time is allocated to discuss, under-
stand and address new risks, it should not lead to removing the attention to existing
ones, perhaps less fancy or trendy, definitely not less important.
Among the range of “old risks” that risk getting ignored or downgraded, one co-
mes on top of the list: Demographics.
Indeed, not a new issue, particularly in developed markets, but one that is always
pushed out of the agenda, either because of political reasons, social ones or becau-
se short term views tend to prevail over long term ones, and it becomes easier to let
someone else take the hit that it implies addressing the demographic challenge we
are confronted with. 
Demographics imply higher reliance and dependency in Health coverage. This
can be provided by the State, but by stepping in, Insurance is de facto alleviating the
bill to Society, allowing governments to continue providing the same level of cove-
rage, regardless of the current public debt levels and budgetary pressure. 
Most importantly, demographics implies looking at Pensions sustainability. The
good news is that we have time to take action, the bad news is that time has in the
past been the excuse for inaction. Insurers should become key players in terms of the
solution, by providing long term protection to citizens that will complement their
Pillar 1 or Pillar 2 pensions. Initiatives like the PEPP (Pan European Personal Pen-
148 HoW To address NeW risKs WiTHouT ForgeTTiNg aBouT THe old oNes
sions), initiated by EIOPA and integrated by the European Commission within the
CMU (Capital Markets Union) programme will become part of the solution… today
better than tomorrow. 
epilogue
At the end, it all comes to the basic question of How can Insurance enhance Resilience?
The long story short is that it should be a preferred owner to certain risks, particu-
larly long term ones, and a key partner to mitigate and reallocate others. By so doing,
it will be adding value not only by allowing business to move ahead when taking the
risk, but also indirectly via enhanced preemption or better recovery by its clients. On
top of that it will continue playing a key role as institutional investor, providing with
much needed capital to the Global Economy. Who can do better?
FiNaNce For deVelopmeNT: 
a euro-mediTerraNeaN perspecTiVe

iNVesTmeNT iN a euro-mediTerraNeaN perspecTiVe
Giovanni Ajassa*
We discuss the issue of development of real investment and finance, taking a Euro-
Mediterranean perspective. I am an Italian economist working at a major Europe-
an bank with strong ties and presence on the southern and eastern shores of the Me-
diterranean. For BNP Paribas the Euro-Mediterranean relationship represents not
only an important part of our history. For us, the Euro-Mediterranean relationship
means future. A future of sound economic development for our clients working in
the area, among them hundreds of Italian SMEs. A future of innovation and inclu-
sion for social communities, starting from the thousands of colleagues working with
BNP Paribas from Maghreb to Turkey.
I well know that the association between development and Mediterranean may
sound quite hazardous today. After great hopes, Arab springs turned into disillu-
sionment, although not everywhere. Threats from a new and wicked form of terrorism
have challenged geo-political stability. Pressures from increasing flows of migrants
heading north from sub-Saharan Africa risk to tilt the European perception of the
Mediterranean to a source of serious problems instead of a sea of shared opportu-
nities.
Notwithstanding this complex background, my task this morning is to submit to
you a few numbers from the economic scenario which may support the case for in-
vestment into the Euro-Mediterranean perspective. I will start from a more global
perspective: the need for higher investment as the only way to escape the doldrums
of secular stagnation.
THiNK gloBal: iNVesTmeNT To escape secular sTagNaTioN
John Maynard Keynes stated the point very clearly. It was exactly 80 years ago, at
the time of writing the General Theory:
(…) there has been a chronic tendency throughout human history for the pro-
pensity to save to be stronger than the inducement to invest. The weakness of
the inducement to invest has been at all times the key to the economic problem.
* Chief Economist, BNL – Group BNP Paribas.
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Eighty years after, what the global economy is experiencing again is a massive di-
sequilibrium between the abundance of saving and finance and the scarcity of in-
vestment and development projects. It is not only a matter of quantities. What is be-
coming more and more evident is also a kind of fatigue in the ability of drafting a
new model of growth: a growth which has to be sustainable in a context of binding
limits from long-run factors such as planet-population increase and ageing, nonre-
newable resource depletion, pollution generation and the affirmation of labor-squee-
zing digital technologies. So, coming out from the current experience of secular sta-
gnation is getting much more difficult now than it was 80 years ago as it requires not
only to run more investment, but to do the right investment. Putting it in another
way, what we need now is to combine the activist attitude from the General Theo-
ry with the long-run view on sustainability of the Club of Rome’s seminal workings1.
From words to numbers, let me now turn to some snapshots about the current
global growth’s problem. I make reference to OECD and IMF data and estimates.
According to latest forecasts, in 2016 the world’s GDP is going to grow by a mere
+2.9%, slightly below the +3% threshold that marks the limit for a global recession.
Low growth in volumes combines with a fairly dramatic deceleration of world tra-
de, which this year may fall below 2%, less than one half of the average growth of
the 2000-15 period. The picture of overall stagnation is then completed by a third
element which is as important as low growth and low trade. This third actor in the
play is a very low inflation: too low for a too long time to be any more deemed as a
blessing. With a +1.0% forecast, inflation in advance economies is going to be just
half of what central banks’ wisdom considers as appropriate. For Italy, average in-
flation in 2016 will mark an even weaker result, with several unpleasant consequences:
to name just one, a negative effect on the public debt to nominal GDP ratio.
How to break the vicious circle of low growth, low international trade and low
inflation? Sound and simple, the answer is with more investment. Monetary stimuli
in the form of conventional or unconventional measures can help, but cannot suf-
fice. Quantitative easing cannot last forever, on both shores of the Atlantic. By the
way, as for any cure unpleasant trade-offs do exist also for monetary expansions. So
resuming fixed capital formation is now worldwide viewed as the tool for giving growth
a stronger, a more domestic and a better drive. 
From the European “Juncker Plan” to the latest plans from the new American ad-
ministration, economic policies have finally embarked into concrete measures for ac-
celerating investment, both public and private, and through public-private par-
tnerships. The good news is that the move has globally started. A question to be an-
swered is whether the Euro-Mediterranean will join. 
1. Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers William W. Behrens, The Limits
to Growth, A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, 1972.
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iNVesTmeNT iN THe mediTerraNeaN? yes, We caN
Investment pave the way for future growth. And better economic prospects are nee-
ded to stimulate investment and to convince foreign capital to flow in. Past years have
seen many sorts of troubles burdening the scenarios of the economies of North Afri-
ca and the Middle East. However, starting from last year economic ex-post perfor-
mances as well as future projections have improved. According to the latest forecasts
released by the IMF, the growth rate of GDP of the whole group of MENA countries
may go up from 2 per cent to close to 4 per cent in five years time. 
Economic recovery will benefit from a common and exogenous factor that is the
firming of oil price movement after the sharp downward correction occurred in 2014-
15. In my view, stable and remunerative oil prices will be helpful for non-oil producers
in the area too, thanks to indirect advantages from higher prices of non-oil raw ma-
terials. Moreover, oil price stabilization may positively interact with the reduction
of geopolitical risks that the advances in the international fight against terrorism are
already obtaining. On this ground, a key passage will be represented by the full re-
storation of political stability in Lybia. Besides future improvement, what already sup-
ports the economic case for making investment on the southern shores of the Me-
diterranean are the virtuous results obtained by countries such as Morocco. 
As this morning I have the privilege to sit close to His Excellence, the ambassa-
dor of Moroccan Kingdom, Mr. Hassan Abouyoub, let me just remind us how only
a few days ago the International Monetary Fund has very positively judged the ma-
croeconomic development in that country. The IMF mission stated that “in recent
years, the Moroccan economy has benefited from the continuation of prudent ma-
croeconomic policies and structural reforms as well as favorable developments in oil
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prices. Improved fiscal management and diversification of the economy have stren-
gthened its resilience.”2
Diversification of the sources of economic growth, together with reforms and mea-
sures aimed at improving the business environment, increasing productivity, and rai-
sing the quality of the education system are key priorities in countries such as Morocco.
Diversification, reforms, productivity, and education are key-issues that come toge-
ther with higher investment as parts of a medium-term strategy whose final goal is a
more inclusive growth with lower unemployment, particularly among young people.
Lead by example: what Morocco is doing, I think, may set a kind of benchmark for the
entire area and for an increasing Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on investment. 
FiNally, iNVesTmeNT iN THe mediTerraNeaN? yes, We musT
As I run short of my five minutes, let me now conclude with a final thought on an
even deeper reason to back the case for higher investment from Europe into the Me-
diterranean. More than Keynesian, I turn to the long-run viewing of Aurelio Pecce-
i’s Club of Rome. So, moving from current issues to a more forward-looking perspective,
the reason why Europe must invest more into the Mediterranean has anything but
one name: demography. 
In the last number of the Journal of Economic Perspectives two influential Ame-
rican scholars illustrate how in the coming three decades, because the Americas are
entering an era of uniformly low population growth, labor flows across the Rio Gran-
2. IMF, End-of-Mission Press Release of 2016 Article IV Consultation and First Review of the Pre-
cautionary and Liquidity Line Mission to Morocco, December 1, 2016.
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de will slow markedly. On the contrary, Europe will face substantial demographi-
cally driven migration pressures from across the Mediterranean for decades to come3.
Being the recipient of hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan migrants who risk
their lives to cross the Mediterranean, Italy is well aware about the need for higher
investment from Europe into Africa. Not walls, but yards are needed to improve em-
ployment and economic growth in Africa, thus moderating migration pressures. Time
for Europe is to invest into a “migration compact”.
3. Gordon Hanson, Craig McIntosh, “Is the Mediterranean the New Rio Grande? US and EU Im-
migration Pressures in the Long Run”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 30 No. 4 Fall 2016.

Time, space aNd FiNaNce: 
a pragmaTic approacH To THe mediTerraNeaN
Domenico Arcuri*
I’m glad of the opportunity to add my thoughts to the somewhat dated debate about
the Mediterranean whose glorious and extraordinary history we can admire on one
horizon, and whose present and future we can observe on another.
In today’s world, time has won its battle against space and money. I have long
been firmly convinced of this.
What do I mean by time having won its battle against space? I mean that the pla-
ces where goods and services are produced or can be produced – places where we-
alth can be created – are no longer necessarily those where the basic conditions for
this happening. They are no longer, as we were told years ago when we were students,
the places that have the primary factors of production, nor are they the places whe-
re consumers, able to transform the production of goods and services into wealth,
live. This model no longer exists. Today, a growing quantity of goods and services,
which means an increasing amount of wealth, is produced in the places where their
production is easier and faster.
I believe that time has also won its battle against money. The financial assets avai-
lable for allocation and conversion to investment – and thus to produce wealth – are
not necessarily assigned where national systems provide financial incentives to make
this happen, but where investors feel confident that such investment will produce
a profit in a short period and with a reasonably high probability. A large international
investor does not invest in Italy because the government and Invitalia give him mo-
ney to reduce the shortfall between the amount of investment needed and assets avai-
lable for the investment, but only because he is certain that the investment will be
converted into wealth in a reasonable time.
Let me give you two examples. The first concerns COSCO, a large Chinese mul-
tinational company that spent €3.3 billion in 2010 to obtain a 35-year permit for a
second quay in the port of Piraeus in Greece, where during that time it will handle
large quantities of goods, and will produce greater wealth than in the past. The com-
pany did not choose the Italian ports of Taranto or Gioia Tauro. An average of 17 days
is needed to move a container in Italy today, against 11 in Morocco which thus has
a 6-day advantage over Italy. Without considering incentives that governments of-
fer, COSCO chose to invest in Greece because this offers a shorter time to produce
* CEO, Invitalia Spa.
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returns. So time won against space and against money. (The Italian government has
in fact launched an important and welcome reform of the ports, an effort that ne-
eds to be continued.)
The second example concerns tourism. During the past 10 years the percenta-
ge of GDP that tourism brought to the Mediterranean countries has been characte-
rized by a substantial increase. In southern Mediterranean countries the increase has
been 500%, in Turkey 400% and in Morocco 170% while in Spain, Italy and Fran-
ce it has only been 20%. Yet again time has won against space and money.
I trust that these two examples make my opinion clear about the possibility of
looking to the future of the Mediterranean and not dwelling on its past. European
countries on one side and Mediterranean on the other need to respond coherently
to the realities of today's economic world. Time has won against space, and time has
won against money. Countries will develop if they are on the side of the winner. As
for those that side with the loser, indulging in talk and still believing that the eco-
nomic incentives are enough for GDP growth, I hope this reflection will be useful. 
alTerNaTiVe FiNaNce For deVelopmeNT iN europe 
aNd THe mediTerraNeaN
Innocenzo Cipolletta*
Alternative finance, represented by firms operating in private equity, venture capi-
tal, and private debt, is playing a fundamental role within the disintermediation pro-
cess from the banking system. In fact, banks are facing growing obstacles in adju-
sting their assets along tighter European rules. 
The credit crunch has affected – and still affects – particularly SMEs, which mo-
stly depend on domestic demand. In spite of accounting for the greatest majority of
the Italian entrepreneurship, this kind of enterprises has been receiving less credit
from the banking system.
Traditionally, financing channels of enterprises in Italy have relied mostly on banks.
Therefore, the current system needs to be supported by complementary channels for
the supply of credit; thus, the presence of a “private capital/equity systems” can be
seen as a guarantee for sustaining the growth of SMEs. Actually, this private equi-
ty system can facilitate an orderly disintermediation of the banking sector, providing
an adequate amount of equity, which could counterbalance debt capital, as repea-
tedly stressed by the European Commission. 
How does the alternative finance system operate? Alternative Investment
Funds enter the company through private equity injections, typically un-listed SMEs,
thereby trying to support their development plans both on a domestic and on an in-
ternational level. To that aim, they offer financial resources, along with the skills that
fund managers have acquired in their professional career.
Now, under the European Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers,
whose intention was to harmonise organisational rules of alternative funds, such fi-
nancial subjects can do their business everywhere, starting from the country selec-
ted as operation basis (European Passport).
Therefore, I want to draw on what was said by Giovanni Ajassa and by Ambas-
sador Abouyoub about entrepreneurship development in the South-Mediterranean
area, in order to reflect on possible business opportunities which could be promoted
by Italian private equity funds already used to operating on an international level. 
Both enterprises and infrastructure projects can be supported by private capi-
tal operators, able to carry on international development plans, grow responsive en-
terprises, finance technological start-ups as well traditional ones. 
* Chairman, Italian Association of Private Equity, Venture Capital and Private Debt – AIFI.
160 alTerNaTiVe FiNaNce For deVelopmeNT
We should not forget that operators specialising in alternative finance have the
advantage of combining both private capital for growth and professional manage-
rial skills, which they bring to the firms where they invest. This means that they con-
tribute not only through finance, but also through renewed management skills. Ope-
ning up to this opportunity would have the undoubtable benefit of putting enterprises
that operate south of the Mediterranean into a net of enterprises which would ac-
celerate their growth path and reinforce their competitiveness. 
As President Pittella has recalled, Europe is also promoting a strong recapitali-
sation of the industrial system: firstly, the fundamentally important role played by
the European Investment Fund (EIF), which has already been mentioned and spe-
cifically created in order to underpin SMEs risk capital. Moreover, we should not for-
get that one of the aims of the Capital Markets Union, as it appears from the Com-
mission’s documents, is the broadening of financial resources for innovation, start-
ups and non-listed enterprises, particularly for SMEs and innovative enterprises.
Given all this, and in order to make North-African companies an attractive tar-
get for investors, not only from Italy but from the whole of Europe, a suitable system
of guarantees should be ensured. If, on the one side, it is clear that private capital
investments naturally imply also an entrepreneurial risk, related to the ability of ge-
nerating entrepreneurial capacities, on the other side it is not obvious that private
equity investors must automatically also bear the political and institutional risks, which
could derive from their investments.
Starting with public guarantee systems already in place, it would be apprecia-
ted that they be reinforced by European guarantee systems, which could cover in-
vestment risks in more politically risky areas, in order to let the investor assume only
its natural entrepreneurial risk. 
From my experience as General Director of the Italian Association of Enterpri-
ses (Confindustria), I remember that together with other colleagues of the South Me-
diterranean area, we had launched a dialogue between the North and South side of
the Mediterranean, notwithstanding the multiple obstacles that this platform had
to encounter. On this path, and wishing for a continuation of the physical and vir-
tual Mediterranean dialogue, we should prevent North-Africa from abandoning mu-
tual exchanges. On the contrary, we should continue to encourage a process of in-
creased integration with the rest of Europe, in order to attract Europe’s abundant
amount of investors and capital. 
improViNg THe mediTerraNeaN FiNaNcial eNViroNmeNT: 
a parTNersHip approacH
Giuseppe Papaleo*
iNTroducTioN
Before the birth and evolution of the Barcelona Process (1995), the European Union
only entertained bilateral relations with the countries of the Mediterranean basin,
and not a single policy for the region was present. In 1995, during the Spanish Pre-
sidency of the EU, the Barcelona Process was launched by 15 EU members and 12
Mediterranean partners, as a framework to manage both bilateral and regional re-
lations. The Barcelona Process – based on the Barcelona Declaration – formed the
basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and its aim was to establish a common
area of peace, stability, and prosperity, by reinforcing three key aspects: political and
security dialogue; economic and financial partnership; social, cultural and human
partnership. The Barcelona Process foresaw the adoption of a series of bilateral As-
sociation Agreements between EU Member States and the Mediterranean partner
countries. While certain aspects are common to all of them (political dialogue, eco-
nomic cooperation, etc.), details differ from country to country. Since the 1995 Bar-
celona Conference, several more Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs have been held, where important decisions have been taken. From
a political standpoint, results have been scarce in terms of the stabilization of the re-
gion, the promotion of democratic reform, and the liberalization of politics. As re-
gards the economy, the gap separating the North and South rims of the Mediterra-
nean in terms of GDP per capita has not been reduced, and the creation of a productive
trans-Mediterranean system isn’t being fostered. In addition, the trade relations bet-
ween the EU and the Mediterranean partners remained unbalanced, and due to low
foreign direct investment (FDI), economic integration has remained weak.
THe mediTerraNeaN ecoNomic siTuaTioN: WHere do We sTaNd? 
The Mediterranean region has experienced significant social, political, and econo-
mic transformation during last year. Examples of these include widespread social pro-
tests and change of governments in southern Mediterranean countries, and grave
* President, Institute of High Euro Mediterranean Studies – IASEM.
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concerns about fiscal health, banking systems and stagnant growth across a num-
ber of northern Mediterranean countries that are also members of the Eurozone. The-
se events, which have created significant uncertainty for markets, policy-makers, and
individuals in the short term, make it even more important today to consider how
these changes and the underlying trends and uncertainties that shape the region may
play out in the long term. The aim of our project, MCH Alliance for Finance and Ban-
king is specifically directed to the creation of a series of fruitful meetings in order
to implement an integrated reporting system, which connects the financial and ban-
king actors with the entrepreneurial one, the politics’ representatives with the world
of culture. Monetary and private financial integration between the European
Union and the Mediterranean is a crucial hub for the development of trade, the ex-
pansion of financial markets and the strengthening of cultural contacts between the
two shores of the Mediterranean. As part of the financial globalization process, this
area reaps great success, but with strong emphasis on environmental and religious
aspects, which always make the relationships between the two shores of the Medi-
terranean permeated by a strong character of informality (which implies widespread
pegging processes, cross-fertilization and transnational dialogue). This makes the
ability to fit into a structured system of relations and fluid at the same time, able to
adapt to fluctuations in the political, economic, and cultural scene, an essential point.
MCH – Alliance for Finance and Banking is a strategic way to build or expand rela-
tionships in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. The network is a structured container, but
in constant reorganization, whit the aim of taking into account environmental fac-
tors and the evolution of "human factor" in the construction of financial and banking
projects. MCH – Mediterranean Common House was born from the expertise of the
IASEM Steering Committee, active for 10 years in the Euro-Mediterranean relations,
which intends to make available to international finance and banking system, its net-
working capabilities. Furthermore, the Network offers the possibility of structured
multilateral meetings between partners two times per year:
• MED FINANCE&BANK – Annual Meeting among the Members of the Alliance for
Finance and Banking.
• INTER-MEDITERRANEN MEETING – Annual Meeting among all the MCH
(Mediterranean Common House) Partners. 
The aim of the network is also to encourage bilateral relations and the right exchange
of information among the Partners with the intention of implementing joint projects.
In addition, MCH – Alliance for Finance and Banking develops ad hoc services, with
the aim of assisting the Partners in developing networking strategies, public relations,
or lobbying. 
To join the Network is required to sign the Memorandum of Understanding bet-
ween the partners and the Leading Proponent (IASEM). It must be signed by the le-
gal guardians or their delegates. 
Last but not least, the aim of our alliance is to get involved with all the different
financial intermediaries and all the banking actors eager to interact with their pe-
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ers in the Mediterranean region. The construction of deep relations between all ac-
tors interested in the Mediterranean would be implemented under the supervision
of Mediterranean Common House. We believe that, at this time of great social, po-
litical, and economic uncertainty, there are huge gains to be made by focusing on
the opportunities of collaborative investment in the long term. Yet, there are equal-
ly significant risks that we have to deal with. In any case we hope that our experience
could lead us to meaningful and productive strategic conversations between local
stakeholders.
The Mediterranean today is a highly fragmented region, composed of a wide va-
riety of sub regional groups, exposing one of the sharpest divides in GDP per capi-
ta in the world. Recent economic trends, however, indicate a gradual change in re-
gional economic dynamics: fiscal pressures have negatively affected northern Me-
diterranean growth rates while economic reforms and greater openness to trade have
been associated with surging growth rates in several southern Mediterranean coun-
tries, before the developments of 2011 again diminished the short-term growth ou-
tlook. In 2015, the average income per capita in the South and East Mediterrane-
an countries was 2.5 times lower than the average income in the EU Mediterrane-
an countries. The GDP growth rate in the south and east Mediterranean countries
were much higher than those of the EU Mediterranean countries. However, they are
considered low when compared to the population growth rates, as the demographic
growth is still high in the southern Mediterranean countries. The share of the Me-
diterranean GDP in the world GDP is also decreasing: from more than 13.5% in 1990
to 11.5% in 2010 and 9.5 % in the two-year period 2015-2016. Meanwhile, the sha-
re of the Mediterranean population remains constant in the World population (about
7%). For what concerns trade patterns across the region, they are very variegated.
While north-south trade across the Mediterranean is strong, southern Mediterranean
countries have the lowest levels of trade integration globally between neighbouring
countries, with on average only 5.7% of their total trade being conducted within the
southern Mediterranean region. Competitiveness varies significantly among the coun-
tries of the region, with rankings from 16th to 116th out of 138 economies take in
consideration in The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017 (which providing
insight into the drivers of their productivity and prosperity). In comparison to other
regional groupings, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) re-
gion, we can note that the competitiveness of the Mediterranean as a whole lags be-
hind considerably across all areas, but in particular with respect to market size, in-
novation, labour market efficiency and financial market development.
FiNaNcial iNTegriTy oF THe mediTerraNeaN couNTries
When assessing the trade finance environment in the Mediterranean region, one has
to differentiate carefully between the countries they are looking at, as they differ sub-
stantially in terms of legal environment, transparency, sophistication and political
structure. This is probably one of the reasons for which the region has never come
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together to form a trade union similar to the African ones, like COMESA (The Com-
mon Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). Such trade unions can indeed sup-
port trade flows significantly and there have been initiatives for the Mediterrane-
an region in the past, to no avail. Mediterranean region represents 21 countries and
over 500 million people speaking at least 20 different languages. Trade patterns have
clearly changed in recent years, which means that major emerging economies are
likely to collectively take on a larger and rising international net asset position, al-
beit at a diminishing rate given the general market situation. Over the last couple
of years the Mediterranean partner countries have gone through an unprecedented
phase of transformation, forcing them to tackle a multitude of economic, political
and social challenges. While the region benefits from a vast growth potential, ari-
sing not only from its geographical location and climate, but also from its young and
well-educated population, it has in the past failed to generate the growth required
for sustained and inclusive economic development. Banks are thus increasingly being
called upon to support private sector development by increasing credit supply to bu-
sinesses and entrepreneurs. This is a role that the sector, despite its size, has only par-
tly fulfilled in the past. Throughout this challenging period, the European Investment
Bank through the Trust Fund Internship Programme has sustained its support for the
Mediterranean partner countries. The EIB has received a reinforced mandate, and
has consequently adapted its activity to the new economic and social reality in the
region. Overall, the bank has been very active in supporting the private sector’s ac-
cess to finance over the past decade, and it is ready to increase its efforts in this area
in order to contribute to the development of a dynamic private sector and job crea-
tion in the region. 
BaNKs’ FuNcTioNiNg iN THe mediTerraNeaN parTNer couNTries 
The Mediterranean partner countries (MPC) face the common challenge of impro-
ving their economic performance, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. GDP
per capita has increased only slowly over the last decade, particularly compared to
some other emerging market economies. At the same time the population in the re-
gion has been growing at a rapid pace. The combination of low growth and a rapi-
dly increasing working age population has caused unemployment to skyrocket-espe-
cially among young people. In addition to structural shortcomings, the implications
of the Arab Spring coupled with a difficult international economic environment have
put strains on the MPC economies. GDP growth has slowed down and recovery is slug-
gish; increased expenditure has deepened government budget deficits; and current
account deficits have widened especially as the European economy has weakened.
The difficult economic situation of some of the MPCs has been reflected in a dete-
rioration of their sovereign risk ratings. The private sectors in the MPCs are large-
ly dependent on the banking sectors for external debt financing as financial markets
are dominated by banks. Banking sectors in the region are generally large. Howe-
ver, financial inclusion is still relatively low in the FEMIP region, with more than half
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of the adult population without an account in a formal financial institution. The re-
latively low access to financial services in the region often hits SMEs particularly hard.
Bank lending is traditionally concentrated in large, corporate customers, and
banks in some FEMIP countries use a substantial amount of their available liquidi-
ty to fund government debt. Generally, banking intermediation remains relatively
weak in the region. Private sector credit as a percentage of GDP is particularly low
in Egypt, where the government finances its increasing debt mainly through the do-
mestic banking sector and over a third of the banking sector’s balance sheet consists
of government securities. At the same time, some countries exhibit low loan-to-de-
posit ratios, e.g. Lebanon where less than half of the banking sector’s large deposit
base is used to extend loans to the economy. In contrast, Morocco and Tunisia have
loan-to-deposit ratios in excess of 100%. In both countries the banking sectors have
difficulties matching rapid loan growth with adequate deposit growth, which lea-
ves them in a difficult liquidity position. This can, on the upside, lead to banks loo-
king for a diversification of their funding sources, such as bond markets, which is a
trend observable to some extent in Morocco. The overall soundness and profitabi-
lity of banking sectors in the region have deteriorated but nevertheless remain rea-
sonable despite the difficult domestic and international economic environment of
recent years. As expected, the economic downturn in some countries is impacting
the performance of banks and especially the loan quality of banks’ loan portfolios.
The most affected banking sectors are in Tunisia and Egypt given the severity of the
economic and political struggles in the aftermath of the revolutions in both coun-
tries. In other countries in the region the repercussions are also tangible, for instance
through liquidity squeezes. Regulators in most countries in the region have reacted
by implementing different measures to support banks. However, further measures
to strengthen the banking sectors and improve regulation and supervision will be
necessary in some countries to increase the capacity of banks to support more effi-
ciently the development of the private sector. 
possiBle Way To iNcrease FiNaNcial serVices 
iN mediTerraNeaN parTNer couNTries 
Access to financial services across most Mediterranean partner countries is relati-
vely low, as only 36% of the population aged over 15 has an account with a formal
financial institution. Excluding Israel, whose access to finance ratio (at 90%) is at
par with that of high income countries, the average of the remaining seven MPCs stands
at 28%. This is lower than the average for the upper middle income group of coun-
tries (of which Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon are part) and approximately
the same as the average for lower middle income countries (of which Morocco, WBG
and Egypt are part). Thus, countries in the region face an important challenge in terms
of access to finance which, to some extent, jeopardizes their economic development
and contributes to income inequality. In sharp contrast with relatively low access to
finance, mobile phone penetration is very high across almost all MPCs – the avera-
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ge penetration rate is 106%. This combination of high mobile penetration and low
access to financial services suggests that mobile financial services can be a useful in-
strument to increase the use of formal financial services in all the countries in the
region – perhaps with the exception of Israel. That large potential notwithstanding,
mobile banking offerings can only become a useful tool in expanding access to fi-
nance to households and small businesses in MPCs if they meet potential customers’
needs. Supply should adjust to prevailing conditions and not give in to the tempta-
tion of blindly adopting models that were successful in other parts of the world. In
particular, it needs to recognize that financial sectors in MPCs are bank dominated
and that mobile banking services should complement existing banking products and
serve as a means to expand banking services to larger segments of the population.
That said, even well designed business models face a significant number of imple-
mentation challenges, of which the flexibility and adaptability of existing regulatory
frameworks is undoubtedly the most relevant. But the success of those offerings will
also depend critically on a few basic infrastructures such as (dense) distribution net-
works, risk analysis databases and methodologies as well as retail payment archi-
tectures that ensure interoperability and decrease transaction costs. On the other hand,
some favourable conditions such as international remittances can provide the ne-
cessary lever for a successful uptake of mobile banking in MPCs.
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FiNaNce For THe commoN good: solidariTy, iNclusioN 
aNd social respoNsiBiliTy iN THe ligHT oF THe social
docTriNe oF THe cHurcH
Archbishop Silvano Maria Tomasi*
The title of my contribution on the topic: “Finance for the common good: new ap-
proaches to solidarity, inclusion and social responsibility”, contains in itself many im-
portant concepts that I will try to address in the light of the Social Doctrine of the
Church. First I will explore the concept of finance for the common good and secondly
I will report on new approaches to solidarity, inclusion and social responsibility in
the domain of finance, to which the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, now
incorporated in the new Dicastery, has been looking at in recent conferences and in-
ternational gatherings.
FiNaNce iN caTHolic social TeacHiNg
Let me begin with looking at the idea of finance, or better of “finance for the com-
mon good”, present in the Catholic Social Teaching. Finance is not something new
to the Catholic tradition. Indeed, in Italy in the second half of the 15th century the
Franciscans were responsible for the birth of pawnbroking– in Italian known as Mon-
ti di Pietà – the first experience of microfinance destined to the more vulnerable sec-
tors of the population. The weakest members of society were in this way helped to
defend themselves against usury and to derive real benefit from this tool of econo-
mic development. In the case of these first pawnbroking, finance – or better micro-
finance – was conceived as an instrument directed towards improved wealth crea-
tion and development of the poor.
In November 2008, on the eve of a Conference sponsored by the United Nations
General Assembly in Doha on “Finance and Development to Review the Imple-
mentation of the Monterrey Consensus”, the Pontiﬁcal Council for Justice and Pea-
ce published a Note titled “A New International Financial Pact”, which declares that
the “true” nature of ﬁnance consists in favouring the use of surplus resources to pro-
mote the real economy, which means the well-being and development of the who-
le person and of all people1. Indeed, ﬁnance for the common good is a ﬁnance de-
* Apostolic Nuncio, Delegate Secretary of the Dicastery for promoting human integral deve-
lopment, Holy See.
1. Cfr. Address of Pope Francis to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25.9.2015.
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voted to serving the real economy, it is a ﬁnance conceived as an instrument for rea-
ching the common good meaning by that the sum total of social conditions which
allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulﬁlment more ful-
ly and more easily2.
Now one interpretation of the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis that began in
2007-2008 – and still has not been completely overcome – attributes it to the loss
of this “intrinsic” nature of ﬁnance. Finance had failed to fulﬁl its authentic function
of a bridge between the present and the future, because its operators’ timeframe had
been reduced essentially to the present, to the search for the maximum achievable
short-term proﬁt. 
Hence, economics and ﬁnance should be brought back within the boundaries of
their real vocation and function, including their social function, in consideration of
their obvious responsibilities to society – for example that of nourishing markets and
ﬁnancial institutions which are really at the service of the person and are capable
of responding to the needs of the common good and universal brotherhood3.
In his address to the participants in the 2016 International Conference of the Chri-
stian Union of Business Executives (UNIAPAC), on the past 16th of November, Pope
Francis declared the urgency of restoring the social meaning of ﬁnancial and ban-
king activities. “Credit must be accessible to households, to small and medium-si-
zed enterprises, to farmers, to educational activities, especially at the primary level,
to general healthcare, to the improvement and integration of the poorest urban are-
as. A market-based ﬁnancial logic makes credit more accessible and cheaper for tho-
se who already have resources, and more expensive and diﬃcult for those who have
less, to the point of leaving the poorest segments of the population in the hands of
ruthless usurers”4.
NeW approacHes To solidariTy, iNclusioN aNd social respoNsiBiliTy
Moreover, Pope Francis in his more recent encyclical letter Laudato Si’ calls for a re-
newed sense of responsibility on the part of all for the common good and for our fel-
low brothers and sisters worldwide5 and this in a spirit of fraternity. Indeed, frater-
nity is an essential human quality, for we are relational beings. A lively awareness
of our relatedness helps us to look upon and to treat each person as a true sister or
brother; without fraternity it is impossible to build a just society and a solid and la-
sting peace6.
2. Cfr. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, LEV, 2005, § 64.
3. Cfr. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, “Towards reforming the financial and moneta-
ry systems in the context of global public authority”, 2011, pag. 15.
4. Pope Francis, address to the participants in the International Conference of the Christian Union
of the Business Executives (UNIAPAC), 16th November 2016.
5. Cfr. Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, “Laudato Si’”, n. 25 and n.196.
6. Cfr. Pope Francis, Message for the World Day of Peace, 1st January 2014. 
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The world truly needs renewal of the sense of responsibility on the part of all.
To achieve this, it is necessary to connect with people’s deepest moral being
through education in responsibility for the common good, which should be oﬀered
to all actors on all levels: ﬁnancial agents, businesses, ﬁnancial institutions, public
authorities, and civil society – and even families7 and which can ﬁnd its solid foun-
dation in fraternity and in other principles of the Social Teaching of the Church, such
as the universal destiny of goods and the priority of labour over capital8. 
There are important signs of hope in this regard. For instance, a new generation
of value-based investors is arising in every part of the world; people who are willing
to align their ﬁnancial choices with their personal beliefs. Indeed, separating one’s
moral values from one’s ﬁnancial choices leads to living a divided life. This paral-
lels the technocratic ideology which makes technology absolute and thus minimi-
zes the value of the concrete human individual by reducing choices to merely technical
or ﬁnancial variables9. Only the reintegration of moral values in ﬁnancial investments
will avoid the risk of living a divided life and, hence, bring to all ﬁnancial actors the
peace to which they aspire as human beings10. 
Today the awareness of the huge impact of ﬁnance on the real economy, of its
social and environmental impact, is growing rapidly. From the beginning of his Pon-
tiﬁcate, Pope Francis is tireless in calling for a ﬁnancial system that is inclusive, that
cares for the environment and takes seriously our responsibility to future generations.
In response to Pope Francis’ invitation, the Pontiﬁcal Council for Justice and Peace
has organized – in collaboration with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) – two Confe-
rence on the topic of impact investing. These two gatherings demonstrated how im-
pact investing can be consistent with Catholic Social Teaching, how individual and
institutional investors are working to align the deployment of their assets to support
positive social and environmental impacts. In the case of impact investing priority
is not given to proﬁt – ﬁnancial returns are usually smaller than those of traditional
investments – but rather to pursuing the common good by making a diﬀerence for
the environment and the poor. 
One way to generate a positive social and environmental impact on the lives of
individuals, their families and the community, could be that of investing in businesses
with a social purpose – in Italian the so called “imprese sociali” – which, without re-
jecting proﬁt, aim at a higher goal than the mere logic of the exchange of equivalents,
7. Cfr. Cardinal Peter Kodwo Apphia Turkson, “Sustainable Finance and Care in the light of Lau-
dato Si'”, 15 aprile 2016.
8. Cfr. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, “A new International Financial Pact”, November
2008.
9. Cfr. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace,”Towards reforming the international financial
and monetary systems in the context of a global public authority”, 2011.
10. Cardinal Peter Kodwo Apphia Turkson, “Sustainable Finance and Care in the light of Lauda-
to Si'”, 15 aprile 2016. 
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of proﬁt as an end in itself11. In the month of November 2016, as previously alrea-
dy mentioned, the Pontiﬁcal Council for Justice and Peace organized, in collabora-
tion, with the International Christian Union of the Business Executives (UNIAPAC)
an International Conferences titled “Business Leaders, as agents of economic and so-
cial inclusion”, in which several successful business experience aimed to overcome
social exclusion and directed to support integral human development were presented.
I would like to recall just one case in this occasion: a company dedicated to hiring
and providing work to people with disabilities which became in the long term a ma-
jor company in the US market, not despite disabled people, but precisely thanks to
disabled people hiring. Indeed, disabled people stay much more loyal to their pro-
fessional commitment and are rarely absent from the workplace, and their presen-
ce creates a better and more virtuous environment of work as well as had a deep and
remarkable impact on culture. People around them started to think at the compa-
ny’s system as a community looking at the other as a person to get to know better,
appreciate and to respect12.
Furthermore, we are seeing today also an increase of investments in businesses
focused on decarbonisation for the reduction of climate change. Laudato Si’ has in-
creased people’s understanding that an economy founded on fossil fuels is unsu-
stainable because of its destructive impact, not only on the environment but espe-
cially on the most vulnerable people, in opposition to the idea of inﬁnite or unlimi-
ted growth, a dominant idea in economics and ﬁnance “based on the lie that there
is an inﬁnite supply of the earth’s goods”. 
coNclusioN
The challenge we face today is the shift in the financial paradigm; it is that of rethinking
our way of doing finance; it is that of enriching and – why not – changing our vision
of finance. It is a matter of openness to different possibilities which do not involve
stifling human creativity and its ideals of progress, but rather directing that ener-
gy along new channels! Indeed if we look at the larger picture, we can see that more
diversified and innovative forms of investing, which impact less negatively on the
society and on the environment, can prove profitable as well13. 
The challenge we face is also that of humanizing – next to economics – also ﬁ-
nance which must not rule, but serve the common good. This is a key principle that
Pope Francis explained in his address to the participants in the 2016 International
11. Pope Benedict, Encyclical Letter “Caritas In Veritate”, n. 38.
12. Cfr. Randy Lewis, Walgreens former senior Vice-President, International Conference, “Busi-
ness Leaders as agents of economic and social inclusion”, 16-17 November 2016.
13. Cfr. Pope Francis, “Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’”, June 2015, n.129.
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Conference of the Christian Union of the Business Executives (UNIAPAC). He sta-
ted: “money must serve, not rule. Money is only a technical instrument of interme-
diation, of comparison of values and rights, of the fulﬁlment of duties and saving.
Like any technical instrument, money does not have a neutral value, but acquires va-
lue based on the aims and circumstances in which it is used. When we claim that mo-
ney is neutral, we fall under its power”.
Finally, the challenge we face is that of giving the ethical dimension of the eco-
nomy and of ﬁnance not an incidental but an essential status. The economy – and
by extension ﬁnance too –“needs ethics in order to function correctly –  not any ethics
whatsoever, but an ethics which is people-centred”14. “Insofar as they are instruments,
the entire economy and ﬁnance, not just certain sectors, must be used in an ethical
way so as to create suitable conditions for human development and for the deve-
lopment of peoples”.15
14. Cfr. Pope Benedict XVI, “Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate”, June 2009, n. 45.
15. Cfr. ibid, n.65.

FiNaNce For THe commoN good: 
a disasTer risK reducTioN perspecTiVe
Robert Glasser*
It is interesting to look at this topic through the lens of disaster risk and how we ma-
nage it, and how go about reducing it.
Nothing tells us more about social inclusion or the lack of it, in many parts of the
world, than the percentage of the population regularly exposed to disaster events
and how they cope with them. 
We know that in terms of absolute economic losses, it is the rich developing world
that pays the most. However, the poor pay an even higher price in terms of losing
whatever shelter they might have, their livelihood and access to basic services such
as health and education.
A Latin American politician, recalling his poverty-stricken childhood, described
it in these few sentences: “When our house ﬂooded, I sometimes woke up at mid-
night to ﬁnd my feet in water, cockroaches and rats ﬁghting over space, and various
objects ﬂoating around the living room, so I had to get up in the middle of the night.
“Our biggest concern was preventing the furniture from getting ruined. Not that
we had much to get ruined. Every time it rained, we used to nail another piece of wood
across the doorframe, and dump another truckload of earth to reinforce the barri-
cade. But every time it rained the water level rose further. And the authorities ne-
ver did anything.”
He was describing an era which one hopes is long gone in most places when he
said the authorities never did anything because today disaster management is so-
mething that most countries and local government authorities have had to learn.
And over the last twenty years there has been a concerted push to shift the fo-
cus from disaster management to disaster risk management, and this has come shar-
ply into focus with the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion in March 2015 by all UN Member State. The Sendai Framework seeks a reduc-
tion in disaster mortality, numbers of disaster aﬀected and economic losses.
What kind of numbers are we talking about here? Analysis of twenty years of data
on over 7,000 disaster events from 1996 to 2015, in which 1.35 million people died,
shows that earthquakes and tsunamis are the biggest killers overall followed close-
ly by climate-related disasters. In an average year the lives of some 100 million peo-
ple are disrupted by disasters.
* Special Representative of the Secretary-General, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Re-
duction – UNISDR.
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High income countries suﬀer huge economic losses in disasters but it is low in-
come countries which suﬀer the most when it comes to loss of life. A 2016 estima-
te from the World Bank states that annual economic losses are running at US$500
billion from just weather-related disasters which are estimated to push 23 million
people into poverty every year. 
“Where you live should not be a factor in how you die,” said the Secretary-Ge-
neral in a message for International Day for Disaster Reduction on October 13. He
was referring to the fact that over 90% of all disaster deaths occur in low and mid-
dle-income countries. 
The vast majority of climate-related deaths occur in low and middle-income coun-
tries which contribute least to greenhouse gas emissions. These countries also bear
the brunt of earthquake deaths.
These mortality statistics have implications for the achievement of the Sustainable
Development Goals. Disaster deaths are a strong indication for poverty and under-
development and 90% of disaster deaths happen in low and middle income countries.  
It is clear that when impoverished countries like Haiti or Nepal lose huge chunks
of  their GDP to recurring disaster events that that eats away at funding available for
social expenditure as they pay for recovery and rehabilitation. 
So what are the solutions? How can we show solidarity and demonstrate corporate
social responsibility when it comes to disaster risk management.
The richest 2% of the world’s adult population now own over 50% of global we-
alth, whereas the bottom 50% own less than 1% of global wealth. This stark inco-
me disparity can only lead to growing risk inequality across territories and social groups
unless we make a conscious eﬀort to correct it.
The private sector has a huge role to play in reducing existing levels of disaster
risk and helping to avoid the creation of new risk. This can be done at a number of
levels facilitated by the fact that some 80% of all investment decisions are made by
the private sector. 
Let’s look at a number of areas where the common good needs to take precedence
over shareholder value, remembering that the most precious thing we have a sha-
re in, is this planet.
It is critically important that the business world gets behind implementation of
the Paris Agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and leads from the front.
Keeping the rise in global warming at 2⁰C or below is to relieve the world of an exi-
stential threat. 
Success depends on industry and commerce providing the technology and in-
novation which will move us towards a carbon free world where fossil fuels are left
where they belong, in the ground. 
Otherwise, the words in a famous tweet from your neighbour the Pope, will be-
come more our every day reality than it already is. ”The earth, our home, is begin-
ning to look more and more like an immense pile of ﬁlth.” 
The truth of this is nowhere more obvious than in another great driver of disa-
ster risk, the destruction of the environment which is often motivated by short-term
proﬁt which translates into long-term loss for all of humanity. 
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Deforestation, desertiﬁcation, pollution, acidiﬁcation of the oceans, over-ﬁshing
are in nobody’s long-term interests and the human activity which propels these phe-
nomena needs to be stopped. The private sector needs to support a vision of con-
sumerism which is responsible, sustainable and lasting. 
One of the downsides of globalization is that the search for lower costs, higher
productivity, and just-in-time delivery are driving business into hazard-prone loca-
tions where resilient infrastructure is often not a priority.
The temptation to cut corners and avoid the costs associated with resilient in-
frastructure must be avoided in a world which is embarking on one of the greatest
building sprees in the history of the human race. 
Over 60% of the land projected to become urban by 2030 has yet to be develo-
ped. Additionally, nearly one billion new housing units will need to be constructed
to house the world’s growing population by 2060.
It is essential to ensure that this is done in a risk-informed manner if we are to
make signiﬁcant progress on reducing disaster losses. A disaster-prone urban futu-
re must be avoided at all costs. 
This means we must put greater eﬀort into addressing the urbanization of disasters
and disaster risk especially in low and middle income countries where endemic po-
verty leaves many especially vulnerable to disaster events.
One only has to look at the destruction wrought on cities and towns in Haiti, the
poorest country in the western hemisphere, by the 2010 earthquake and the hurri-
cane Matthew to realise how challenging this can be. 
While cities are the drivers of economic development and social progress in most
countries, accounting for more than 80% of global GDP, they are also home to many
of the world’s poor and vulnerable.  
That is why urban resilience is such a critical element of the 2030 Development
Agenda. If we are to eradicate poverty we must reduce urban risk to allow low-in-
come communities to thrive and develop in an environment free from the threat
of recurring floods and storms, and in earthquake-resistant housing where requi-
red. 
This last point I am sure is one well understood by people here in Italy given the
tragic loss of life you have suﬀered in recent years from earthquakes.
The arguments for the common good are also based on sound economics. Over
the coming years, trillions of dollars will be invested into hazard-exposed regions.
How and where these funds are placed will determine how much disaster risk is ac-
cumulated and whether underlying risks are addressed. 
Markets have placed greater value on short-term returns than on sustainability
and resilience. Reducing your investment’s exposure to disaster risk is not a cost but
an opportunity to make that investment more attractive in the long-term.
The continuous mispricing of risk is another area that needs to be addressed by
the ﬁnance community. If the main metric for success is GDP growth, questions of
solidarity and social inclusion take a back seat along with reducing disaster risk and
accepting the need for regulation – for the common good –  of potentially harmful,
risk generating economic activity.
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Our extensive research for the Global Assessment Reports on Disaster Risk Re-
duction has shown that risks, losses and impacts are often not borne by the risk ta-
kers but instead are transferred to other social sectors or territories. 
A classic example would be speculative urban development that may increase
ﬂood risk for households in informal settlements in other parts of the city. Other risks
are transferred to the whole of humanity because of climate change and the destruction
of biodiversity.
There is no single magic number for beneﬁt-cost ratios for investments in disa-
ster risk reduction. What is beyond doubt is that DRR is a good investment strate-
gy. Typical beneﬁt-cost-ratios seem to lie in the range of 3 to 1 and 15 to 1, and the
most quoted as an order of magnitude is four to one.
This reality has yet to sink in for many governments as we saw two years ago for
example in Australia where the Australian Government’s Productivity Commission
published a report which found that Governments overinvest in post-disaster re-
construction and underinvest in mitigation that would limit the impact of natural
disasters in the ﬁrst place. As such, natural disaster costs have become a growing,
unfunded liability for governments.
Even in a high income country like Australia, the rising cost of disasters can be
explained by the rising exposure and vulnerability of communities to natural disa-
sters. For example:
• the number of houses, businesses, infrastructure and other assets exposed to na-
tural disasters has increased (partly in line with population growth)
• the value and size of assets at risk has increased
• an increasing number of people have settled in areas prone to natural disasters,
such as along the coast and urban fringe.
Australia has the advantage of having a thriving well established insurance industry
which is not the case in emerging  economies across Latin America, Africa, and Asia
which currently contribute 40% to global GDP, yet represent only 16% of global in-
surance premiums. 
When a disaster strikes this level of underinsurance can reverse development gains
and damage future growth. There is a huge gap between reported insured disaster
losses and the reality.
Last year eight  Lloyd’s syndicates joined forces to develop new solutions to help
developing economies tackle underinsurance and improve their resilience against
the economic impact of natural catastrophes.
The eight Lloyd’s syndicates have committed capacity of US$400m towards so-
lutions that address  risks associated with natural hazards in emerging and developing
economies. Key to its eﬀective deployment will be well designed risk sharing initiatives
and the diversiﬁcation of risk.
This is further evidence that private companies and investors are starting to take
disaster risk into account when deciding where to invest. This trend was accentua-
ted after heavy business losses in 2011 after earthquake and tsunami in Japan and
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the ﬂoods which hit the industrial heartland of northern Thailand.
More recently, UNISDR’s Private Sector Alliance, ARISE, has worked with the Eco-
nomist Intelligence Unit to add the threats posed by natural and human-induced ha-
zards to its widely-respected country analyses.
The Economist Intelligence Unit is the world’s leading provider of country in-
telligence, with its timely, reliable and impartial research oﬀering governments, in-
stitutions and businesses the evidence base that they need to set strategy and make
critical decisions.
These are just some examples of initiatives we are supporting to encourage new
approaches to solidarity, inclusion and social responsibility which are themes
which run throughout the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction which iden-
tiﬁes the private sector as a key stakeholder in achieving a safer world through risk
informed decision making and investment decisions.

respoNsiBle agriculTural iNVesTmeNT aNd THe uNiTed
NaTioNs susTaiNaBle deVelopmeNT goals
Kostas Stamoulis*
Let me start by saying that so much of what is being discussed today is at the heart
of the 2030 agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Mobilizing and
re-orienting private finance investment to achieve the transformational changes de-
manded by the SDGs is one of the preeminent challenges of our time. 
I think we all agree on this.  The question is how? How can we incentivize pri-
vate action when so many of our objectives have the nature of public goods? How
do we make growth more inclusive, reaching the very poorest of our societies? How
can we guarantee a minimum social ﬂoor that begins with ending the scourge of hun-
ger for everyone, everywhere? How can we transform food systems to make them
“nutrition-driven”? How can we move whole economies from a high– to a low-car-
bon pathway? How can we bring our production and consumption of the necessi-
ties of life fully sustainable and consistent with the environments we want to live in?
These are not rhetorical questions – they are the question we have imposed on
ourselves by adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable development. These are que-
stions we now have a duty to answer. And at FAO, these are questions we believe can
be answered. 
But to develop and implement workable solutions, we need to think diﬀerently.
One the ﬁrst steps is to enable the demanders and beneﬁciaries of change, to beco-
me more eﬀective agents of change.
European ministers of labour met in Bratislava last year to look at the question
of achieving the EU’s objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. At the
heart of that discussion were the role of social enterprises as key actors in the pro-
vision of services of general interest to European citizens and, especially, to vulne-
rable persons. According to an EC Expert Group on Social Enterprises, these enter-
prises meet many social needs and contribute to the ﬁght against exclusion and po-
verty. In Spain, for example, the social economy created more than 31,000 enter-
prises and 210,000 jobs in the 2008-2015 period. In the United Kingdom for instance,
40 % of social enterprises were managed by women in 2015, compared to only 18
% in traditional SMEs. 
For FAO, social enterprises– in the forms of small family farms, rural coopera-
tives, and farmers associations – have clear links to food security, poverty eradica-
* Assistant Director-General a.i., Economic and Social Development Department, Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations – FAO.
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tion, women’s economic empowerment, decent employment creation, social protection,
adaptation to climate change and good governance. 
Now, let me link this with the big picture – the SDG Zero Hunger vision of a “world
free from hunger and malnutrition, where food and agriculture contribute to improving
the living standards of all, especially the poorest, in an economically, socially and
environmentally sustainable manner.” 
To meet the challenge of zero hunger in 2030 – Sustainable Development Goal
no 2– agricultural production will have to increase signiﬁcantly. 
This means that much more investment in the agricultural sector and in food sy-
stems is needed. 
Many studies show that investing in agriculture is one of the most eﬃcient and
eﬀective ways to reduce hunger and poverty. 
And FAO’s own research has demonstrated that the largest and most important
investment in agriculture comes from farmers themselves. 
In essence, if we want to transform food and agriculture systems, we need to be-
gin by creating incentives for farmers themselves to begin producing more and bet-
ter food, and to do so in ways that are sustainable and resilient, and that maximize
the contribution of agriculture to climate change mitigation. 
To achieve this, especially where farming is a low-productivity activity, and whe-
re people who grow food are consequently both poor and food insecure, we need to
think in new ways.
Analysis of country experiences shows that relatively small investments in social
protection can be a truly powerful mechanism for inducing farmers’ own investment
in production and productivity. 
Contrary to popular myths, we have found, small farmers do not consume or wa-
ste social protection money. Instead, they use it to experiment with new techniques
and seeds, and, over time, to acquire productive assets – land and equipment – that
help them to escape poverty.
We have also found that this approach, when combined with other supports for
farmers, can be quite cost eﬀective.
The Rome-based UN agencies estimate that to eradicate hunger and poverty su-
stainably by 2030, the additional public investments required are–on the order of
USD 265 billion per year over the period 2016-2030. 
The vast majority of these funds will be paid by large middle-income countries
out of their own tax receipts; the amount of money that will be required for the very
poorest countries is only a few percent of the total.  
Over time, however, this public investment will trigger many multiples in private
investment, led by the farmers themselves.
In the case of the European region, the overall ﬁnancing needs are high, but iof
we break down the balance of public and private investment, we see a diﬀerent pic-
ture. 
We see that small, targeted public investments can unlock very large signiﬁcant
cascades of downstream investment. 
To increase productivity, investments are required not just at the farm level, but
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also in market infrastructure and processing and distribution activities that connect
producers and consumers. 
The growth of on-farm investment creates a need, and hence also an opportu-
nity, for large-scale oﬀ-farm investment in storage and transport, in infrastructure,
in market development, in food quality and safety assurance.
Making food systems nutrition-driven and fully sustainable and climate compatible
needs to be seen for the investment driver that it is. Governments can set standards
that drive investment in all the systems needed to transform food and agriculture.
This investment should focus not only on technological innovation, but also in
the engineering of innovative business models seeking to enhance the eﬃciency and
stability of agricultural value chains. 
In the case of many developing countries, the share of the market captured by
local agribusiness actors is growing faster than the one captured by international in-
vestors in agriculture. 
The proportion of medium and small agribusiness actors along value chains in
national and local agricultural markets tends to be high and the local agricultural
markets they participate in are less understood given large degree of informality. 
However, the aggregate statistics in the performance of agricultural markets sug-
gests these markets are expanding rapidly and have been a strong motivator for bu-
siness model innovations that enable ﬁnance and investment in the sector.
Although the coverage of ﬁnancial services in rural areas by formal ﬁnancial in-
stitutions improved between 2011 and 2014, the percentage of the rural population
that obtains ﬁnancial services from informal actors has grown much more rapidly
within the same period. 
It is possible to infer from existing data that the informal ﬁnancial service pro-
viders that are beginning to dominate rural ﬁnancial markets possess signiﬁcant in-
formational advantages that allow them to identify client needs and viable investment
opportunities, and to deliver ﬁnancial services in a feasible manner in rural areas. 
They also assess and manage the risks associated with providing such services
more accurately than their formal counterparts.
As most investments already come from the private sector, the role of Governments
should focus on fostering an enabling environment for responsible private investments,
both on– and oﬀ-farm. 
Eﬀorts by governments and development partners should reduce the constraints
that farmers and other value chain actors face and stimulate their investments. In-
vestments with strong multipliers that raise the yields and productivity of farmers,
such as investments in agricultural research, development, training and extension,
should be prioritized. This will contribute to the twin goals of reducing hunger and
poverty in rural areas. 
Government investment in essential public goods and services should include pro-
ductivity-enhancing research and development, science and innovation systems, in-
stitution building, legal framework, advisory services, rural transport, health, edu-
cation and social protection. They represent a fundamental part of the enabling en-
vironment. To stimulate private investments, governments need to secure proper-
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ty and tenure rights, and develop robust well-governed, public-private partnerships
for rural infrastructure and public services, adapting and strengthening existing in-
stitutions for the new policy environment. 
To help countries enhance the quality of agricultural investment, FAO has sup-
ported the development of guidance tools, in particular the Principles for Respon-
sible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (CFS-RAI) negotiated by the Com-
mittee on World Food Security (CFS) in 2014. 
These voluntary principles beneﬁt from widespread support, as they were de-
veloped through a broad consultation process that included representatives from go-
vernments, private sector and civil society organizations. FAO is now launching an
Umbrella Programme to translate these general principles into action at national le-
vel. 
We look forward to collaborating with Italy’s financial sector for its implementation.
coNsTrucTiNg alTerNaTiVes To promoTe HumaN digNiTy
THrougH ecoNomic aNd social policy1
Domingo Sugranyes Bickel*
iNTroducTioN
When confronted with appeals for solidarity and inclusion, business normally refers
to the well-known policies of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The generally ac-
cepted approach to CSR appears in several indexes and sets of guidelines for com-
pany codes of conduct. And still, CSR policies are far from having conquered a cen-
tral position in financial and business decisions. True, many companies have deve-
loped their own codes of conduct or adhered to existing sets of principles; investors
pay more and more attention to CSR performance of listed companies; consumers,
even if slower in adopting new criteria, also start paying attention to producers’ re-
cords regarding the environment, local working conditions in producing countries,
child work and so on. Companies also use from time to time their own CSR perfor-
mance as a marketing argument. But this change in decision criteria and perceptions
of business policies, though started more than 40 years ago, is still in the making.
In the meantime, profound changes are aﬀecting the context: digitization is chan-
ging work, perceptions and culture. The future of employment as we know it is being
questioned. The stakeholders concept, which was the base for CSR, needs to be re-
vised as deep changes are aﬀecting the roles of some of them. Consumers are becoming
directly involved in designing and production in electronic products and services:
the blurring of roles of consumers and producers translates in a new category of pro-
sumers. Shareholders’ rights and shareholder value are frequently invoked, but ma-
nagement power has in fact overcome that of shareholders in public companies: sha-
reholders’ decisions follow exclusively short term or long term investment criteria
– the investors often are pension funds and insurance companies – while strategic
business decisions rely totally on management. These examples show how the pro-
blems which any ‘social responsibility’ approach needs to focus on now may be diﬀerent
from those of the decades previous to 2008.
The Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation, a Vatican-based, lay-led think
tank on applied Catholic Social Thought, tries to understand and to translate the prin-
ciples of a human-centred economy contained in the Popes’ encyclicals since 1891
* Chairman, Centesimus Annus Pro Pontifice Foundation (CAPPF).
1. This contribution draws on the 2017 statement of the CAPPF (The Vatican, March 2017).
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in the context of real actual economic life. The following document contains the es-
sential lines of our work and some of the conclusions we propose as new approaches
to solidarity, inclusion and social responsibility.
THe pope’s BrieF
In his address of May 13th, 2016, Pope Francis asked the Centesimus Annus pro Pon-
tifice (CAPP) Foundation2 to “contribute to generating new models of economic pro-
gress more clearly directed to the universal common good, inclusion and integral de-
velopment, the creation of labour and investment in human resources”. 
Translating these aims into practice requires changes in economic behaviour and
personal commitment at various levels, from political institutions to business ma-
nagement, to workers and consumers. Such changes question underlying attitudes,
as the Church consistently does in Catholic Social Thought, namely the prevailing
utilitarian, positivistic, or emotive versions of ethics or, at another level, the idea of
‘shareholder value’ as a suﬃcient goal to ensure on its own that the economy will
work for the common good. Questioning moral attitudes is ever more urgent in the
context of a digital economy, which oﬀers new possibilities for inclusion but also po-
ses new ethical challenges. As the Popes tirelessly repeat for more than 125 years,
the dignity of all human persons must be the true compass in this search. And the
message can be understood and shared by Christians and non-Christians alike.
The Centesimus Annus pro Pontiﬁce Foundation addresses people who are ac-
tive in economic life.  Within our brief, it is useful to contrast moral exhortations with
the analysis made by academic experts and with the experience of professionals, the-
reby contributing a dimension of feasibility to the search for alternative models.
In the last two years, the Foundation has focused its work on three main themes.
All of them oﬀer possibilities to focus on constructive alternatives:
• Business initiative in the Fight against Poverty
• A Digital Economy at the Service of the Common Good 
• New alliances in the search for Inclusive Economic Reforms.
2. The Centesimus Annus pro Pontifice Foundation is a Vatican based, lay-led platform on Ca-
tholic social teaching applied to social and economic life. This statement is based on the Foun-
dation’s recent activities and was approved by its Board on March 3, 2017. More details on
www.centesimusannus.org.
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1. Business initiative in the fight against poverty3
“To enable these real men and women to escape from extreme poverty, we must
allow them to be dignified agents of their own destiny. Integral human deve-
lopment and the full exercise of human dignity cannot be imposed. They must
be built up and allowed to unfold”.4
Economic growth and a market embedded in institutions and social relations are the
only contexts in which poverty has been effectively reduced in large numbers. But
this is not enough: there are permanent demands of human development which eco-
nomic growth does not solve by itself.5 We need better measurement and better un-
derstanding of poverty. A process of human and participative development is best
served by autonomous and responsible entrepreneurial initiative. 
• Poverty is not adequately measured by income ﬁgures. The experts are the poor
themselves, and what is measured should match their experience of multidi-
mensional, overlapping deprivations. The CAPP Foundation wishes to support
research and recognition of new methodologies like, for example, the Fordham
Francis Index (FFI) developed by Fordham University’s International Political Eco-
nomy and Development Program. This is based on the Holy Father’s priorities
and includes seven easily accessible indicators: water, food, housing, employment,
education, gender equity and religious freedom.
• The real alternative to bureaucratic utilitarian approaches is a person-based path,
internally fostered by entrepreneurship, and eﬀectively helped from outside. The
aim should be to promote small- and medium-sized enterprises, which are the
bone of developed economies. In this process, proﬁt is not to be considered an
evil in relation to poverty reduction. Poor people are poor because they are ex-
cluded from networks of productivity and exchange. Small business owners should
be supported on the way to reach critical mass; credit and government policies
should aim at this wealth-creating process, not just at mitigating poverty.
• Business in general is responding to ethical responsibility towards the poor through
philanthropy projects, and this is both positive and necessary for certain activi-
ties, which need ongoing subsidies. But more creatively, a growing number of
companies and ﬁnancial institutions are using their own business models to con-
tribute to poverty reduction as well, particularly for the promotion of entrepre-
neurship, small business development, aﬀordable housing and the support of wo-
men’s groups. Good practice of this kind must be known and extended.
3. From debates held at the Vatican CAPP international conference, Vatican, May 2016 and at
the CAPP-USA/Fordham University conference, New York City, September 2016.
4. Pope Francis, “Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the United Nations Or-
ganization”,  25 September 2015.
5. Centesimus Annus pro Pontifice Foundation, 2015 Statement, “A Reformed Market Econo-
my: Entrepreneurship for Human Development”.
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• There are possible ways to share risk by working together across corporations
and banks in development impact investment projects designed in dialogue with
the parties involved. In the light of the social teaching of the Church, there is need
for ‘goodwill brokers’, mediators rather than intermediaries6, who can bring to-
gether corporations and banks with local initiatives and development groups.
Church members can lend institutional strength, credibility, knowledge and un-
biased generosity to these contacts.
• The refugee crisis and the ﬁght against human traﬃcking requires speciﬁc ac-
tion. But the long-term objective should be, as indicated by Pope Francis, “to de-
fend each person’s right to live with dignity, ﬁrst and foremost by exercising the
right not to emigrate and to contribute to the development of one’s country of
origin”.7
• Income inequality, even in developed countries, implies threatening vulnerabi-
lity for many persons and families. To help people helping themselves and avoid
falling back into poverty, we need to foster new sharing initiatives involving a
larger number of people, especially within the Church. This is the idea behind
the Voluntary Solidarity Fund network, which is being set up as a follow-up to
debates held in several CAPP Foundation instances.
2. Work and wages in developed economies: digital technology, fear of job loss
and education8
“Work should be the setting for this rich personal growth, where many aspects
of life enter into play: creativity, planning for the future, developing our talents,
living out our values, relating to others, giving glory to God. It follows that, in
the reality of today’s global society, it is essential that we continue to prioritize
the goal of access to steady employment for everyone, no matter the limited in-
terests of business and dubious economic reasoning”.9
Decent work is a vital part of human development. Nowadays, industry, commerce
and financial activities as well as public institutions face deep challenges and op-
portunities in the context of digitization and ‘big data’. These transformative inno-
vations offer great potential for inclusive finance and economic development, but
they also pose challenges about the future of jobs. And they raise a range of new ethi-
cal questions relating to truth in communication, extreme time pressure, uncertainties
about the future of meaningful work, lack of interpersonal relations and the question
of moral agency in machine driven self-learning processes. The strength and effects
6. Interview with Pope Francis, El País, January 22, 2017.
7. Message for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2016.
8. From debates at the CAPP/Civiltà Cattolica Italian conference, Rome, November 2016 and
at CAPP/Universidad Pontificia Comillas/BBVA consultation, Madrid, January 2017.
9. “Laudato Si’”, 127.
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of the underlying technology imperative are difficult to discern: technology is a me-
ans, but sometimes it is not easy to distinguish the ends it pursues. Church groups
need to update their thinking on the legitimacy of the technology imperative and on
the ethical issues typical of hyper-connectivity.
A full picture of the present digital revolution on jobs will not emerge until new
technologies are standardized and consolidated. As ‘robots and computers are ea-
ting jobs’, we need a serene analysis about jobs disappearing and others emerging,
taking history into account, and without cultivating utopian proposals of universal
income and the ‘end of work’, which would undermine human dignity and freedom.
We also need to identify the existing obstacles to change, whether legal, manage-
rial or educational: lay-oﬀs sometimes are not caused by technology, but are the con-
sequence of changes in consumer behaviour or the price paid for past mismanage-
ment. The Church has an important role to play in educating consumer choice. Di-
gitization needs to be seen together with demographics and intergenerational ten-
sions. There are also some positive signs of a new work mentality, still the fact of a
small minority, where ﬂexibility is seen as an opportunity for autonomous and mea-
ningful community-oriented activities.  
• The public sector, both as regulator and as sponsor of many technical develop-
ments, has a role to play in inﬂuencing the direction and the pace of technical
change so as to minimize its negative eﬀects on employment and working con-
ditions. The debate in the ﬁeld of education, social safety nets, public and pri-
vate policies in the digital era also requires a new start in the dialogue among
employers and workers. Catholic Social Thought could oﬀer a platform for such
free and constructive dialogue among social partners.
• We support transparent, co-operative use of ‘big data’ technology for common
good purposes: for instance for inclusive ﬁnance, better sectorial risk manage-
ment, protection against natural catastrophes, well-functioning job markets, in-
ternational business relationship developments.
• Education policies need to revalue the prestige of professional vocational trai-
ning. Financial support should go to practical educational institutions. Corre-
sponding bridging possibilities towards university should be available for tho-
se academically most gifted.
• Permanent education of workers is an essential business responsibility as a way
to allow a balance between ﬂexibility and security.
• Portability of welfare rights and the principle of contribution are essential to con-
tinue shifting protection from jobs towards the working person. 
• Managers and workers should join eﬀorts to monitor the digital environment in
a way that promotes knowledge and a sense of purpose.
• New ways of combining public and private initiative are necessary to address the
possibilities of the unemployed (young and old) to ﬁnd employment. Personal
care activities need to be re-valued and better paid.
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3. New Alliances For Change10
“I urgently appeal, then, for a new dialogue about how we are shaping the fu-
ture of our planet. We need a conversation that includes everyone, since the en-
vironment challenge we are undergoing, and its human roots, concern and af-
fect us all”.11
The Holy See exercises through its teaching and through diplomatic action a per-
manent role as world-wide moral authority. For instance, on the question of “po-
pulations and entire regions being displaced, trying to flee from war, from persecution,
from exploitation and poverty, (…) the Holy See will continue to encourage Go-
vernments to overcome every form of narrow nationalism and, above all, to reco-
gnise the unity of the human race. (…) Migrants are men and women who enjoy the
same universal rights, above all the right to life and to dignity. It is the task of all ci-
vil societies, including the commercial sector of those societies, to accompany this
action and to engage actively in welcoming and integrating migrants and refugees”.12
The message is being addressed not only to members of the Catholic Church. Its
eﬀectiveness depends on believers and non-believers, Christians or otherwise, to join
forces on a common basic program which is essential for sustainability of our pla-
net and for a reasonable pursuit of dignity for all. We need to leave aside the old, of-
ten sclerotic established ways and promote possibilities for new alliances based on
shared responsibility and shared interest. This requires new ethical conversations:
“We are challenged to be people of depth, attentive to what is happening around us
and spiritually alert. To dialogue means to believe that the ‘other’ has something wor-
thwhile to say”.13
To foster new alliances for change translates into two immediate practical gui-
delines:
• For a useful dialogue, we need to be capable of arguing convincingly against mo-
ral ills in a way which is neither exclusive nor relativistic. For this purpose, as Chri-
stian lay people we should commit more time and eﬀort to self-education and
training, abandoning a passive attitude as Church members and being able to
sustain mature, constructive debate on moral issues with all people of good will.
• Business corporate policies and our public engagements should include listening
to the poor and including their aims as fully legitimate criteria. 
10. From CAPP international conference, Vatican, May 2016.
11. “Laudato Si’”, 14.
12. Archbishop Paul Gallagher, Secretary for Relations with States, Address to the CAPP Foun-
dation conference on 14 May, 2016.
13. Pope Francis, World Communications Day Message, 2014.
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THe Way ForWard
The CAPP Foundation will continue to debate practical and realistic ways of applying
the Pope’s teachings, in the search for constructive alternatives to promote human
dignity. It will do it through the analysis and understanding of new social facts, and
with an eye to current international challenges. CAPP members are expected to help
elaborate and disseminate its findings and translate them into action within their
circle of contacts and within their possibilities.
In the present turbulent political environment, with far-right and far-left mo-
vements seeming to gain traction while a majority appears to be disillusioned with
politics, people who wish to reconcile their Christian faith with their social and po-
litical commitment need to abandon prejudice and open up for dialogue in what Pope
Francis calls the culture of encounter. 
Participating in a group like the CAPP Foundation means adhering to a new hu-
manism, oriented to the present and future, with the aim to integrate, to dialogue
and to produce creative new answers.

THe imporTaNce oF parTNersHip For THe perFormaNce oF a
susTaiNaBle FiNaNcial sysTem
Davide Dal Maso*
The 17th Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recalls the importance of partner-
ships for the achievement of the Goals themselves. Maybe because it is the last one,
its importance is often overlooked or taken for granted. But partnership is in fact a
key element to deliver sustainability: most if not all SDGs can hardly be achieved by
either institutional, economic or social actors alone, but require strong cooperation
amongst all of them, at both local and global level. 
This is the ﬁrst reason why the Italian National Dialogue on Sustainable Finance
(NDSF) is a good example of how an eﬀective process can generate positive eﬀects
that go beyond its immediate outputs. Convened by the Italian Ministry of Envi-
ronment (MATTM), the dialogue was launched in February 2016. At that moment
in time, a group of pioneering countries from China to France and the UK had laun-
ched a range of initiatives to boost ﬂows of private capital for climate and sustai-
nability. The G20 had also just set up its ‘green ﬁnance study group’, bringing to-
gether ﬁnance ministries and central banks to work out how to scale up private ca-
pital ﬂows to green investments. And the Financial Stability Board had made its ﬁrst
foray into the sustainability arena with its Task Force on Financially-related Climate
Disclosures.
What was striking about the dialogue was the way in which key players in Ita-
ly’s ﬁnancial community took responsibility for identifying the way forward. Re-
presentatives from leading banks, investors and insurers as well as the stock exchange,
regulators and foundations did not just review experience to date, but also pinpointed
practical options that could make a real diﬀerence in Italy’s speciﬁc circumstances. 
Along with other countries, Italy has seen a growing commitment by ﬁnancial
institutions to international initiatives such as the Principles for Responsible Inve-
stment and the Principles for Sustainable Insurance. Italy was one of the ﬁrst developed
countries to introduce a disclosure obligation for pension funds on how environmental,
social and governance (ESG) concerns are integrated into their investment policies.
Italy’s Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI) assets under management now
account for 6% of Europe’s total. Among G7 stock exchanges, Borsa Italiana has the
highest proportion of green revenues from the listed companies on its exchange and
* Coordinator of the National Dialogue on Sustainable Finance, UNEP Inquiry.
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has just opened a new segment on its ExtraMOT PRO market dedicated to the issuance
of green and social bonds.
The core of Italy’s financial system remains bank-centric and focused on serving an
economy dominated by nearly 4 million small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). Here, the challenge is one of improving access to tailored financial servi-
ces both for SMEs wishing to improve their sustainability performance as well as tho-
se seeking to provide goods and services for the growing green economy. 
Another reality is Italy’s vulnerability to natural hazards, ranging from earthquakes
to ﬂoods. The onset of climate change can exacerbate the natural fragility of the coun-
try bringing potentially far-reaching consequences for the economy and the ﬁnan-
cial system. Banca d’Italia has found that over 15% of households and 18% of local
businesses are exposed to ﬂooding risk, and that most are uninsured. Positively, ear-
ly ﬁndings from Banca d’Italia’s analysis suggests that a reduction in ﬂooding risk
is associated with an increase in outstanding loans to SMEs.
Harnessing the ﬁnancial system is essential for achieving a successful transition
to a low-carbon, inclusive and sustainable model of development. Sustainable ﬁnance
involves the integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors across
the ﬁnancial system with the goal of strengthening resilience, targeting capital al-
location and improving accountability. The dialogue focused mainly on the envi-
ronmental dimension of ﬁnancing sustainable development, often called ‘green ﬁ-
nance’. Green ﬁnance aims not only to guarantee ﬁnance for needed environmen-
tal projects but also to make more sustainable all ﬁnance (“greener ﬁnance”). The
dialogue clearly demonstrated that a shift is already under way both domestically
and globally. There is growing recognition that ESG factors are now material for va-
lue creation. Environmental threats such as climate change and water scarcity are
creating risks to ﬁnancial assets – and new challenges particularly for the insuran-
ce sector. Banks, capital markets and institutional investors are starting to incorpo-
rate environmental and social factors in capital allocation decisions. Public ﬁnance
will be key to enabling this shift, but the bulk of the capital required will need to come
from the private sector. 
In the end, the dialogue involved well over 100 participants from across the ﬁ-
nancial system. 
The seven working groups (Banks, Insurances, Asset management, Capital mar-
kets, Risk, Governance & Disclosure, Measurement of progress) were led by market
leaders and supported by the secretariat provided by MATTM and Unep (the Uni-
ted Nations Environment Programme). Its results were launched in Rome in February
2017, symbolically in the Headquarters of the central bank, in the presence of Go-
vernor Visco, the Environment minister Galletti and the Finance minister Padoan.
The dialogue’s report pointed to four broad areas where action could be taken. The
ﬁrst was improving the national policy framework to support green ﬁnance, for exam-
ple through the country’s forthcoming Strategy for Sustainable Development. The
second area was focusing ﬁnancial innovation on critical priorities, for example, the
untapped energy eﬃciency opportunity. A third priority was to strengthen disclo-
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sure and governance standards (including by investors to their clients). And the fourth
priority was to boost awareness and capacity on sustainability among both ﬁnancial
consumers and ﬁnancial professionals. 
Clearly, this ambitious agenda has to be seen as part of the wider programme of
structural reform of the economy, that means reforming rules and incentives so that
actual ﬁnancial behaviour is changed and concrete results can be achieved.
Besides the intrinsic value of the policy options identiﬁed in the ﬁnal report, one
of the unattended outcomes of the Dialogue is the creation of a cooperative network
of private and public actors that, while pursuing their interests, did their best to ﬁnd
proposals and solutions that actually respond to the real needs of the economy and
the society. All of them, aware that environmental and social challenges require for
everyone’s contribution, have put their competences and skills at disposal of the group,
in a spirit of service for the Country. 
In order not to loose the momentum, the Italian ﬁnancial community is now cal-
led to mobilise and accelerate progress on climate and sustainable development go-
als. An open and inclusive platform should be established with the goal to monitor
progress, to launch new projects and speciﬁc initiatives at sector level, to promote
the Milan marketplace as a global leader in green ﬁnance, to enhancing the level of
awareness of both the demand and the supply side, to stimulate product and pro-
cess innovation, to contribute to the public debate at national and global level, to feed
into policy frameworks. 
Italy faces a strategic opportunity to align its ﬁnancial system with sustainable
development. Reforms to green the ﬁnance sector can help to identify new growth
areas, new ways of ensuring the soundness of ﬁnancial institutions and new ways
to serve clients at home and abroad. This can contribute to wider ﬁnancial stabili-
ty and long-term economic recovery. 
What is clear, however, is that green finance is no longer regarded as a constraint.
Instead, it offers a way to restore credibility and trust. 

THe role oF THe europeaN FiNaNcial iNdusTry For THe
FiNaNciNg oF THe commoNgood
Pier Virgilio Dastoli*
2015 and 2016 were key years reshaping the ‘sustainability’ path. 2017 will the year
to restart the European project.
The adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Climate Change
Agreement, the Encyclical Letter “Laudato si’” and then the COP22 in Marrakech were
three major milestones.  
Brexit before and then the election of Donald Trump are marking the beginning
of the end of the Anglo-Saxon leadership in place since World War. These events could
give the chance for the European Union to regain its role as international actor.  
What role for the European ﬁnancial industry in such context? 
In its Communication «Next steps for a sustainable European future, European
action for sustainability» the Commission states: Sustainable development has sin-
ce long been at the heart of the European project. The UN 2030 Agenda reﬂects for
the ﬁrst time an international consensus that peace, security, justice for all, and so-
cial inclusion are not only to be pursued on their own but that they reinforce each
other. 
In our view, the Sustainable Development Goals are deﬁning the new ‘economic
and ﬁnancial development’ framework for a ﬁnancial industry willing to lead at glo-
bal and European levels and ‘Invest for the Common Good’ so that ‘no one is left be-
hind’.
The European Movement in Italy – together with EPE – European Partners for
Environment and CSF – Centro  Studi sul Federalismo – organised on 14 –15 April
2016  with Value Based Investors a Conference in Rome on how to mobilize public
and private capital in support of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
The meeting addressed in particular “Sustainable Finance and Care in the Light
of Laudato si’”.  
This meeting with value based investors and representatives of the Catholic, Or-
thodox and Protestant Churches addressed what should be the roadmap of Long Term
Investors aiming to contribute to the Common Good. 
As underlined by Cardinal Turkson in his speech introducing the Conference, "the
'true' nature of ﬁnance consists in favouring the use of surplus resources to promo-
* President, Italian Council of the European Movement – CIME.
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te the real economy, which means the well-being and development of the whole per-
son and of all people".  
Our initiative aimed to contribute to develop a "reset action plan" by the "tran-
sformative cooperation" of value-¬based investors, workers, civil society organisa-
tions, faith groups and public authorities. 
As European Movement in Italy we are engaged in two main projects. 
The ﬁrst one (LADDER) is about development education and awareness raising
as a process for a change of attitudes within local Authorities and civil society wor-
king at local level, understood as multipliers. We will meet in Sardegna in July 2017
with all our Mediterranean Partners in the framework of the ENPI CBC programme..
The second one is in the follow-up of our conference in Rome.
We will meet again the 8th and the 9th, September 2017 for a second Conference
In Rome on valued based investors. This Conference will be opened again by Car-
dinal Turkson as President of Pontiﬁcia Congregrazione Giustizia e Pace.
Will 2017 be the time for a metamorphosis of Europe to face the challenges of
the 21st century inside and outside Europe, a ‘Transformed EU’  to be called  after
the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome ??
In view of this challenges , the European Movement in Italy, France and Spain
have taken the lead of a large network of civil society associations united in a com-
mon awareness about the state of the Union and the need of a citizens’ initiatives
until the European election in 2019.
The European Union risks disintegration due to serious errors of political and
economic strategy, to the inadequacy of its institutions and the lack of democracy. 
Walls have been rebuilt with the bricks of national egoisms, and they are stiﬂing
the idea of a Europe establishing the right of citizens to free movement.
In the last ten years, austerity has blocked the investments in the real economy,
exacerbating inequalities, creating uncertainty and precariousness, and dismantling
the European social model.
Europe has to be the land of rights, welfare, culture, and innovation. Europe should
have learned the values of peace, hospitality, equality, and coexistence from the best
part of its history and from its tragedies.
The European Union must face the grand challenges of our times restoring the
hope in the well-being of the whole community, assuring common good, the strength
of rights and solidarity.
The European Union must reject wars and pursue the respect of rights and hu-
man dignity; ensure the reception of those asking for refuge, the freedom to migrate
and the right not to migrate by engaging in solving those global problems that are
at the origin of many migratory ﬂows such as wars, hunger and natural disasters;
equip with an eﬀective plan for cooperation and development and with a Mediter-
ranean policy for peace, democracy, and equality
It is fundamental to restore the meaning of politics, in order to eliminate inequalities
by stopping austerity policies; to provide the European budget with its own resour-
ces in order to ﬁnance a great plan to support a New Deal capable to create employ-
ment in a low carbon economy, to sustain the circular economy, and a new produc-
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tive and sustainable model to win the ﬁght against climate change; to create social
and territorial cohesion, contrasting poverty by investing in costs, in rural and internal
areas and governing the economic dynamics triggered by new technologies.
It is urgent to reduce the generational and gender divides by ﬁghting youth and
female unemployment; to promote active participation and citizenship also through
a European Civil Service, education and training; to set the bases for a European wel-
fare system to guarantee social inclusion and raise the standards of protection for
the most vulnerable and less advantaged groups; to defend and valorize the cultu-
ral and natural heritage.
In this regard the role of Value Based Investors, supporting the implementation
of the SDGs, cannot be overestimated. 
This is why we are calling to join champions of the sustainability agenda to ela-
borate a ‘new narrative for the EU’ based on the 2030 UN agenda and to establish
their own scenario for the future of Europe..
Financing the greening of the economy and the management of new risks are,
on the agenda of the G7 to be hosted in May 26-27 by Italy in Taormina, the G7 of
the Environmental Ministers in Bologna  to be hosted in June and the G20 to be ho-
sted in July 7-8 by Germany in Hamburg.
European Union has to maintain and develop its engagements for the Sustainable
Development Goals and to push the International organizations and its partners to
adopt the same approach.  
Which new steps? 
In our opinion, in the present geo-political turmoil, it’s the time for a new EU Al-
liance with our Neighbors from Russia to Morocco to lead the implementation of the
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris/Marrakech Climate Change Agreements.  
In both ﬁelds, the ﬁnancial industry has a key role to play. We need leaders of
the Financial Industry to partner with other European leaders of the Sustainability
agenda to explore these two major steps which would demonstrate that – in the pre-
sent global turmoil – Europe is back and, thanks to a partnership between State ac-
tors and non-State European actors, has engaged a transformation for a "good life
for all" in Europe and in the world. 
We very much hope that the European Champions of the Financial Industry com-
mitted to contribute to the implementation of the SDG’s and Climate Change Agree-
ment will join us.  
The 8th of September 2017 event in Rome will oﬀer the opportunity to present
a new EU narrative and strategic vision where the universal SDGs are for the Euro-
pean Citizens programmatic rights and a lever for new forms of cooperation with
our neighbors as well as with ACP and Asian Partners. For the Europeans, it is the
opportunity to build a new software for a ‘transformative cooperation’ intended to
better manage our interdependence between Europeans and between Europeans and
our neighbors and their neighbors, on a planet facing profound changes. 
We need a tremendous amount of social long-term investments on a large sca-
le for an unprecedented number of human beings and in a very diﬀerent perspecti-
ve from the one that has dominated the ﬁnancial agenda till recently.  
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Financing the transition demands some drastic changes in ﬁnancial rules and ge-
nerally in the European and international governance, aimed at providing concre-
te incentives to redirect public and private capital towards the real needs of humankind. 
Broadening and sharing a vision on ﬁnance for sustainable development and
through innovative multi-stakeholders partnerships is vital.
You rightly raised the questions of which are our priorities in order to mobilize
more ﬁnancial means for inclusive investment and to bring it to critical mass and suc-
cess. 
What kind of investment do you envisage? Who is going to move it: Banks and
ﬁnancial institutions? European institutions? Associations? New alliances? Public-
private joint action?  
The UN, the OECD, the EU have announced the launch of platforms for scaling
up innovative ﬁnance solutions to support the achievement of the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals. 
The Rome April 2016 Conference suggested that, in addition, there is a need to
set up a ‘Capital Stewardship and SDG's’ Platform’ to register 'commitments' of non-
state actors (ﬁnancial institutions, regions and cities, companies and foundations,
workers organizations and the immense crowd of individuals) to mobilize private
capital and foreign direct investments to reach the whole UN 2030 goals. This plat-
form could be a place for dialogue. 
Such ‘Capital Stewardship and SDG's’ Platform’ could be launched at the EU or
Member State level as well as at the Euro-Mediterranean level.  
We don’t expect that this will be decided by the EU itself soon. This is why we
are encouraging Banks and ﬁnancial institutions to partner with representatives of
the Business sector as well as presidents of European Regions and Civil Society and
launch together such ‘Capital Stewardship and SDG's’ Platform’ which should indeed
be the testimony that European Champions of the 2030 Agenda implementation are
building new alliances and Public-private joint action. Such Platform should contribute
to accelerate the global transition towards an inclusive, low carbon, resource eﬃcient,
just economy, basic condition for ‘ensuring that no one is left behind’ and to meet
the SDG’s by 2030.
These ‘Capital Stewardship and SDG's’ Platform ’ would work in synergy with the
Non State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform already launched in sup-
port to the climate change agenda and which should continue to be used by insti-
tutional investors. 
Let us build a vision for our citizens of a European ﬁnancial industry leading  in
“Investing for the Common Good”.
ToWards a more susTaiNaBle FiNaNce: 
THe role oF respoNsiBle iNVesTmeNT
Flavia Micilotta*
When it comes to sustainable finance, Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI)
is an integral part of the equation.  SRI is a long-term oriented investment appro-
ach which integrates ESG factors into the research, analysis and selection process
of securities within an investment portfolio. It combines fundamental analysis and
engagement with an evaluation of these ESG factors to better capture long-term re-
turns for investors, and to benefit society by influencing the behaviour of companies.
To this end, Eurosif strives to promote SRI as a key part of policy-making and raise
awareness throughout Europe of more responsible investment practices. 
Today, SRI has come to the fore of strategic investments and is increasingly re-
cognised as that part of ﬁnance which can help make a diﬀerence beyond returns.
It can contribute to solving some of the more pressing issues, which are so much part
of the international debate about more sustainable economies and more resilient bu-
sinesses in the context of a general increased awareness of climate change and its
impact.
Junker’s Capital Market Union plan recognises the importance of including long-
term and sustainable investment as a key requirement for Europe to maintain its com-
petitiveness while shifting to a low-carbon and resource-eﬃcient economy. Impor-
tant regulatory initiatives have included the European Long Term Investment
Fund (ELTIF) Regulation and the signiﬁcance of ESG has been deemed crucial in ad-
ding value to the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial markets with a view to increased transparency
and a better risk assessment. It is safe to say that the Commission is working in fa-
vour of the sustainable investment community. This much is clear from the interest
in long-term and sustainable investments expressed through consultations, its work
on the upcoming guidelines on non-ﬁnancial disclosure, the revision of the share-
holder rights directive and the decision to include ESG consideration as part of the
European pension directive, better known as IORPs.
In the ambition to be the EU reference point for SRI, with the renewal of its stra-
tegy and mission, Eurosif has tried to bring further clarity to the SRI industry, in light
of the on-going debate on deﬁnition. To encourage not more but better EU regula-
tion, Eurosif and its members produce research and bring forward examples of what
* Executive Director, Eurosif.
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truly works when it comes to integrating the principles of sustainability in ﬁnance. 
Thanks to the European SRI Market Study, we accomplish another one of our mis-
sions, focused on providing research and analysis on the development and trends
within the SRI market across Europe.
This year’s Study puts the emphasis on the strong relation between SRI and po-
licy developments.   Today, several practitioners apply at least some form of extra-
ﬁnancial evaluation in their portfolio, though this is not suﬃcient to fall under an
SRI denomination or to meet the requirements of one speciﬁc strategy.  The fact that
there are no set parameters indicating what constitutes an SRI product leaves am-
ple room for creating products which reﬂect the speciﬁc needs of clients, legislati-
ve requirements at country level, speciﬁc themes or trends. Regardless of the fact that
there is currently no speciﬁc regulation in place, practitioners closely follow the de-
velopments on the policy side at a national level. The Article 173 of the French Ener-
gy Transition Law clearly shows how legislation at a country level can be a game chan-
ger for the industry. It also shows the strategic relevance of strong legislation at na-
tional level and the inﬂuence this can have on European dynamics.
Some key highlights of this year’s SRI Study: 
• Exclusions are still the most dominant SRI approach in Europe, with over €10
trillion of assets under management, showing a 48% increase in the past two ye-
ars. This is in line with a wave of divestments, fuelled by the climate change de-
bate and supported by so many players today.
• Norms-based screening remains a popular strategy, becoming the second most
signiﬁcant SRI approach with over €5 trillion in Assets under Management and
a growth rate of 40%. 
• The increased relevance of stewardship within Engagement & Voting and the ever
more present debate around ﬁduciary duty have given further impetus to the stra-
tegy which grew by 30% since the last review. The signiﬁcant policy drive for this
approach is reﬂected in the debate around the Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD),
as part of the Commission’s action plan to modernise corporate governance and
increase corporate transparency. The aim of this directive is to increase the sha-
reholder’s ability to demonstrate further accountability and engagement – both
key characteristics of SRI.
• Sustainability Themed Investment grew by 145 percent. There are a variety of
themes that comprise this strategy, mostly preferred by investors who are keen
to focus on one or more areas, typically with a close link to sustainability. COP21,
the ratiﬁcation of the Paris Agreement on climate change by the EU and the adop-
tion of the SDGs by the international community – and which commit the EU mem-
ber states to a universal agenda to deliver social, environmental, economic and
governance sustainability – are just some of the events with international reso-
nance that led to this growth. European sustainability themed assets have now
grown to reach €145 billion.
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Impact Investing has registered an astonishing growth of 385 percent in the last two
years. As the fastest growing strategy, Impact Investing puts a clear emphasis on fi-
nancial return, and could well represent the future face of SRI, in terms of making
it mainstream. We’re counting on European member states to continue supporting
the potential of SRI by leading the way and we count on policy makers to continue
to facilitate the debate and ease the investing process, allowing for the retail mar-
ket to become more dominant and fulfil the promise delivered in the findings of our
research.

moBilisiNg FiNaNce For THe iNVesTmeNT 
iN social iNFrasTrucTure
Jonathan Watson*
coNTexT
Resilient and innovative social infrastructure is a foundation for creating vibrant com-
munities that in turn leverages economic capital and social justice. How to secure
financing that helps make social infrastructure work in this way does not have easy
answers.  
Social infrastructure is about tangible ‘in place’ assets (schools, health and so-
cial care, aﬀordable housing, cultural centres) that are able to generate intangible
beneﬁts (e.g. ambient living for older people) and connected using community net-
work assets (ICT as part of closer to home care and social networks, urban green and
public transport).  These need to happen in ways that do not isolate individual so-
cial groups, especially young people post school and older people post retirement.
Unfortunately, there are too few public resources available to address the infrastructure
gap especially in the EU. This is compounded by a degree of uncertainty among pu-
blic authorities about whether, when and how private investment is the right path
to take. 
Good solutions will need, among other things, new thinking and approaches to
private sector investing in social infrastructure and associated public service rene-
wal. Putting into play some predictable pre-conditions are essential for generating
investable and resilient social infrastructure projects that are to scale for long-term
investing. In particular, credible evidence for appraisal by investors of ﬁnancial re-
turns and monetary and non- monetary social, economic and environmental bene-
ﬁts: a triple bottom line.
In this context, the priority is to rework how the public sector (public authori-
ties, public services, third sector) mobilises ﬁnance for social infrastructure. This has
three primary elements for answering why and how mobilisation can be better rea-
lised: prevention as a strategic principle for planning and investment; local capaci-
ty to absorb ﬁnancial capital and; playing up the externalities of social infrastruc-
ture investment.
* Executive Director and Co-Founder, Integrate.
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preVeNTioN as a sTraTegic priNciple For plaNNiNg aNd iNVesTmeNT
Across Europe just now public systems are under pressure. The combination of de-
mographic change, environmental change, migration pressures and downward pres-
sure on current spending is creating a gap between demand growth and capacity to
meet it using current public sector models.  This has led to the conclusion in many
countries that we need new service models much more focused on “prevention” and
“early intervention”.
What this means is that rather than health services designed to respond to ill he-
alth and disease once it has occurred, focus on what will keep the population heal-
thy in the ﬁrst place. Rather than intervening expensively to support children who
fail to thrive in the education system, identify the factors that lead to failure to thri-
ve and prevent them (or at least intervene very early to address it).
This all seems self-evident but there are major issues with it.  Because we have
not operated eﬀectively in this way in the past, we have embedded patterns of de-
mand that drive up the resources needed in reactive services rather than prevention.
It becomes very hard to shift declining current budgets to prevention if demand on
current services is rising. 
“Prevention” as a concept includes a focus on preventing factors or circumstan-
ces likely to lead to negative outcomes as well as focus on the consequences of the-
se factors or circumstances, if we have failed to prevent them.  The urgent focus tends
to be on the latter.  For example, all evidence suggests that low income, high unem-
ployment or underemployment, and low value housing are statistically associated
with poor health, educational and negative community safety outcomes.  These are
hard to address and require a long-term resolution so the short term focus tends to
be on addressing their consequences, not their causes.
The case for adopting prevention as a principle for planning and investment is
not new Speciﬁcally, we have lost the late 19th and early 20th century understan-
ding that getting infrastructure right is central to prevention.  The biggest gains in
health and life expectancy across the last 150 years come from investment in water
supply, sanitation and housing, before the period of public universal healthcare.  The
biggest reduction in assaults came from lighting city streets, not the development
of police services.
Municipal investment across Europe created an infrastructure we now take for
granted and was based on an understanding of prevention as investment: invest now
and a ﬂow of beneﬁts will follow over time.  As major infrastructure could not be fun-
ded out of current budgets, municipal bonds and borrowings were necessary to fund
it.  All prevention is investment in the sense that up front spending delivers a ﬂow of
beneﬁts over time.  Given this, it is entirely unclear why it should, or even could, be
funded upfront from the current budget.  Like any other investment, we need to ﬁnd
funding mechanisms that allow the phasing and linkage of costs and beneﬁts over time.
KEY MESSAGE – Prevention is investment and needs to be designed and financed within
an investment paradigm, and given declining and pressurised current budgets, signifi-
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cant investment in prevention is very unlikely if it has to be funded “upfront”.  Social in-
frastructure needs to be brought back into our understanding of prevention: preventing
the circumstances that lead to negative outcomes.
local capaciTy To aBsorB FiNaNcial capiTal
The key for generating investable social infrastructure projects that match local ne-
eds with investors needs for scale, can be found in capacity and capabilities within
four interdependent functions (i) long-term planning and associated risk assessment
(ii) living labs  that provide a real life test and experimentation environment whe-
re end-users, industry and investors co-create solutions (iii) capital absorption ca-
pacity that helps us know when private investment for social need is the right path
to go down1 and (iv) intermediation platforms that maximises public value and de-
livers resilience-focused performance (see Figure 1). 
Long-term planning and risk assessment – Something that needs particular at-
tention in Europe but is unpopular politically and often misused is long-term plan-
Figure 1. Capacity to match local needs with investment
1. For recommended reading about this function go to: Initiative for Responsible Investment at
Harvard University – http://iri.hks.harvard.edu/files/iri/files/the_capital_absorption_ca-
pacity_of_places_self_assessment_tool_4.1_2013.pdf.
208 moBilisiNg FiNaNce For THe iNVesTmeNT iN social iNFrasTrucTure
ning. Institutional investors, governments, public authorities, business and ﬁnancial
markets have diﬀerent experiences of what is meant by ‘long-term’: 10 years from
start to ﬁnish for projects relying on Structural Funds; 5 years is seen as long-term
for public authorities; 4-5 years for politicians although re-election seems to be a prio-
rity after 18 months; 12 months for a SME and 60 seconds is long-term for ﬁnancial
traders. But cities, regions and sectors in the US, Australia, Canada etc. understand
that 30-40 year plans/forecasts are needed in the competition to attract investment,
generate economic growth and build vibrant and attractive communities. The con-
ﬁdence of institutional investors relies on these strategic plans, risk assessment and
projections. In the EU, some of the regions we have worked with have gamed local,
national and EU-level systems to plan and deliver long-term (e.g. Norbotten, Ber-
lin-Brandenburg and Kymenlaasko). For them, long-term planning is about aligning
local needs with clear growth goals through a continuous process that is: intelligent,
innovative, integrated and implementable (see Figure 2).
The essence of long-term planning is not a static list of investment priorities. It
is about having a clear and transparent set of strategic principles to guide planning
decisions informed by big data analytics for prevention, prediction and localisation.
And then blending this with participation through genuine consultation to identi-
fy the needs and priorities of the people you provide services for. Perhaps most im-
portant, long-term planning and associated risk assessment supported by informed
consultation can help communities work the economy to achieve their priorities ra-
ther than hollow-out communities to serve the economy. 
Figure 2. An overview of long-term planning
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Living labs – A Living Lab is a real-life test and experimentation environment whe-
re users and producers co-create innovations. Living Labs have been characterised
by the European Commission as Public-Private-People Partnerships (PPPP) for user-
driven open innovation. A Living Lab employs four main activities:  co-design by users
and producers; discovering emerging usages, behaviours and market opportunities;
implementing live scenarios within communities of users; assessment of concepts,
products and services according to socio-ergonomic, socio-cognitive and socio-eco-
nomic criteria. 
There are opportunities for Living Labs to contribute to pre-procurement projects
aimed at supporting public authorities and services to undertake relevant actions
that show how multiplier eﬀects from social infrastructure investment can be achie-
ved2. For example, Amsterdam is the Living Lab run by a partnership between the
City Council and the Amsterdam Institute of Advanced Metropolitan Solutions. Re-
search and valorisation are integrated through a network of ‘test beds’. The ﬁrst 3
of these are: rain sense, urban pulse and urban mobility3.
Intermediation platforms for project preparation – A key problem is that despite
rhetoric, for over two decades the public sector has been locked into an embrace with
short-termism by national governments. This is largely driven by political resistan-
ce to thinking and acting strategically (compounded by 2007-2009) combined with
the ﬁnancial pressure on public services to continue ﬁghting ﬁres by pursuing fur-
ther eﬃciency savings instead of looking ahead. Cuts are sold as growth enhancing.
But all EU countries that pursued austerity since 2010 now have more debt and not
less. 
This is not to say that regions, cities and municipalities are sitting still. New ini-
tiatives such as R20 (regions for climate action with green infrastructure using in-
novative ﬁnancing); 100 Resilient Cities (pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation),
the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Metropolitan Solutions and the European PPP
Expertise Centre provide examples of how public authorities are innovating in or-
der to address the challenges and stresses of macro-trends and how preventive and
resilient actions are reinventing the public sector. 
That said, there is a need for a new type of intermediary between the public sec-
tor and investors. In the United States, there is growing attention to alternative ﬁ-
nancing vehicles for infrastructure investment. These suggest ways that the public
sector, investors, and local communities might adapt to new roles in infrastructure
ﬁnance4. One response to the challenge of developing deals of this type has been the
seeding of capacity-building organizations (or platforms) that can work to develop
eﬀective local demand for socially valuable infrastructure investment e.g. the West
2. http://www.openlivinglabs.eu/aboutus.
3. http://www.ams-institute.org/category/research-programs/.
4. Wood D, Organizing demand for infrastructure investment with high social value. In: Garonna
P and Reviglio E (eds.) (Pending) Investing in long-term Europe: re-launching fixed, network
and social infrastructure. FEBAF/CdP, Rome
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Coast Infrastructure Exchange and Partnerships British Columbia5. The need for such
intermediation platforms is underlined by a 2016 Ford Foundation funded report
‘Unlocking the market for more and better infrastructure’. The report identiﬁed 5 key
barriers (and then solutions) to more and better investment for cities that are rele-
vant to regions, cities, and municipalities across the EU although these need to na-
vigate the obstacles provided by EU rules (e.g. Stability and Growth Pact, Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance and European Accounting Standards (ESA
2010).
KEY MESSAGE – Intermediation platforms combined with living labs, capital absorption
capacity and long-term planning are important as a means of unlocking investment and
political cycles while maintaining local value for social infrastructure investments. 
playiNg THe exTerNaliTies oF social iNFrasTrucTure iNVesTmeNT
Over and beyond the evident output of sectors such as lifelong education, health and
social care and affordable housing, there are very substantial “externalities” gene-
rated (otherwise termed added value, multiplier effects or high road outcomes) from
social infrastructure investment.  Indeed, this is the reason why markets alone do
not work well here if left alone. Government needs to step in to provide services, or
otherwise subsidize provision if not delivered directly by the public sector. The mea-
sure of the externalities should help the public sector, among other things, to bet-
ter calculate the amount of direct grants which it may have to provide aside from other
private or public forms of financing.
A focus on social infrastructure and asset secured investment may seem restrictive
but it is quite possible to identify a multiplier eﬀect when combining prevention and
a secure asset base.  Consider the social and environmental performance areas in the
Figure 3
Social performance – For example, in the UK there is currently a chronic shortage
of good housing for frail older people and a development sector focused largely on
competitively priced family housing. (Low-land footprint, two stories, small bedroom
sizes, steep stair throws, etc.)  This exposes older people to risk (falls, etc.), obstructs
the delivery of care at home in later life, and results in higher spending on hospital
and residential care.  A “home for life” programme could create appropriate de-ri-
sked housing, with telecare protection designed in at the outset, and bedroom sizes
that would permit intensive nursing support at home if necessary.
Environmental performance – Equally, poor designed, poorly constructed, ener-
gy ineﬃcient social housing makes it harder to prevent environmental damage through
emissions, and is also a major factor in fuel poverty.  A major programme to upgra-
5. West Coast Exchange http://westcoastx.com/. Partnerships British Columbia, http://www.par-
tnershipsbc.ca/.
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de all aﬀordable housing to a high environmental standard, sensibly commissioned,
could prevent environmental damage, prevent fuel poverty, and prevent unem-
ployment/beneﬁt dependency through targeted training and employment require-
ments built into procurement.
KEY MESSAGE – Attention to externalities as well as governance and financial returns
would create a secured asset, an income stream, reduce hospital and care costs through
prevention, and the employment opportunities created through construction and deli-
very could be targeted on economically disadvantaged communities.  The merits of an
investment model would be that repayment could be phased across 20 – 30 years so that
full benefits realisation supports repayment. 
coNclusioNs
In the EU, public authorities and public services are not building or repairing in-
frastructure in sufficient quantities to meet existing needs or future demand; nor do
Figure 1. Capacity to match local needs with investment
Figure 3. Assessing the performance of investments in the built environment. (Adapted from: High
Road Infrastructure Working Group (2015), Unlocking the market for more and better infrastruc-
ture, Draft Report for the Ford Foundation).
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their infrastructure investments “take the high road” by being designed, built, and
operated to meet standards other than short-term capital costs and minimum ser-
vice requirements. To this end, putting prevention into an investment paradigm crea-
tes a framework for a more disciplined approach to governance and performance and
would contribute to ensuring scale and credibility that are likely to be essential in
attracting investors (public, institutional, third sector, foundations, retail).
This chapter is illustrative only but indicates the potential for major investment
in social infrastructure to deliver a range of preventative beneﬁts if designed and com-
missioned intelligently. But achieving this needs more informed dialogue between
investors, intermediation platforms and end-users that place investments in physi-
cal, human, and social capital.  
coNclusioNs: NexT sTeps iN FiNaNciNg loNg-Term europe

eNsuriNg coNFideNce iN THe FuTure oF europe
Robert Ophèle*
In most euro area countries investment dropped sharply after the 2007 peak and it
has only slightly recovered; as a share of GDP, investment is still well below its 2007
level in almost all euro area countries, and this is particularly the case in Italy whe-
re investment represents around 16.5% of GDP, compared with 5% higher before the
crisis. We now have a huge investment gap that needs to be closed if we want to have
a chance of avoiding the “secular stagnation” menacing our ageing countries 
But investing means risk taking and at the same time the household saving rate
remains high but with savings mostly invested in the form of short-term, very liquid,
ﬁnancial instruments. Also, non-ﬁnancial corporations have turned from net borrowers
into net lenders in most euro area Member States, including Italy. 
The gap between savings and investment is therefore huge and the current ac-
count surplus of the euro area reached EUR 350 billion on a yearly basis in September
2016, which is more than 3% of GDP, with Italy being in the euro area average. 
Is it a saving glut or an investment crunch or even an investment dearth? Pro-
bably a mixture of all three, but if there is a real desire to ﬁnance long-term Europe
there is an urgent need for some radical changes in three diﬀerent areas: we need
to introduce the right incentives, achieve an eﬃcient institutional environment and
reinforce or restore conﬁdence in the future of Europe. Let me elaborate along the-
se three lines. 
First, the right incentives; this means promoting long-term savings products as op-
posed to short-term ones in order to safely finance infrastructures and favour equi-
ty over debt; as Europe’s economy is close to the “technological frontier”, busines-
ses need to innovate more. As such, they need to be able to take more risks, which
means more equity financing, rather than debt financing. But Europe is lagging be-
hind: equity capital amounts to only 52% of GDP in the euro area, compared with
121% in the United States. The efficient tools are well known: some targeted tax in-
centives, a favourable regulatory treatment and positive real returns. 
In this respect, two European Commission proposals are particularly welcome:
* Deputy-Governor, Banque de France.
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• In order to reduce the ﬁscal bias against equity funding the proposal by the Eu-
ropean Commission for a Common Corporate Tax Base including the proposal
for a new tax allowance encouraging equity issuance should be warmly welco-
med. The ﬁscal bias that favours debt ﬁnancing, via a tax deductible interest ex-
pense, may contribute to economic distortions that can result in high and ineﬃ-
cient debt-to-equity ratios in ﬁrms. 
• In order to develop long-term European savings products, the Commission clo-
sed a public consultation on a potential EU personal pension framework. This
initiative is also welcome as it could develop cross-border long-term savings pro-
ducts with a retirement objective. These products would supplement social se-
curity-based and occupational pensions while contributing to pan-European long-
term investments. The development of long-term savings products, harmonised
at EU level, could help intermediaries (banks, insurers, asset managers) to di-
versify their investments. They would invest in geographically diversiﬁed assets
including both listed and non-listed equities and possibly hybrid debt. These in-
vestments could therefore support the shift towards more equity ﬁnancing. The
development of such products requires putting in place relevant prudential ru-
les for those intermediaries taking into account the long-term holding period con-
straint of the products. 
We should not discourage intermediated risk taking. In order to ensure the robustness
of financial intermediaries there is a tendency to transfer risks from these players
to customers. There are many variations on this theme: for banks it could mean swit-
ching from fixed-rate mortgages to variable-rate ones, for insurers it could mean swit-
ching from euro life insurance contracts to unit-linked contracts, for pension funds
it could mean switching from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes; the
possible switch from bank lending to crowdfunding is another illustration of this ten-
dency. Such developments are straightforward for financial institutions, they are even
encouraged by some regulations and, to some extent, they are facilitated by the emer-
gence of Fintechs. Such changes, while massive, would actually imply a transfer of
risks from institutions prepared and equipped to manage them to individuals largely
unable to do so efficiently as well as the loss of many benefits deriving from inter-
generational risk-sharing. This will not be a success and, at the end of the day, af-
ter many disillusions, all the savings will end up in banknotes or sight-deposits, which
is exactly what we want to avoid. 
Positive real returns are also key in order to provide the right incentives. Many
economists have highlighted the unintended consequences of long lasting very low
interest rates. Instead of favouring consumption by households and investment by
ﬁrms, low interest rates can stimulate saving without boosting investment, in which
case this would aggravate the imbalances between savings and investment and trig-
ger a downward spiral of interest rates. Many factors could contribute to explaining
such a negative outcome: from the household point of view, the need to increase sa-
vings could stem from the lack of a home equity channel in continental Europe or
from the sharp increase in future savings needed during working life to provide the
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same level of pension, a situation which is worsened if you take into account the fact
that housing and health costs, two key consumption items for retirees, usually in-
crease more rapidly than the HICP. From the corporate point of view, the low level
of investment could be explained in some cases by the need, for sponsors of speci-
ﬁc pension schemes, to cover the liability gap deriving from the low interest rate en-
vironment and, more generally, by the lack of consumer-driven demand. Fortuna-
tely, the situation is evolving rapidly and while both the slope of the yield curve and
the slope of inﬂation expectations are steepening, long-term real interest rates are
signiﬁcantly less negative than some months ago. 
Second item on our agenda: achieving an efficient institutional environment.
The Five Presidents’ Report rightly called for a Financial Union, encompassing
the completion of the Banking Union as well as the launch of the Capital Markets Union
(CMU). Strengthening the integration of capital markets must be seen as a complement
to Banking Union since both share the same objectives of the free ﬂow of capital and
the better ﬁnancing of the economy by allowing savings collected in one part of the
Union to ﬁnance investment in another part of the Union. In the end, deepening the
Banking Union and the Capital Market Union would allow a better allocation of sa-
vings in Europe and a more eﬀective ﬁnancing of the real economy. 
Let me focus on the completion of the Banking Union since, while being one of
our major successes, it still needs to be ﬁnalised. If one rightly considers that the ul-
timate goal of a banking union is to facilitate the ﬁnancing of the Unions’ economy
by developing Union-wide banking services allowing for the collection of deposits
in one part of the Union in order to fund credit in other parts of it, we are still far from
achieving such an aim. Having a Single Supervisory Board and a Single Resolution
Board would make it possible to treat banks under their remit in a harmonised man-
ner but it would not, in itself, create an eﬀective Banking Union. 
We need to increase ﬁnancial integration, ﬁght the fragmentation of the Euro-
pean banking sector and foster cross-border investments. In this regard, the free ﬂow
of capital and liquidity is one of the fundamental principles of the EU as it is a pre-
requisite for the eﬃciency of capital allocation and the smooth funding of the eco-
nomy. Indeed, it means treating the euro area as a single jurisdiction and not as a
collection of 19 jurisdictions, and each of the three pillars of the Banking Union ne-
eds to be revisited with that aim.
• The ﬁrst pillar – the Single Supervisory Mechanism – is completely operational
and has now ﬁne-tuned its supervisory stance. But if we really want to favour the
emergence of a true euro area banking sector we need to make progress on three
fronts: 
- First, we should refrain from trapping liquidity and capital on a purely na-
tional basis; for the supervisor this means limiting Pillar 2 requirements at
a national subsidiary level and granting intra-group liquidity waivers. 
- Second, instead of discouraging banks from developing cross-border activity
within the euro area, we should encourage them to do so; this means avoi-
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ding the automatic increase in their systemic buﬀer when they increase their
cross-border operations; since the euro area is both a monetary and a ban-
king union, it should be treated as a single jurisdiction in the calculation of
the SIFIness score (cross-jurisdictional activity weighs 20% in the overall cal-
culation). This is currently under discussion at the Basel Committee. 
- Third, we should encourage the restructuring of our banking industry by en-
suring the favourable accounting treatment of badwill, and by ensuring that
losses booked on legacy assets (i.e. on sales of large stocks of NPLs) do not
aﬀect automatically the calculation of RWAs (i.e. the capital requirements)
for other assets. 
• While a banking union could be a fashionable issue in good times, it often be-
comes nasty in bad times, when resolutions and bail-ins are envisaged. Whate-
ver the resolution strategy – and we assume that at the euro area level it would
be a single-point-of-entry approach – if a resolution were to be implemented and
a bail-in triggered, it would be on a solo basis, i.e. at the national level. The na-
tional level means applying the national rules in order to assess compliance with
the “no creditor worse-oﬀ than in liquidation” principle and possibly the “8% mi-
nimum of total assets bail-in” principle in order to be able to use public support.
Both have still signiﬁcant national features: the hierarchy of creditors in a ban-
kruptcy process diﬀers between euro area countries, as do the accounting stan-
dards applied by banks and the calculation of the amount of total assets. The Com-
mission proposal clearly goes in the right direction. But it is clear that our reso-
lution stance can only be implemented either if you start with a completely cle-
an banking sector or when banking consolidation is encouraged and facilitated
at the euro area level, or with a strong common Deposit Guaranty scheme. None
of these three conditions are fully met in Europe today. Should we ask for a BRRD
holiday? Certainly not. Rapid progress is possible regarding the consolidation
of the banking sectors and if necessary we can use the possibility provided for
in the BRRD to implement precautionary recapitalisation with a limited bail-in
complying with general State Aid rules. 
• This means that, in my view, the third pillar, i.e. a fully-ﬂedged European Deposit
Guaranty System, is not a prerequisite for an eﬀective European Banking Union
but its ultimate step; we have to initiate this journey but a progressive approach
is the most realistic one in this area. 
My third and last point will be on the necessity to ensure confidence in the future and
confidence in the future of Europe; without this confidence players will never invest long
term. 
This is evidently ﬁrst a political issue, linked to the governance of the euro area.
But I would like to stress two more ﬁnancial issues: the need to reinforce the euro
area as a major independent ﬁnancial jurisdiction and second the need to implement
an investment strategy which fully takes account of climate risks.
First, the need to reinforce the identity of the euro area as a major independent
ﬁnancial jurisdiction. I have already mentioned the usefulness of treating the euro
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area as a single jurisdiction in order to encourage banking reorganisation, but we
should go further by: 
• Promoting a review of third-country regimes. Current third-country regimes were
adopted in a context where most of the ﬁnancial transactions pertaining to the
European Union were located within its borders, complying with EU rules and
consistently supervised within the EU. Accordingly, third-country regimes were
designed to be applicable to relatively remote or secondary ﬁnancial services ﬂows,
which did not concentrate a signiﬁcant part of the EU’s ﬁnancial risks and ser-
vices and were by no means comparable in volume or signiﬁcance to ﬂows wi-
thin the Union. Now that the landscape is likely to signiﬁcantly evolve, the fo-
cus of the discussion should be to properly scrutinise existing third-country re-
gimes. The equivalence regime should be made much more stringent for signi-
ﬁcant ﬁnancial activities pertaining to the European Union but carried out out-
side it in order to establish an eﬀective level-playing ﬁeld and to avoid the build-
up of oﬀshore risks, with a regular review of the provisions. This could be done
using a tiered approach, with thresholds above which stringent requirements
would apply. 
• Second, promoting the relocation in the euro area of the most systemic activi-
ties for our ﬁnancial markets. Some entities or activities play such a systemic role
in the EU ﬁnancial system that they should be deterred from providing services
to European actors from an oﬀshore place. They should be located within the EU
so that they can be primarily supervised by the framework in place in Member
States of the EU, to avoid systemic ﬁnancial stability risks building up beyond the
reach of the supervisors in the EU. This includes most importantly the clearing
of euro-denominated ﬁnancial instruments or the trading of EU sovereign debt.
The introduction of thresholds, above which the activity would be required to
be located or relocated in the EU should therefore be considered. 
• And, third, implementing the proposal made by the European Commission to re-
group foreign banking activities under the umbrella of an intermediate holding
company in order to supervise and regulate them on a consolidated European-
wide basis. 
I can’t conclude without mentioning one key driver for confidence in the future which
needs to be addressed in order to unlock significant long-term investment: the fact
that climate risks are properly tackled. Most of you have in mind the seminal spe-
ech by Mark Carney on this issue, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate
change and financial stability” in September 2015 and I do not wish to return to the-
se risks, which are either direct when a catastrophe occurs or indirect through the
increase in the scope of possible “stranded” assets. But almost everyone is now awa-
re that, in the medium run, risks are huge and no sensible investor would now in-
vest long term without measuring these risks. That is the reason why the release last
Wednesday of the Recommendations of the Task force on climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD) is an important step in the right direction. I do hope that these
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standards, that are open to a 60-day public consultation period, will be endorsed by
the FSB and the G20 and widely implemented. The German authorities have clearly
stated that climate challenges will be high in the Agenda of their Presidency. Let me
quote them: “During its G20 Presidency, Germany not only aims to ensure the sta-
bility of the global economy, but also, and this is the second pillar, to make it more
fit for the future. One main concern is to make progress on realising the goals of the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on climate chan-
ge.” 
“Fit for the future”, this is precisely our ambition for Europe.
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Pierre Gramegna is Minister of Finance of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg. He was
the Director of the Chamber of Commerce of Luxembourg from September 2003 to
December 2013. From 2002 to 2003 he has been the Director of International Eco-
nomic Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg.
From 1996 until 2002, he was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Lu-
xembourg to Japan. He is a dedicated amateur of tennis and photography. Pierre Gra-
megna is fluent in English, French, German, Italian, Luxembourgish.
roBerTo gualTieri
MEP, Chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Aﬀairs
Roberto Gualtieri (born in Rome, 19/07/1966) has been a member of the Europe-
an Parliament since 2009. In July 2014, he has been elected Chair of the Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. He graduated in literature and philosophy
(1992) and has a research doctorate (PhD) in contemporary history (1997). Mr. Gual-
tieri is an associate professor of contemporary history at ‘La Sapienza’ University, Rome.
He is member of the National board of the Partito Democratico (Italy), since 2008.
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roNy Hamaui
Chairman, Assifact
Rony Hamaui is president of Intesa SanPaolo Forvalue and Assifact (Associazione
Italiana per il factoring), adjunct professor of Monetary Economic at Catholic Uni-
versity of Milan, Board Member of the LSE Alumni Italy and CDEC (Centro di do-
cumentazione ebraica). He graduated at Bocconi University and London School of
Economics and Political Science. He was General Manager of Mediocredito Italia-
no (a leading bank for factoring, leasing, and medium term loans) and head of Fi-
nancial Institutions at Banca Intesa. He formerly headed the Economic Research De-
partment of Banca Commerciale Italiana and was a lecturer at University of Berga-
mo, Bocconi University and a research assistant at the Institute for Social Research.
He was member of the board of Société Européenne de Banque– Luxembourg, ZAO
Banca Intesa– Moscow, Montetitoli, Assilea and EBA Clearing for several years. He
has published articles and books mainly in international economics and finance.
JyrKi KaTaiNeN
Vice President European Commission, European Commissioner for Jobs, Growth, In-
vestment and Competitiveness
Finnish nationality. Married with two children. Prime Minister of Finland (2011-14);
Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Finland (2007-11); Vice-President of
the European People's Party (2006-12); President of the Finnish National Coalition
Party (2004-14); Vice-President of the Finnish National Coalition Party (2001-04);
First Vice-President of the Regional Council of Northern Savonia, Finland (2001-04);
Member of the Finnish Parliament (1999-14); Vice-President of the Youth of the Eu-
ropean People's Party (1998-2000); Master's degree in Social Sciences (1998).
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sTeVeN maiJoor
Chairman, European SecuritiesMarket Authority – ESMA
Steven Maijoor has been the Chair of the European Securities and Markets Autho-
rity (ESMA) since taking up office 1 April 2011. He is the first chair of the authori-
ty and is currently serving his second five-year term. He is responsible for representing
the Authority as well as chairing ESMA’s Board of Supervisors and the Management
Board.  The role of the Board of Supervisors is to give strategic guidance to ESMA and
make all main regulatory and supervisory decisions. The Management Board's pur-
pose is to ensure that the Authority carries out its mission and performs its tasks. Prior
to taking up this role, Steven was Managing Director at the AFM, the Dutch finan-
cial markets regulator, where he was responsible for capital market supervision, in-
cluding financial reporting and auditing, prospectuses, public offerings, and the su-
pervision of the integrity of financial markets. During his term, the scope of activi-
ties of the AFM vastly expanded and he was responsible for building and implementing
supervision in the capital market area. In his regulatory role at the AFM, Steven has
held a number of international positions, including the Chairmanship of IFIAR (In-
ternational Forum of Independent Audit Regulators). Before joining the regulatory
world, Steven was the Dean of the School of Business and Economics at Maastricht
University, and had pursued a long career in academia which included a variety of
positions at Maastricht University and the University of Southern California. He holds
a PhD in Business Economics from Maastricht University, was a research student at
the London School of Economics, and has a master in Business Economics from the
University of Groningen. Steven is married and has two daughters and a son.
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raiNer masera
Dean of the School of Business at the Università degli Studi Guglielmo Marconi in Rome
He served as technical Minister for the Budget and Economic Planning in the Dini
Government and was appointed one of the 5 “Wise Men” for the review of the “Lam-
falussy” process (IIMG) and Member of the High Level Group of European Commission
on Financial Supervision in the EU (Group de Larosière). He was Member of the Bo-
ard of the Bank for International Settlements and Member of G10 Deputies, Central
Director in Bank of Italy (Rome), Managing Director of IMI SpA, Chief Executive Of-
ficer and Chairman of the Group Sanpaolo IMI (Turin) and of RFI SpA, Chief of the
Italian Delegation of the Franco-Italian Government Committee for the new Turin-
Lyon railway link and Expert Member of the Board of the European Investment Bank.
He is currently Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Financial Management of
Fondazione Roma.
FraNcesco maZZaFerro
Head of the Secretariat European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Frankfurt a. M.
Francesco Mazzaferro has been the Head of the Secretariat of the European Syste-
mic Risk Board (ESRB) since January 2011. Following legal studies, he began his ca-
reer in the field of financial market analysis at the Istituto Bancario San Paolo di To-
rino (today part of Intesa Sanpaolo) in Turin in 1987. Mr Mazzaferro joined the Eu-
ropean Commission in Brussels in 1992, starting his international career in the Di-
rectorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, where his work focused on the
European Currency Unit (ECU) and preparations for the introduction of the single
currency. In 1995, he joined the European Monetary Institute – which later became
the European Central Bank – in Frankfurt as the Officer of Policy Planning. In 1998,
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Mr Mazzaferro became Senior European Relations Officer. From 2000, he worked
as Principal in the EU Neighbouring Regions Division, becoming the Head of Divi-
sion in 2003.
FlaVia miciloTTa
Executive Director, Eurosif
Flavia came on board Eurosif in December 2015. Ms Micilotta joined from the Brus-
sels based Foreign Trade Association (FTA), the umbrella organisation that promotes
social compliance (BSCI) and environmental performance management (BEPI), whe-
re she worked as Sustainability Consultant. Over the years, Ms Micilotta has accu-
mulated a wealth of experience on Corporate Social Responsibility and SRI, with a
particular focus on valuing intangibles through ESG performance, across sectors. She
worked on SRI for Vigeo group and KBC group and as sustainability consultant for
Deloitte and EY. She is one of the founding members of the UN Global Compact in
Belgium and a former board director of the Belgian Sustainable Investment Forum,
BELSIF.
carlos moNTalVo reBuelTa
Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers Spain
Carlos has joined PwC as EMEA Insurance Regulatory leader, anticipating regula-
tory trends and providing coordinated responses that benefit from his expertise in
the Global and European regulatory landscape. Carlos has recently joined PwC (May
2016) following a career of more than 15 years in the area of Regulation and Su-
pervision of Insurance undertakings and groups. Until end March 2016, and since
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2011, Carlos was the first Executive Director at EIOPA (European Insurance and Oc-
cupational Pensions Authority), in charge of its management, work program, or-
ganisation, people and finances. During his mandate, EIOPA moved from less than
20 staff to 150 and became a key stakeholder regarding, amongst others, the Sol-
vency II project. Prior to that, Carlos was appointed (2007-2010) as Secretary Ge-
neral of CEIOPS, the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Supervisors, responsible of its regulatory agenda and the day to day management
of the institution.In addition to his international roles, Carlos played a number of re-
levant roles at the Spanish Insurance Supervisor (2000-2007), including represen-
ting it at Council meetings during Solvency II negotiations, or at CEIOPS Board. His
role coordinating group supervision in Spain provided him with an in-depth view
of the Market and the business. Carlos is also a Member of the Board of Trustees at
the ILF (Institute of Law and Finance) in Frankfurt, where he also lectures risk ma-
nagement for Insurance undertakings. Additionally, he has been a frequent speaker
in different fora, invited professor by a number of universities and author of diffe-
rent articles on Insurance and Pensions related issues. 
roBerT opHÈle 
Second Deputy Governor, Banque De France
Robert Ophèle was born in 1956 and graduated from the ESSEC business school with
a specialist degree in finance. He joined the Banque de France in 1981 and spent three
years in banking supervision before joining the Monetary Studies and Statistics Di-
rectorate as an economist, specialising in the interaction between financial market
developments and monetary policy. Following a secondment to the Federal Reser-
ve Bank of New York between 1990 and 1991, he returned to the Banque de Fran-
ce as Head of the Budget Division, and subsequently took up the position of Direc-
tor of the Management Control and Budget Directorate. In this role, he represented
the Banque de France on various Eurosystem committees, including the AMICO, the
COMCO and the Budget Committee. In July 2006 he was appointed Deputy Direc-
tor General Economics and International Relations, with responsibility for monetary
policy issues and for the Bank’s collaboration with universities. In June 2009 he was
promoted to the position of Director General Operations, and took charge of mar-
ket operations, the oversight of French payment systems, financial stability and cu-
stomer banking services. While in this post, he actively participated in the work of
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various financial bodies (Chairman of the National SEPA Committee, Chairman of
the Paris Robustesse group and of the Market Infrastructure group). Robert Ophè-
le has been Second Deputy Governor of the Banque de France since 6 January 2012,
and has also been appointed by the Governor to represent him as Chairman of the
Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (French Prudential Supervision and
Resolution Authority – ACPR). He is a member of the college of the Autorité des mar-
chés financiers (French Financial Markets Authority – AMF) and of the Superviso-
ry Board of the Caisse des Dépôts, and in January 2014 became a member of the Su-
pervisory Board for the European Central Bank’s Single Supervisory Mechanism. Ro-
bert Ophèle is a Chevalier of the French Legion of Honour.
pier carlo padoaN
Italian Minister of Economy and Finance
Pier Carlo Padoan was appointed Minister of Economy and Finance in the Government
led by Matteo Renzi on 24 February 2014. Mr. Padoan was Professor of Economics
at the University La Sapienza of Rome, and Director of the Fondazione Italianieu-
ropei, a policy think-tank focusing on economic and social issues. On 1 June 2007
Mr. Pier Carlo Padoan was appointed Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD. As of
1 December, he was also appointed Chief Economist while retaining his role as de-
puty Secretary-General. In addition to heading the Economics Department, Mr Pa-
doan was the G20 Finance Deputy for the OECD and has also lead the Strategic Re-
sponse, the Green Growth and Innovation initiatives of the Organization. From 2001
to 2005, Mr. Padoan was the Italian Executive Director at the International Mone-
tary Fund, with responsibility for Greece, Portugal, San Marino, Albania and Timor
Leste. He served as a member of the Board and chaired a number of Board Committees.
During his mandate at the IMF he was also in charge of European Co-ordination. From
1998 to 2001, Mr Padoan served as Economic Adviser to the Italian Prime Ministers,
Massimo D’Alema e Giuliano Amato, in charge of international economic policies.
He was responsible for co-ordinating the Italian position in the Agenda 2000 ne-
gotiations for the EU budget, Lisbon Agenda, European Council, bilateral meetings,
and G8 Summits. He has been a consultant to the World Bank, European Commis-
sion, European Central Bank. Mr. Padoan has a degree in Economics from the Uni-
versity of Rome and has held various academic positions in Italian and foreign uni-
versities, including the College of Europe (Bruges and Warsaw), Université Libre de
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Bruxelles, University of Urbino, Universidad de la Plata and °University of Tokyo. He
has published widely in international academic journals and is the author and edi-
tor of several books.
giuseppe papaleo
President, IASEM
Giuseppe Papaleo is an Italian civil engineer and entrepreneur, specialized in civil
constructions, roads and paves. Since 2013 he has held the role of sole director of
Papaleo Srl and within the family company he has developed high and specific ex-
pertise, both in the implementation and management, in Quality and Factory Pro-
duction Control System, as well as in Safety in workplace matters. He has been Ge-
neral Director of C.R.O.Med. – Center for Research on East and Mediterranean. He
is founder and, since 2011, President of IASEM – Institute of High Euro Mediterra-
nean Studies; in this role he has focused especially in developing international re-
lations network and strengthening public relations with several Mediterranean Coun-
tries and European Institutions. His work moves from his personal belief that Me-
diterranean integration represents the most important challenge to reintroduce and
realize efficient international policies.
Valeria roNZiTTi 
General Secretary CEEP (European Centre of Employers and Enterprises Providing Pu-
blic Services and Services of General Interest)
Ms. Ronzitti is General Secretary of CEEP since May 2012. She reached this position
after having worked for the organisation for nine years. Jurist, she joined CEEP Ge-
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neral Secretariat as legal advisor in 2003, after having started her career practicing
labour and civil law in a law firm in Italy.  In her function as Head of Social Affairs from
2005 to 2009 she represented CEEP General Secretariat in several negotiations. Amongst
others: the European cross-sectoral negotiations on the orientations for reference on
managing change (2003), the lessons learned on European Work Councils (2005),
the autonomous agreement on work-related stress (2004), the autonomous agreement
on violence and harassment at work (2007), the joint labour market analysis (2007),
the revision of the parental leave agreement (2009). Alongside her functions in CEEP
she was also, from 2005 to 2010, Director of HOSPEEM, the European Hospital and
Healthcare Employers Association, that she contributed to set up as a sectoral mem-
ber of CEEP. In that function she negotiated the sectoral agreement on sharps in-
struments, which was transposed into a directive. In her function as Director from 2009
to 2012 she continued to represent CEEP General Secretariat in European cross-sec-
toral negotiations such as the autonomous agreement on inclusive labour markets
(2010) and the (failed) revision of the working time directive, while also supervising
CEEP policy implementation, communication to CEEP members and managing
CEEP staff. In her function as CEEP General Secretary she is responsible for managing
the organisation, including overall policy making and implementation, external re-
presentation, communication to members, management and coaching of CEEP
staff. The main achievements of her first mandate as General Secretary (2012-2015)
have been either directly related to CEEP such as the establishment and consolidation
of a new and lighter governance structure and a complete internal restructuring in com-
pliance with budgetary needs or more broadly positively affecting the public services
community, such as the positive definition of “in house” in public procurement and
concessions or the re-launch of the CEEP-CSR Label, which awards Services of General
Interest providers with outstanding Corporate Social Responsibility commitments de-
monstrating that public services providers do more than just fulfilling their services.
Her current mandate is focussed on positioning high performing public services as a
key component for EU competitiveness and a driver for jobs and growth EU wide.
gioVaNNi saBaTiNi 
General Manager ABI. Chairman of the Executive Committee of the EBF
Giovanni Sabatini, General Manager of the Italian banking association (ABI) since
2009, has been appointed as the new Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
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European Banking Federation for a two-year term from January 2016. He’s also Chair-
man of Consorzio Bancomat. Giovanni Sabatini graduated in Economics and Busi-
ness from the LUISS university in Rome and later returned there in the capacity of
lecturer. He has been Co-Manager of CONSOB (the Italian Stock Exchange Autho-
rity) as well as overseeing its Issuers Information Division since June 2008. From Sep-
tember 2004 to May 2006 he headed the Intermediaries Division and before that he
was in charge of the Markets Division (September 1986-May 2001). From June 2006
to June 2008 he was the Head of the Banking and Financial System – Legal Affairs
Department of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. At this time Giovanni
Sabatini was also the Ministry's representative on the High Council of the Bank of
Italy. From May 2001 to September 2004 he was CEO of Monte Titoli S.p.A (a com-
pany owned by the Italian Stock Exchange Group) and Chairman of ECSDA (the Eu-
ropean Central Securities Depositories Association. From July 2009 to 2014 he was
Chairman of the Consultation Committee of the Italian stock exchange Borsa Italiana.
Valeria saNNucci
Deputy Governor Bank of Italy
Valeria Sannucci has been a Member of the Governing Board and Deputy Governor
of the Bank of Italy since May 2013; as such, she is also member of the joint Gover-
ning Board of the Insurance Supervisory Authority (IVASS). Born in Rome, 19 April
1953, she joined the Bank of Italy in 1977, assigned to the Foreign Exchange Unit
of the Milan regional branch. In 1979 she moved to the Head Office in Rome, in the
Research Department, first with the international and then with the monetary sec-
tor, where she headed the Financial Accounts Office. From 1986 to 1992 she was part
of the Historical Research Office, contributing to the works published in 1993 for
the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Bank of Italy. In 1996 she joined the
Personnel Management Department and then, from 2006 to 2012, she was Head of
that Department. During this period she worked on the organizational reform of the
Bank and was a member of the Human Resources Conference (which groups the he-
ads of personnel of the ESCB central banks) as well as a number of collegial bodies
for human resources management within the Bank. In December 2012 she was na-
med Managing Director responsible for coordinating the activities related to the Ban-
k's participation in the Eurosystem, including the Banking Union project. Ms San-
nucci graduated from the University of Rome “La Sapienza” in 1976 with a degree
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in business and economics. She was awarded the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro’s Ar-
turo Osio fellowship and took an M.A. in Economics from Columbia University in New
York.
mauriZio sella
Chairman of Banca Sella Holding, holding company of Gruppo Banca Sella, as well as
of Banca Sella, of Banca Patrimoni Sella & C. and of Maurizio Sella S.A.A., the family
holding
His other present appointments include: Chairman of ASSONIME, Board member
of the Italian Association of Banks (ABI) and member of its Executive Committee,
Board member of the Fédération Bancaire de l’Union Européenne (FBE) and “al-
ternate” of the Chairman Frédéric Oudéa in the Euro Retail Payments Board
(ERPB), Board member of Buzzi Unicem and Chairman of its Control and Risk Com-
mittee, member of the Council for the U.S. and Italy and of its Board, member of the
Italian Group of the Trilateral Commission, Chairman of Istituto Luigi Einaudi (Istein).
In 1991 he was conferred the honour of Cavaliere del Lavoro by the President of the
Republic of Italy. He is member of the National board of the Partito Democratico (Ita-
ly), since 2008.
BerNard spiTZ
President International & Europe, MEDEF; President, French Federation of Insurance
– FFA
Bernard Spitz is the President of the French Insurance Federation (FFA) which ga-
thers the French Federation of Insurance Companies (FFSA) and the Association of
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Mutual Insurance Companies (GEMA) since 8 July 2016. Mr Spitz was the chairman
of FFSA since 2008. A Board member of MEDEF, the French employer’s organiza-
tion, Bernard Spitz has chaired International and Europe since July 2013. From the
2011 French Presidency of the G20, Bernard Spitz has represented MEDEF and wor-
ked on the B20 Task Forces related to employment and the financing of growth. Ber-
nard Spitz is a graduate of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and the École su-
périeure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (ESSEC), as well as of École
nationale d’administration (ENA) from 1984 to 1986. He was an adviser to Prime
Minister Michel Rocard from 1988 to 1991 ; a Maître des Requêtes at the Council
of State ; and an executive Director at the head of Canal+ from 1992 to 1996. From
2000 to 2004, he was Chief Strategy Officer of Vivendi Universal. Bernard Spitz has
served as a rapporteur to the French Competition Council, a member of the French
Economic and Social Council and of the Security Council. He has overseen a num-
ber of public reports and efforts, among which President of the Diversity In Media
Committee (2010); Coordinator of the Estates General of the Print Media, com-
missioned by President Nicolas Sarkozy (2009); and in charge of the 50th anniver-
sary celebrations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights for Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin (1998). Bernard Spitz sits on the Policy Board of the Aspen Institute
(France), and is a member of several leading European think tanks, including Astrid
(Italy), The Lisbon Council (Belgium) and En temps Réel (France). Bernard wrote
several books on how to reform the State, including Notre Etat (In Our State), with
Roger Fauroux, published by Robert Laffont in 2001; C’est possible ! Voici comment...
(It’s possible : Here’s How), with Michel Pébereau, published by Robert Laffont in
2007 ; Le Papy Krach (The Grandfather Krach), published by Grasset in 2006 and
On achève bien les jeunes (Our children betrayed) published by Grasset  in 2015.  
KosTas g. sTamoulis
Assistant Director-General a.i. of the Economic and Social Development Department at
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation
Kostas G. Stamoulis is currently the Assistant Director-General a.i. of the Economic
and Social Development Department at the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations. He served as Director, Strategic Programme Leader, Food Security
and Nutrition in FAO. He led through 2015 the design and provided strategic gui-
dance of FAO’s Strategic Programme on Food Security and Nutrition which cuts across
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several disciplines and geographical regions. Between 2008 and 2015 he was the Di-
rector of the Agricultural Development Economics Division of FAO. ESA carries out
the bulk of analytical and evidence-based policy work of FAO with about 150 staff
members. From 2007 to 2015 he has been the Secretary of the Committee on World
Food Security (CFS) and played a key role in the reform of the committee. Since joi-
ning FAO he has held progressively responsible technical and management positions.
Before joining FAO in 1989, he was Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics
at the University of Illinois in Urbana Champaign. From 1985 to 1987 he was a post-
doctoral fellow at the University of California at Berkeley. His work includes issues
related to the role of agriculture in rural development and rural poverty reduction
in developing countries; the impact of changes in food systems on smallholder far-
mers and on rural poverty; the linkages between the agricultural sector and the ru-
ral non-farm economy and the integration of food security and nutrition in secto-
rial policies and programs. He has also carried out work on the assessment of the
role of macroeconomic and exchange-rate policies on agriculture and the rural sec-
tor and the interdependence between exchange rate, financial and commodity mar-
kets. He has published a large number of papers, articles, books and monographs
on a variety of subjects. He holds a degree in Economics from the Economics Uni-
versity of Athens (Greece), a Master’s Degree in Agricultural Economics from the Uni-
versity of Georgia (USA) and a Ph.D. in Agricultural and Resource Economics from
the University of California at Berkeley.
domiNgo sugraNyes BicKel 
Chairman of CENTESIMUS ANNUS – PRO PONTIFICE Foundation
Born 29 April 1945 in Fribourg (Switzerland). Spanish nationality. Resident in Ma-
drid. Married to Cecilia Foletti Moschini – 3 daughters and 11 grandchildren. Gra-
duated from the University in Fribourg, Switzerland (Licence en Sciences Économiques
et Politiques). Training periods in Barcelona, Geneva, Madrid, London, Rome. Ac-
tive from 1969 at UNIAPAC (International Christian Union of Business Executives),
Brussels. Secretary-General from 1974 to 1981. From 1981 with MAPFRE insurance
group in Madrid, Spain; at the beginning of the group’s international development.
Responsibilities in Reinsurance, Credit and Guarantee Insurance, Corporate Finance
and Investors Relations. Managing Director in charge of CORPORACIÓN MAPFRE,
the public listed holding controlled by MAPFRE MUTUALIDAD. Since 2000, Mem-
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ber of the Group Executive in charge of Finance. After completion of the demutua-
lization process, Executive Vice-Chairman of MAPFRE Group until retirement from
executive office in 2008. Member of the Board of  FUNDACIÓN MAPFRE and of se-
veral  group subsidiaries until April 2015 (statutory age limit).  Member of the Bo-
ard of SOCIETÀ CATTOLICA DI ASSICURAZIONE, Verona, Italy. Past-President of
UNIAPAC, International Christian Union of Business Executives (1997-2000). Sin-
ce 2009, Chairman of FONDAZIONE CENTESIMUS ANNUS – PRO PONTIFICE, The
Vatican.
gaBriele Todesca
Head of NPI Platform, European Investment Fund – EIF
Mr. Todesca joined EIF in 2006. He served as Associate at Francisco Partners and So-
ros Fund Management. He has worked as Analyst at Citigroup. Mr. Todesca hold a
degree in Law from the University of Trento and a Master of Laws in Banking and
Finance Law from the London School of Economics.
arcHBisHop silVaNo m. Tomasi, c.s., pH. d.
Apostolic Nuncio, Delegate Secretary of the Dicastery for promoting human integral de-
velopment, Holy See
Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi’s formative education was both in Italy, where he was
born in the Veneto region in 1940, and in New York, where he studied theology and
was ordained a priest in 1965. He holds a masters’ degree in social sciences and a
doctorate in sociology from Fordham University in New York. He was assistant pro-
fessor of sociology at the City University of New York (Richmond College, City Col-
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lege) and at the New School of Social Research (1970-74). As founding Director of
the Center for Migration Studies, Inc., of New York, he established and edited the
quarterly journal International Migration Review. He carried out pastoral work in
the New York area and served as Provincial Superior of his religious Congregation,
the Missionaries of St. Charles – Scalabrinians. He has published books and articles
related mostly to migration issues. From 1983 to 1987 he served as first Director of
the office of Pastoral Care of Migrants and Refugees (PCMR) of the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB/USCC). From the end of 1989 to his ap-
pointment as Archbishop and Apostolic Nuncio on June 27, 1996, he served as Se-
cretary of the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant Peo-
ple, a department in the Roman Curia. From 1996 to 2003 Archbishop Tomasi ser-
ved as Apostolic Nuncio to Ethiopia, to Eritrea and to Djibouti and as Observer to the
African Union, formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU), whose headquarters
are in Addis Ababa. During his tenure, among various initiatives undertaken, began
the Catholic University of Ethiopia. In September 2003 Archbishop Tomasi began
his service as Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations and Spe-
cialized Organizations in Geneva and to the World Trade Organization, a responsi-
bility he carried out until the beginning of 2016. The Cambridge University Press is
publishing s selection of Arhcbishop Tomasi’s interventions. 
JoNaTHaN WaTsoN, pHd
Managing Director, INTEGRATE; Executive Director and Founder of Health ClusterNET
(UK)
Stichting INTEGRATE is a think tank focused on practical thinking for long-term in-
vesting in innovative social infrastructure across EU regions (2012+). It is a mem-
ber of the Secretariat (with CDP, COM, EIB, ELTI and CEEP) for the High-Level Task
Force in Financing Social Infrastructure while Maximising Public Value. It will also
act as rapporteur and knowledge lead for the two Working Groups of this exercise
that will report in December 2017. INTEGRATE has also been a co-promotor and con-
tributor for the annual Rome Investment Forum: Financing Long-term Europe ho-
sted by FEBAF since its launch in 2014 and Health ClusterNET is a non-profit R&D
performing SME with a focus on optimizing value chains for health and innovation.
As part of this, HCN has been and is a partner in relevant EU funded projects. HCN
led the EUREGIO III project that assessed the use of Structural Funds for health care
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investment. The evidence from this informed the EU Council Conclusions Towards
Modern, Responsive and Sustainable Health Systems (6 June 2011).  Additionally,
Jonathan is commissioned to co-write major transnational research and innovation
action proposals that focus on improving the diagnostics and treatment cancer care;
he has been an external expert for DG REGIO and is an external evaluator for H2020
and the EU Health Programme 2014-2020. He was an Honorary Professor (2010-
2013) and Special Professor of Health and Public Policy (2001-2010) at the Scho-
ol of Community Health Sciences, University of Nottingham and a Visiting Chair in
Healthy Public Policy at the University of York (1999-2001). He did the formative
work for an Erasmus Mundus funded European Master’s degree in Sustainable Re-
gional Health Systems (launched 2008) and has published several books and arti-
cles.

aNNexes

THe europeaN commissioN’s mid-Term reVieW oF THe
capiTal marKeTs uNioN
FeBAF Contribution to the public consultation
In response to the European Commission’s call for feedback and suggestions on the
progress made in the Capital Markets Union (CMU), and in preparation of the Mid-
term Review of the corresponding Action Plan, the Italian Banking Insurance and
Finance Federation is glad to provide its input, bringing together the views of the dif-
ferent organizations affiliated to Febaf that represent the main business associations
of the Italian financial sector. 
In the CMU Action Plan (September 2015), it was clearly stated that a Mid-term
Review would have to be undertaken to assess the progress made and the achieve-
ments obtained so far, and at the same time single-out remaining gaps and new chal-
lenges. We think that this Mid-term Review takes place at a critical and delicate time
for the EU, and therefore welcome the opportunity of having an in-depth discussion
on CMU, and being able to participate in it. 
The topsy-turvy world of CMU: an in-depth rethinking and a substantial reo-
rientation is required. 
The CMU is one of the most ambitious and signiﬁcant projects of the EU. It is a
fundamental component of the European reform plan to re-launch investment, growth
and jobs in the European economy, and marks a leap forward in achieving the Sin-
gle Market and promoting social and economic integration. 
We concur with the Commission’s view that “the CMU pipeline is delivering” and
express satisfaction for the initiatives of the Action Plan that have already been com-
pleted or are in the process of completion. We appreciate that European institutions
show great attention to alternative investment tools, as demonstrated by the EuVECA
Regulation and the AIFM Directive. However, we believe that it must be recognized
that the context within which the project was designed and initiated has profoun-
dly changed, and that those changes aﬀect not only the implementation of the Plan,
but above all the concept itself and the strategic orientation of the CMU. This has hap-
pened to such an extent that much more than a simple mid-term review is now re-
quired. Rather, an in-depth rethinking of the aims, objectives, time-table and prio-
rities of the CMU should be undertaken. 
When we talk of unprecedented changes in the context, we obviously refer to Bre-
xit in the ﬁrst place, which is taking out of the EU framework the most important ﬁ-
nancial center of the EU to date, i.e. the City of London. Other important novelties
have upset and turned upside down the whole picture of capital markets in Europe,
and their prospects for the future. These unanticipated and unsettling developments
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must be accounted for, and taken into consideration. Moreover, the CMU was me-
ant from the start to be a European process moulded and inscribed in a global fra-
mework, as it was directed at promoting wider ﬁnancial integration in the global eco-
nomy, open economies and societies. The new Trump administration in the U.S. ap-
pears to be challenging the long-term tenets of global ﬁnance, alongside with tra-
de liberalization and transatlantic relations. This is also a factor that should lead to
a fundamental resetting of CMU. 
Recently, and signiﬁcantly, the President of the ECB Mario Draghi reaﬃrmed the
concept that deep ﬁnancial integration (as implied by the CMU) and the single cur-
rency are to be two sides of the same coin. He argued that integrated ﬁnancial mar-
kets in Europe would be necessary for an eﬀective single currency. The CMU project
therefore not only aﬀects the wide community of the 27 countries of the EU, but im-
pacts more deeply into the Euro-zone. It represents a necessary ingredient for the
stability and performance of the Euro-area, as a single currency area. It is a requi-
red complement of the Banking Union and an integral part of the inescapable stren-
gthening of EMU. As a matter of fact, the operationalization of Target2-Securities
(T2S) by the ECB (2015) should be seen as laying one of the basic foundations for
CMU, by providing the necessary market infrastructure. Therefore, the implications
of CMU for, and its impact on, the Euro-area give CMU an added component of sy-
nergy, consistency and urgency. 
For the reasons above, we cannot help giving the Mid-term Review a much broa-
der signiﬁcance, and place it in the context of the revisitation and adaptation of the
whole approach, and of the concept itself. CMU needs a new beginning and an ove-
rall redesign, moving from CMU mark 1 to CMU 2.0, and correspondingly re-adjust
deliverables, priorities and methods of work. 
This reconsideration should follow ﬁve basic directions, summarised below, which
will be spelled out in more speciﬁc terms and comments in our response to this con-
sultation: 
1. Put institutional reforms at the fore-front. The ﬁrst point to consider is the insti-
tutional framework, and the need for institutional adjustment at the European
and national level. Following the “British inspiration” of the initial approach, CMU
was thought to proceed very softly and with great prudence on introducing chan-
ges in the institutional architecture and the legislative frameworks. This reﬂec-
ted not only pragmatism, but above all the fact that the City of London, which
was evidently going to play the leading role in the CMU, had already developed
institutional arrangements capable of providing some of the necessary infra-
structure. The basic frameworks therefore of legislation and oversight required
by the markets, particularly wholesale markets, were to some extent already ope-
rational, and had only to be marginally adjusted and adapted to accommodate
the extension of capital markets to the whole of the EU, in areas where they were
absent or not well developed. As a matter of fact, we – among others – had al-
ready expressed some doubts and hesitation on accepting the dominant view at
the launch of CMU that the issue of simpliﬁcation and consolidation of the com-
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plex and baroque architecture of 27-28 diﬀerent legislations and institutional fra-
meworks were to be put on the back-burner. The assumption then was that the
market itself should be able to adopt the best practice in terms of institutional
performance, and operate accordingly. However – we objected – if the market
could accomplish the CMU by itself, it would have already done so. In other terms
the market is imperfect, and only institutional reforms can correct for market im-
perfections and thus eliminate institutional obstacles and barriers, particular-
ly cross-border. A similar line of reasoning was put forward in the Five Presidents’
Report. After Brexit, the issue of institutional adequacy takes on a sense of much
greater momentum and signiﬁcance. The risk is in fact, with the UK out of the
EU capital markets institutional infrastructure, that fragmentation, duplication
and overlap severely hinder the operation of capital markets, creating greater ob-
stacles (and higher costs) to capital market development, particularly where it
is most lacking and needed, and notably for cross border operations. Think for
instance of the convoluted system of oversight for capital markets in Europe that
would result from Brexit. The issues therefore of regulatory harmonization and
supervisory convergence for European capital markets become a priority, par-
ticularly for the Euro-area. More in general the CMU ﬁnancial institutional ar-
chitecture becomes highly relevant to insure a consistent regulation and over-
sight of critical ﬁnancial infrastructures after Brexit, and reconcile regulation with
ﬁnancial innovation and sustainable growth. 
2. Multiple speeds capital markets integration: Euro and non-Euro. The reform of the
institutional arrangements for an eﬀective CMU would also beneﬁt from a more
ﬂexible (variable geometry) pattern, such as the two or multiple speeds approach
suggested by Chancellor Merkel and other European leaders. However, this should
not be a way of crystallizing double standards or fragmenting the single market
space. The CMU should remain a project open to all the 27 countries of the EU,
as it was originally conceived. But its design and implementation would have to
reﬂect both the Euro and the non-Euro possibly diﬀerent requirements, the wil-
lingness of diﬀerent countries to cede prerogatives to the European levels, and
the diﬀerent speeds of individual countries in getting ready for accessing higher
and higher levels of institutional integration. 
3. A level playing ﬁeld of uniform norms and regulation across the single capital mar-
ket space. The other area where a change of pace and priorities is required is that
of regulatory convergence. The notion of a “single rule-book” was inscribed from
the beginning in the role and mandates of the EU ﬁnancial regulatory authori-
ties. However, insuﬃcient progress has been made on creating a really level pla-
ying ﬁeld of norms and rules, considering the number of players involved (the se-
veral national regulators), the wide-spread practice of gold-plating and the com-
prehensible reluctance of individual agencies to give up their speciﬁc national or
sectoral prerogatives. In the end, therefore, the “single rule book” principle has
become nothing more than a myth, or a polar star to enlighten the complex and
tortuous road of intergovernmental and inter-agency coordination. In this con-
text, the appearance on stage of the Banking Union has marked a deﬁnite U-turn.
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Consolidating the diﬀerent supervisors into a single mechanism, and standardi-
zing the various national and local practices has given a strong push toward the
simpliﬁcation and the harmonization of the regulatory space. The Italian ﬁnan-
cial community has greatly appreciated the simpliﬁcation and harmonization im-
plied by the SSM, but it has also lamented that the normative framework for Ban-
king Union has not yet been adjusted correspondingly. Hence the demand that
“Testi Unici” at the European level – the Italian formulation of the “single rule book”
philosophy – be enacted in all areas relevant for banking operations. The Euro-
pean Commission in its 14 September Communication has rightly called for an
acceleration of reforms, and has recognized the “need to speed up the legislati-
ve process”. We appreciate that in the above-mentioned Communication the Com-
mission has reaﬃrmed its commitment to the CMU. We appreciated also that as
a consequence, and considering the new scenario, the Commission has reviewed
its priorities and shown a new thrust towards bolder legislative and harmoniza-
tion initiatives. Concrete examples of such a more ambitious and more eﬀective
approach can be found in the September Communication: for instance, the new
initiatives undertaken for the harmonization of the ﬁscal and insolvency frame-
works. This new approach – in our view- should be highly commended and sup-
ported. It is well known that divergent legislative frameworks, particularly in in-
solvency regimes and around tax barriers, represent major obstacles to (cross-bor-
der) capital market development. In the ﬁeld of the ﬁscal treatment, the advan-
tages oﬀered to debt vis-à-vis equity are a major obstacle to equity investment,
risk-sharing, and more broadly ﬁnancial stability itself. Europe continues to be cha-
racterized by excessive levels of debt. Moreover, the negative interest rate envi-
ronment has exacerbated this problem. As, in principle, ﬁscal aﬀairs are issues of
national responsibility, eﬀorts of ﬁscal harmonization have proceeded very slo-
wly in the past, often without tangible results. Therefore, the Commission’s pro-
posals for an integrated European approach to corporate taxation mark a signi-
ﬁcant break-through and an instance of bold and eﬀective reform. The same should
be said of insolvency regimes: achieving a consistent and harmonized framework
at the European level in this ﬁeld would give a formidable boost to cross border
deals and improve the eﬀectiveness and timeliness of jurisdiction by national courts. 
4. Safeguarding the diversity of the ﬁnancial eco-system: the principle of proportionality.
This fundamental approach that can be dated back to the Prussian times had been
until recently neglected and ostracized in Europe, creating obstacles to the ope-
ration of small ﬁnancial institutions, which in many countries play an important
role in local communities, and a competitive disadvantage with those countries,
like the U.S. where proportionality is highly respected, including in legislation
and regulation. Recently, the issue of proportionality has gained wider support
in Europe, as indicated also by the European Commission. It must be recogni-
zed that proportionality ﬁnds greater recognition and support in some countries,
like Germany or Italy, but also in the European periphery. Moreover, an appli-
cation of this principle would beneﬁt start-ups and ﬁntech, and promote there-
fore ﬁnancial innovation. 
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5. Putting ordinary citizens ﬁrst: the focus on retail markets. A ﬁfth direction to con-
sider in the overhaul of the CMU approach is the role of consumers, both savers
and investors, in ﬁnancial markets. We are glad to notice that in the Action Plan
one of the six policy area on which CMU should focus is devoted to “fostering re-
tail investment and innovation”. Moreover, this area appears to move up in the
priority scale of the plan. This is the right approach: the ultimate beneﬁciary of
CMU in fact is the European citizen. But this truth is not generally perceived and
appreciated by the public opinion and the man of the street. A way to contribu-
te to bridging this gap is by placing much greater emphasis on retail markets. Ma-
king capital markets more inclusive, and giving ordinary citizens access to it, should
be a top priority of the whole CMU project. We also support the emphasis pla-
ced on ﬁnancial “culture” and education. In this context, speciﬁc initiatives of
dissemination and information should be undertaken to enable the widest pos-
sible picking up of the opportunities oﬀered by CMU. For instance, a “roadshow”
on the opportunities oﬀered by CMU particularly for retail markets – consumers
and SMEs – could be organized in Italy, and elsewhere, and organisations such
as Febaf could oﬀer support to such initiatives. Attention to the interests of “re-
tailers/consumers” is to some extent intertwined with the issue of proportionality,
but it can also have a broader application. This focus appears especially relevant
in the case of personal pensions and Fintech products, but it could also apply to
the mortgage market or advisory services. It must be recognized in this respect
that an eﬀective CMU would bring to the fore the issue of competition or com-
petitive complementary, between markets and intermediaries, an obvious
example being that of shadow banking and of securitisation schemes. The ba-
lancing of retail vs wholesale and, more generally, the costs and beneﬁts of re-
gulation, and its sometimes-excessive burden, requires pragmatic, concrete and
equitable measures. 
The comments and suggestions provided below in response to the questions of the
consultation span a wide range of policy areas and issues: from regulation (or legi-
slation) to information and reporting; from accounting standards to financial in-
novation; from financial education to capital requirements, from infrastructure to
start-ups and green finance; from consumer protection to financial inclusion. 
We provide here a listing of a few topics raised in the paper, to give an idea of the
breadth and scope of our approach: 
- Prudential rules aﬀecting the capacity of banks and insurers to invest in the real
economy, particularly SME and innovative enterprises.
- Conditions for encouraging the development of Private Placement. 
- Simpliﬁcation of international accounting standards for SMEs.
- Reduction of administrative and bureaucratic burdens for innovative start-ups. 
- Encourage crowdfunding through ad-hoc European platforms and tax incentives.
- Improve and extend the more favorable capital treatment for infrastructure in-
vestment.
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- Provide Government guarantees to support EFSI investment, particularly by in-
surers.
- Explore ﬁnancial instruments to ﬁnance supply chains or clusters of SMEs.
- Eliminate information overload and duplication stemming from the cumulati-
ve application of the Solvency II Directive, the PRIIPs Regulation and the Insu-
rance Distribution Directive (IDD), etc. 
- Consider the long-term features of EU personal pension products (PEPP).
- Promote identiﬁcation at distance through harmonisation of rules, interopera-
bility of systems and common databases.
- Promote portability of data and eﬀective exchange of information across Mem-
ber States while respecting privacy requirements.
- Diversify transparency rules to focus protection on those investors that most need
it.
- Invest in ﬁnancial education and promote an equity culture among investors. 
- Ensure a level playing ﬁeld in supervisory requirements between traditional ﬁ-
nancial services and FinTech providers. 
- Extended to retail investors suitable products, such as the senior tranche of sim-
ple and transparent securitization. 
- Promote securitization (particularly by insurers and pension funds) through stan-
dardisation, more appropriate calibrations of rules and better information. 
- Promote the establishment of a single market for covered bonds across the EU
through the harmonization of quality and information standards. 
- Review the treatment of intragroup exposures, recognizing a single European
jurisdiction and facilitating cross-border capital and liquidity ﬂows. 
- Remove barriers that currently hinder competition, such as tax distortions, diﬀerent
sanctions envisaged by ﬁscal and accounting prescriptions, and diﬀerent su-
pervisory practices, etc. 
THe iNTerim reporT oF THe HigH-leVel experT group oN
susTaiNaBle FiNaNce
FeBAF Contribution to the public consultation
The Italian Banking Insurance and Finance Federation is pleased to provide its con-
tribution to the High Level Expert Group consultation on Sustainable Finance. This
contribution has been prepared in co-operation with our members, which are the
main financial associations operating in Italy representing banks, insurance companies
and funds. The present consultation is strictly intertwined with the EU Action plan
on the Capital Markets Union (CMU), that includes sustainable finance as one of its
main pillars and is one of our Federation' s main fields of activity at European, in-
ternational and domestic level. The commitment to sustainability plays a fundamental
role in the mission of the Italian Banking Insurance and Finance Federation (FeBAF).
Please note that: 
• The Federation signed in 2012 a joint declaration with its members. The Char-
ter of Sustainable and Responsible Investment of Italian Finance (see attached)
promotes the dissemination of three main principles: 1. Sustainable and Re-
sponsible Investments; 2. Disclosure; 3. Medium-long term view. 
• FeBAF is a supporter of United Nations Environment Programme – Finance Ini-
tiative (UNEP FI) and it’s a supporter member of the Principles Responsible In-
vestment (PRI) and of Principles of Sustainable Finance (PSI) of the United Na-
tions. 
• FeBAF is supporter member of ARISE, the UNISDR (the UN secretariat respon-
sible for the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction)
Private Sector Alliance for Disaster Resilient Societies. As such, we are committed
to raise awareness with respect to Disaster Risks, aiming at the implementation
of projects and activities to achieve the targets of the Sendai Framework. 
• In 2015 FeBAF joined the Paris Pledge, the declaration of commitment of the ci-
vil society against the climate change, with regards to the 2015 United Nations
Climate Change Conference, COP21. 
• FeBAF is one of the 160 members of the Italian Alliance for sustainable deve-
lopment (ASVIS). Under its aegis of this alliance FeBAF and other business or-
ganizations signed a joint Declaration of commitment on sustainable develop-
ment. 
• FeBAF strongly supports the Italian National Dialogue for the Sustainable Finance
which involves Italian Ministries and National Authorities under the leadership
of the Italian Ministry of Environment and the involvement of UNEP. We co-chair
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a group of experts in order to develop Milan as a hub of the sustainable ﬁnan-
ce. 
• FeBAF organizes periodical seminars dedicated to these subjects, often in coo-
peration with other associations and institutions, as i.e. the European Movement-
Italy, Integrate, and the Italian Forum for Sustainable Finance (FFS). 
• Since 2014, the Federation has organized The Rome Investment Forum, an an-
nual international Conference where we host a session dedicated to sustainability,
resilience, ethics in ﬁnance and impact investing. 
Given the above, we feel committed to support all initiatives – including the present
Interim Report – aimed at sharing and disseminating a common culture of sustai-
nability, and provide hereby our response to the questionnaire.
